Kahneman, Dyson; Freud and James; plus Pinker (expanded)

Daniel Kahneman is an intellectual grey-eminence of the past several decades.  If you read at all, you have met some of his ideas (usually written in conjunction with his trusty sidekick Tversky) , though generally at second-hand.  Now he has written his own lengthy and systematic account of his research, aimed at a lay audience.

Most reviews of Daniel Kahneman’s new book (Thinking:  Fast and Slow) simply choose a few from his wealth of anecdotes  and recount them.  Not a bad plan -- they are all worth hearing.  By contrast, Freeman Dyson, in a typically canny offering in the current New York Review of Books, goes beyond the usual review, offering some trenchant personal experiences that illustrate the cognitive case being made, and -- quite surprisingly in the current climate -- puts in a word for Freud:  not the Freud of Die Traumdeutung or the cigars, but of the seminal Psychopathologie des Alltaglebens.   He concludes: “The insights of Kahneman and Freud  are complementary rather than contradictory.”

Noting that neither Sigmund Freud nor William James comes in for mention in Kahneman’s long book, Dyson also outlines the present relevance of this giant of psychology (and one of the heroes of this blog).

Make no mistake -- Kahneman, like Steven Pinker, is one of psychology’s good-guys, plumbing the richness of human experience  though coming to mostly dry and deflating conclusions.   Unlike the eliminative materialists (which includes many of the tribe of neuroscientists), they do not take mere mechanism as a posit, rather than as an occasional result.  James and Dyson, unlike most of their scientific colleagues then and now, have thought deeply about religion and take it quite seriously;  our family had the benefit of Dyson’s teaching at the Presbyterian Church in Princeton.   His invariably broad and thoughtful perspective is ever welcome.

Footnote:  I subsequently borrowed an audiobook of Thinking:  Fast and Slow from the library, to listen through in stages along my commute.   Alas, it turns out not to be suitable for that medium, save perhaps for a beginner.   Far too much of it is platitudinous  -- boring to sit through, while the reader-aloud drones on.    With a printed work, your eyes rapidly scans past the overly familiar, and plucks the occasional novel niblet.

Part of the problem is adumbrated in this passage from America’s premier psychologist of the nineteenth century:

Philosophers long ago observed the remarkable fact that mere familiarity with things is able to produced a feeling of their rationality.

-- William James,  “The Sentiment of Rationality”, in The Will to Believe (1897).

Kahneman rediscovers that remarkable fact, with much spilling of ink, waving of hands, and conducting of unsurprising experiments. 

More interesting is what James writes immediately after that, showing that today’s postmodernist-style relativists  have also not brought forth something new under the sun:

The empiricist school has been so much struck by this circumstance  as to have laid it down that the feeling of rationality and the feeling of familiarity  are one and the same thing, and that no other kind of rationality than this exists.

(I have satirized that dreadful mindset  here.)

~

In an earlier essay, we examined the politics and natural selection of sex as reflected in the writings of Steven Pinker.   There is a Kahnemanian cognitive dimension here as well, of which we now give an example.

Pinker wades patiently through the swamps of Political Correctness;  we salute his perseverence.   It really is remarkable, the sort of emotionally-founded cognitive distortions he must contend with.

Thus, consider this thought-experiment:  Imagine that some researchers published a study suggesting that the higher crime rate for American Blacks is a consequence of innate criminality.  They would of course be denounced by Blacks and their champions;  but would scarcely be denounced as blaming White crime victims.  So much is obvious.

Yet now put in different substitutions for x and y, and though the logical structure has not changed, the political picture has changed entirely.   The Blank Slate, p. 161:

Even heavier bipartisan fire has recently been aimed at Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer  for suggesting in their book A Natural History of Rape  that rape is a consequence of men’s sexuality.  A spokesperson from the Feminist Majority Foundation called the book “scary” and “regressive” because it “almost validates the crime and blames the victim.”

By contrast,  men as such  did not object.  We’re used to it.

The average zealot would be quite incapable of perceiving the logical parallelism between the two accounts.
Similarly Pinker, op. cit., p. 372, re the "Laws of Behavior Genetics":  "It is because the laws run roughshod over the Blank Slate, and the Blank Slate is so entrenched,  that many intellectuals cannot comprehend an alternative to it, let alone argue about whether it is right or wrong."  A depressing, accurate, and important observation.

~

Here and elsewhere, Pinker counters the Noble-Savage ideology that whatever is found in nature must be good.  P. 164

It is inherent to our value system that the interests of women should not be subordinated to those of men, and that control over one’s body is a fundamental right  that trumps other people’s desires.  So rape is not tolerated, regardless of any possible connection to the nature of men’s sexuality.

So far, the standard viewpoint, sensibly put.  But then Pinker, whose logical scalpel is sharp, cuts down another level to make a quite interesting philosophical point:

Note how this calculus requires a “deterministic” and “essentialist” claim about human nature:  that women abhor being raped.  Without that claim  we would have no way to choose between trying to deter rape  and trying to socialize women to accept it, which would be perfectly compatible with the supposedly progressive doctrine that we are malleable raw material.

*     *     *

~ Commercial break ~

Nook lovers are book lovers!

http://murphybros.blogspot.com/p/read-murphy-on-your-nook.html

We now return you to your regularly scheduled essay.

*     *     *

For college psychology instructors:

Here is an experiment you can do with your class, if you don’t mind being denied tenure.

Divide your students randomly into two groups, and send them to separate rooms.  To the first group, present the sentence:

Men are hot;  women are cold.

(This is along the lines of such parlor-game titles as “Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus”.)

To the other group, present this sentence:

Women are hot;  men are cold.

Assignment:  Discuss.

Prediction:  Both groups will denounce their respective sentence as sexist and anti-woman.

[Postscript]  Chesterton anticipated this sally:

Re G.B. Shaw:

He has pleased all the bohemians  by suggesting that women are equal to men;  but he has infuriated them by suggesting that men are equal to women.

-- G.K. Chesterton, Heretics (1905)

~

Kahneman, as Dyson points out, avoids discussing religion; this is probably just as well.  Pinker -- whose range of interests is extraordinarily broad -- to his credit  does not avoid it;  indeed he quotes (pp. 186-7) from the magnificent 1996 address by Pope John Paul II on the subject of Natural Selection and the “ontological  discontinuity” (we have treated of this subject here);    but analytically, in this arena, he is not at his best.  On page 189  he dishes up an absurd false-dichotomy:

Who says the doctrine of the soul is more humane than the understanding of the mind as a physical organ?

Already so much has gone wrong.  We do not adhere to the doctrine of the soul (or of free will) because it is “humane”, but because it is true, and we experience it as such.   Nor does such a doctrine impede or even impinge upon the understanding of the brain as a physical organ.  As for the mind as a physical organ, um, did you really mean to write that?  Are we back with Descartes and his lodgement of the soul in the pituitary or the pineal gland or wherever the hell he placed it?

It gets worse.  The consequences of the “doctrine” of the soul (though, in our view, this is rather like speaking of the “doctrine” of the existence of the physical world)  is “letting people die of hepatitis  or be ravaged by Parkinson’s disease  when a cure may lie in research on stem cells…”  Indeed a cure might be thus expedited, or it might not;  the soul is nothing to the issue.   The moral quandary is rather to what extent society is willing to go, to benefit group A at the expense of group B.   Effective but morally debateable maneuvers include:  harvesting stem cells from embroyos;  harvesting embryos; harvesting aborted fetuses; harvesting fetuses not yet aborted but which, for a fittybone, the unwed mother would be happy to sell you.  Plus harvesting organs from dead adults; from living but brain-dead adults; from criminals; from political prisoners; from the luckless, kidnapped for this very purpose.  Perhaps less effective from a flinty Western medical perspective, but quite real and effective to its practitioners, is harvesting such organs as genitals from living children (our group B, here rather at a disadvantage) for use in sorcery to benefit group A (which in their own estimation, includes all the best people).  All these practices may be found in the world today, though generally not in places where the influence of the Holy Mother Church is at its strongest.   John draws the line at one place, Mary at another; and if you were to do a statistical study, it might well be that churchgoers, on average, place it somewhat more towards the less-interventionist end  than do vivisectionists, grave-robbers or eliminative materialists.   That would be sociologically rather interesting, if true;  Pinker has however made no logical point.   Nor does his heroically rising to the defense of helpless Alzheimer’s patients, who apparently are being abused by nuns when these are not otherwise engaged in cackling over the sufferings of Parkinsonians,  contradict anything a theist would say (apart perhaps from heretics like Christian Scientists):  “Sources of immense misery” (notice the purely emotion-evoking addition of the adjective) “such as Alzheimer’s disease … will be alleviated   not by treating thought and emotion of manifestations of an immaterial soul  but by treating them as manifestations of physiology and genetics.”   Amen; hear, hear;  we can all of us drink to that.  Pinker’s lance has pierced a straw-man.

*     *     *

~ Commercial break ~

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FwzOXzZWUik

We now return you to your regularly scheduled essay.

*     *     *

Pinker touches bottom with this assertion:  “The doctrine of a soul that outlives the body  is anything but righteous, because it necessarily devalues the lives we live on earth.”   (Compare:  "The doctrine that we should become adults  is offensive, as it devalues childhood.")
Leave aside that outsider’s-assessment-word “righteous”, analogous to the skewed perspective of the word “humane” above (We believe, or disbelieve, or simply hope, as the case may be, in eternal life, from conviction or revelation or even logic or what have you, but not because such a belief -- true or false -- seems “righteous”).  Notice, though, that qualifier “necessarily”, which changes the assertion from a sociological generalization or barroom opinion  into one of logico-philosophical apodixis.  Yet the only evidence he offers for this extraordinary doctrine  is the self-serving rationalizations (or irrationalizations) of maniacs who kill their kids, and the rants of al-Qaeda suicide-bombers.  (Page 189 -- look it up if you can’t believe your eyes.)

Good - Heavens!  For all we know, some serial killer has excused his crime-spree by an allusion to the Riemann Hypothesis;  the effect of such grotesques upon number theory  will rightly be nil.

Beyond the logical point, Pinker’s assertion is psychologically absurd.   It may well be the case (though God forbid), that those who hope they may one day rest in the bosom of Abraham  are destined to be cruelly disabused;  but their doctrine does tend rather to distinguish this view of life  from that of scorpions in a bottle.

For a glimpse at the value placed upon human life  among a proud, free people  unpolluted by Christian superstitions, click here, and here.
[update 8 May 2012] And now here:
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/05/south-koreans-confiscated-pills-human-remains.html
South Korean customs said it had confiscated more than 17,000 “health” capsules smuggled from China that contain human flesh, most likely extracted from aborted fetuses or stillborn babies.



(Note, though:  these are quibbles;  just a turf thang, folks.  Pinker's book overall is broad, sound, and beautifully written.)

(For more along these lines: )

http://www.linguasacrapublishing.com/justice.html

Juxtaposition

With the leisure of a Sunday, I dabbled, reading in this and that.  An old New York Review of Books (13 Aug 2009) yielded an article by the ever-interesting Freeman Dyson, which contained this odd glimpse into his family life:

Last year  I received  as a Christmas present, a “Portable Genome Chest”, a compact disc containing a substantial amount of information about my genome.

Initially  that reminded me merely of my puppy-eager ophthalmologist, whom I visit once a year, that he may check for diabetogenic retinopathy (so far:  clean slate), and who beamingly gifted me with a CD containing a detailed rotatable enlargeable image of an enormous and bloody-looking eyeball, allegedly my own.   He burbled on about the wonders I could do with this, once I learn the software;  and I had not the heart to inform him that  I was about as likely  ever to look at the thing, as  fondly to go over (on wintry evenings) old videos of my colonoscopy.

But he went on:

My children and grandchildren, and our spouses, got their compact discs too.  By comparing our genomes, we can measure quantitatively  how much each grandchild inherited from each grandparent.   .. I consider it a cause for celebration  that personal genetic information is now widely distributed  at a price that ordinary citizens can afford.

Well, make of that what you will.   -- I would not have given it another thought, save that, not an hour later, finishing Arthur Koestler’s intensely interesting novel, I happened upon this passage:

“The next step will be the compiling of a card-index for the whole nation, in which each family will be registered with the chief traits of its heredity -- a kind of Domesday Book of the national protoplasma.”

-- Arthur Koestler, Arrival and Departure (1943), p. 137

Freeman Dyson is a notably decent and gracious man;  the character uttering the above in the novel  is a Nazi.   Make of it … what you will.  

Sileo.

ON DEPTH AND BREADTH (überarbeitet)

            Someone (and since I forget who, it is as if the words had passed into proverb) once said: “A brilliant person is one of whom I think: I could have done such work, if only I were ten times smarter.  But in the case of a genius [here the reference was, if memory serves, to Feynman, and the epithet might actually have been not “genius” but “magician”], I can’t even imagine how it might be done.” 

            That is the depth dimension, often commented upon.

            Less obtrusively, because  by its nature  never to be noticed save over time,  is a baffling precellence of breadth.

   
  This thought arises as I finish Ian Hacking’s The Taming of Chance.  Hacking is unfailingly intelligent, but not deep beyond one’s reach.  He has a modest, easy style.  He’s not a bibliographic bully, forever quoting Kant or Toqueville or whoever you haven’t read, a propos of everything and not always with necessity (“Will the Red Sox prevail next season?  Only time, as Aquinas would have it, will tell.”).  He does not throw up a Potemkin village of supposed sources, a bibliography stuffed with Lukacs and Plato, longer and denser than the slender article it supports, topped off with epigraphs from Wallace Stevens and Valéry. Yet with everything of him I come across, he reveals a new side of him.  A polymath;  forsooth, a polytope.

            The first thing of his I read – and warmly recommend – was The Emergence of Probability. Here he seemed one of those philosophical mathematicians-manqués of the stripe of Putnam or Quine, who write with wit and erudition about technical subjects, but (one eventually finds) pretty much plow the same furrow in their various works.  Only, in later works he reveals himself as a closet Foucault fan (to this reader, as far from Kolmogorov as, I don’t know, a Red Sox fan).   And he’s written complete books on purely psychological subjects.  In The Taming of Chance, he returns to the subject of Emergence from a (crucially) slightly different angle, so that the book covers much of the same ground  but with a very different feel and specificity.   It doesn’t even have a bibliography, you have to dig it out of the footnotes.  Yet see what the spade unearths! Page after page of primary sources, like one William Turnbull’s Treatise on the Strength, Flexure, and Stiffness of Cast Iron Beams (London, 1831), or of secondary ones from obscure nooks, like the Tübinger Zeitschrift für Staatswissenschaft 4 (1863).  He cites Bernoulli, fair enough – but wait, not (or rather, not only) the celebrated Jakob of the Ars Conjectandi (which --though I haven’t read it and probably never will-- is a recognized landmark in the field),  but Johann – yet wait again, not that Johann, that familiar Johann “Jock” Bernouilli whose works you probably have on your night-table, but the later one; and not his mathematical publications neither, but rather his  no doubt in its day rightly celebrated  Reisen durch Brandenburg, Pommern, Preussen, Curland, Russland und Pohlen, published in four volumes over the course of that busy year of 1779-80 (in memory still green), and of which Hacking’s unobtrusive morsel is quarried from volume two.

            This is not what is meant by being merely, or even hugely, “well-read”.  Well-read means you’ve read all the classics throughout history in every major language in every field, and absolutely every scrap of anything at all in your own particular specialty (published or in preprint – or in papyrus --  ancient or modern), plus the odd condiment from among contemporary novels, Doonesbury,  or the folks at Port-Royal.  That’s hard enough-- I read all the time; always have; and am still just hitting the high points (and forgetting much).  Yet given 400 hours in a week instead of forty, and a couple of lifetimes tacked end to end, plus total recall, one can imagine doing it.  But the “Compte rendu des travaux de la Société phrénologique pendant le cours de l’année 1839”, which Hacking uses to such telling effect, is not on anybody’s reading list.  The ergodic reader ranging over all space  would perish in the heat death of the universe before striking upon this. 

            In fact, the whole situation puts me in mind of what Lszlew Brnzowlski so memorably said in his (partially encrypted) diary entry for 3 April 1648 (U. Tbilisi MS #9784-K) --…  No it doesn’t.  Haven’t read it.  Never heard of it.

Postscript.

            

Hacking himself can strike a stance of amazement at (allegedly) recondite knowledge.  In a chapter on philology (in Historical Ontology, p. 141), citing Foucault’s discussion of Schegel, Bopp, and Grimm, he exclaims: “Who on earth was Bopp?”  (One of the most celebrated names in the history of philology, that’s who.)  This is no doubt a pose, to let the reader catch his breath, and to chummily pretend that we’re all just struggling along here together, lads -- the way someone expounding physics for a lay audience will strive to make it all “more accessible” by sprinkling-in little apology-markers (“what physicists call the ‘spin’ of a particle known as the ‘electron’”;  “the so-called ‘Higgs boson’”;  “something called a ‘photon’”).  But shortly thereafter, Hacking himself calmly goes on to dust off such truly obscure proto-philologists as, um, “Chladenius”...

And if all that is making you feel stupid (as it certainly should),  here’s something to make you feel even stupider:

        De Stultitiâ

*

One naturally does not notice, upon first or second acquaintance, any lack of breadth  in any favorite author of your own.  You go to him for some few things, whatever they might be, and are delighted to find them again.  We do not reproach the humble hamburger, for failing to be a quail;  nor the quarterback, for lacking the qualities of a third-baseman; nor Dickens, for his obstinate indifference to the more recent developments of the higher calculus; nor indeed the Gospels, for lacking tomorrow’s weather forecast. Yet if some author comes to be our guide, our lens upon the variety of life, we do  in time  notice any astigmatism, or narrowness of the field of view.

            For some time, Orwell was my cherished author, seemingly spanning great territories: as novelist, memoirist, and critic – nay, ever as a fighter at the front --: noted in particular for his splended essay attacking insularity, “Inside the Whale”.   It was only a chance remark of his, apologizing for not having read more than several dozen of the (delightful, but) trifling novels of P.G. Wodehouse, that it struck me, how much had escaped his notice while he was so occupied:  scilicet, virtually every world-shaking intellectual development, be it in physics, mathematics, biology, philosophy,  from the mid-19^th century   on.

            Tolkien created a world, Middle Earth,  commended (in Webster’s Encyclopedia of Literature) as “one of the more detailed of all fantasy worlds”, yet which always struck me as narrow to the point of suffocation.  GKC  creates an  in some ways  similar world, but which has airholes into the infinite, which let us breathe. C.S. Lewis, in his childhood, together with his brother, created such a puppet-theatre world, reminiscences of which survive in his adult fiction; but he bursts its walls decisively  in all his essays.  His world is wider; retaining (in his own metaphor) the furniture of the nursery, side by side with the cold hard sunlight of the new world.

            It was in the course of reacquainting myself, with the saga of Greek antiquity, and Roman valor, that I happened to notice  the absence of any echo thereof, in any of the aforementioned authors. (The mindworld of Lewis embraces Northern mythology, but nothing earlier.)

*

Other such instances.

Re Otto Rank, Ernest Jones speaks of

… his truly vast erudition;  it was quite mysterious  how he found the time to read all that he did.  One of the compliments I treasure in my life  was when he asked me wherever I had found all that material in one of my non-medical essays;  that the omniscient Rank should be impressed, signified much.

-- Ernest Jones, Freud: Years of Maturity (1955), p. 160

Richard Fortey, Earth (2004), p. 314:

            One of the chief proponents of the [Snowball Earth] theory is Paul Hoffman at Harvard, one of those American academics who seem to have twice their fair share of energy. If expertise is defined as knowing  more and more  about less and less,  I am at a loss to describe what it is to know more and more  about more and more – but that is the Hoffmann condition.

*

In a work, written in English, and  ostensibly directed at engineers and physicists, subsequent to a discussion of infinitesimal deformation and path systems, we read:

We shall not go further into this approach here.  It is done quite simply and naturally in a classic paper by J. Radon.  Indeed, since this paper is one of the clearest and most elegant in the entire history of the calculus of variations, we prefer to suggest to the reader  that he consult it directly.

-- Robert Hermann, Differential Geometry and the Calculus of Variations (1968), p. 257

An admirable suggestion!  One hopes, however, that our pocket-protector-sporting anglophone engineer has been keeping up his German, and has ready access to an enormous research library, since it was published in that language (“Zum Problem von Lagrange”) back in 1928, in a relatively obscure series (Hamburg. Math. Einzelschriften, Leipzig).

*

[Update Jan 2012]  Freeman Dyson on his depth stage and his breadth stage:
http://moreintelligentlife.com/content/ideas/charles-nevin/60-year-job-freeman-dyson

~            ~            ~

For a different essay covering distinct though similar ground, try this:
http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/2010/12/on-scope-and-difficulty.html

For depth itself, as deep as it gets (which is in mathematics),  this:

http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/2014/01/a-dive-to-depths-expanded.html

Difficulty is Hard

[Note:  Rather in the spirit of those of our essays which we have labeled “faux-naïf”, the title of this one might be called “pseudo-stupid”.  

Compare a formulation we likewise favor, “Infinity is big.”   That epigram is double-edged.  First, it mimics the naïve astonishment that the novice feels, not only upon being introduced to the idea of infinity, but even large-but-finite things like a googolplex.  (As a child, I marveled over that one, much as I marveled over the brontosaurus, and for the same reasons.)  But beyond that, it alludes to the fact that infinity is much bigger than you can imagine when you first meet it as “1,2,3, …. keep going forever”.  And this, in two qualitatively different ways:  

 (a)  The whole “Hilbert’s hotel” Marx-Brothers-stateroom routines you can play with countable infinity (well described by Rudy Rucker in Infinity and the Mind).   

(b) That countable infinity, for all its capaciousness, is merely the smallest infinity; beyond it lies the uncountable infinity which denumerates the real numbers.   That one you can still kind of get a handle on;  but then in turn, infinitely many much larger infinities  rise beyond.

Too, the epigram is tricky to turn around into ‘Finitude is small’.  For, although anything finite is immeasurably smaller than infinity -- infinitessimally so -- so too is any given finite quantity, not immeasurably small to be sure (the ratio can be measured exactly, and differs for different quatities, unlike the case when comparing it with infinity), still unimaginably small (in psychologically evident sense which could be more rigorously defined) with respect to some other finite quantity, which therefore is unimaginably larger than it is.  (Think Graham's Number, or some iterated Ackermann function thereof.) There is, indeed, a lot of elbow room in the land of the finite.  To get a handle on it at all, you stop talking about individual quantities altogether, and instead investigate rates of growth of various kinds of function.  Some have been discovered which increase with a dizzying rapidity, next to which the proverbial “exponential growth” is like watching paint dry.

The concept of “difficulty” is not nearly so dizzying as that;  still, here as well there are at least two levels.  (1)  That felt by the ordinary layman, “Gee, this stuff is hard.”  (2)  A sharper and deeper sensation felt by many of those who have devoted a lifetime of study and practice to math and the sciences:  “Some of this stuff is difficult in ways I never even knew existed."

And, rounding out the paradox hidden in the apparent tautology,  the apparent converse is false:  for ease does not come easy, but only with much practice, and a certain gift.]

In the post linked to immediately below, we examined essayistically  the peculiar difficulty of mathematics -- not merely the well-known fact that a majority of schoolchildren find that algebra hurts their head, but that everyone, all the way to the top of the professional pinnacle, eventually butts up against something that baffles them, and weighs on their brain:

            De Stultitiâ

In the following, we surveyed less drastic analogues of the phenomenon, in such fields as linguistics and physics:

           

            On Scope and Difficulty

In the following series of essays, we examined the (difficult) question of intellectual depth, comparing and contrasting that with the (mostly psychological, not particularly deep) notion of difficulty:

           On Depth

Now (in the spirit of that last essay-series), we pass  to views internal to the field;  and this in two perspectives:

(1) Psychological:  simply a scattering of quotations, illustrative of the groans and misereres, of those who have attempted to scale this cognitive Olympus.

(2)  Mathematical:  Hints at ways in which certain areas or aspects of mathematics can be qualitatively “difficult”, quite apart from any intellectual limitations of its practictioners.

~

Psychological

Otto Hahn, My Life (1968), p. 90: "I remember Professor Rubens once asking me: `How do you manage to distinguish between all these names and remember all their chemical properties into the bargain?  It's all so frightfully complicated!'"

Imre Lakotos' catty footnote in Lakotos & Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), p. 114: "Neurath's [1935] shows that he never grasped Popper's simple argument."

Ronald Clark, Einstein: the Life and Times (1971), p. 333: Wolfgang Pauli, quite sure of his own brilliance, nonetheless wrote to a friend in the 1920's: "Physics is very muddled again at the moment; it is much too hard for me anyway, and I wish I were a movie comedian or something like that  and had never heard anything about physics."

Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (1979), p. 54: at Cornell, "Hans [Bethe] was using the old cookbook quantum mechanics that Dick [Feynman] couldn't understand.  Dick was using his own private quantum mechanics that nobody else could understand."

Mark Kac, Enigmas of Chance (1985), p. 112: "I had a look at some of Wiener's work on Brownian motion  but found it extremely difficult to follow."

& p. 115:  Kac contributed to the invariance principle, which is "now textbook stuff".  Yet "a recent book on the subject  is outside my comprehension."  [Note that this does not mean, "contains much material that was new to me", but rather:  "Even after working my way through the book, I cannot understand it.  God willing the next generation will be able to."]

Richard Rhodes, reviewing Abraham Pais' biography of Niels Bohr in NYTimes Book Review, 26 I 92: "It's sometimes heavy going, and I was reminded along the way of Luis Alvarez telling me that when he read Mr. Pais's biography of Einstein  he'd skipped the hard parts.  If a Nobel laureate could skip the hard parts, so can we all."

John Langlands, in his first of a series of IAS lectures (fall 99), said he'd wanted to be a physicist, but physics was "too difficult", so he had to settle for being a humble mathematics professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies.

Gigerenzer et al, The Empire of Chance (1989), p. 97: Ronald Fischer's writings are "not always transparent  to even the most hermeneutic reader".

John Conway, 17 XI 1999: "I studied Quantum Mechanics with Dirac. Quantum Mechanics is hard to understand, even when you can answer the questions on the exams.  And I couldn't answer the questions on the exams anymore."  [Yet another mathematical genius who found physics "too hard".]

David Berlinski, The Advent of the Algorithm (2000), p. 157: "Gödel lectured on his own results … the mathematicians (and philosophers) at Princeton for the most part could not and did not understand a word of what he said…"  [Note:  Here, nevertheless, the audience was mathematically the most sophisticated in the world.]

I.M.Yaglom, Felix Klein and Sophus Lie (1988), p. 54:

“Lobschevsky’s colleagues  failed to understand his work.  Since they did not want to write negative reviews, they simply ‘lost’ the text.”

I.M.Yaglom, Felix Klein and Sophus Lie (1988), p. 55:

“This symbolic language, using a minimum of words, made it very difficult for Bolyai’s contemporaries to read his great work.”

I.M.Yaglom, Felix Klein and Sophus Lie (1988), p. 57:

“His review was extremely negative.  Bunyakovsky failed to understand Lobachevsky’s ideas.”

I.M.Yaglom, Felix Klein and Sophus Lie (1988), p. 61:

“The audience listened attentively to Riemann’s lecture “Ueber die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen”, but did not understand it.”

I.M.Yaglom, Felix Klein and Sophus Lie (1988), p. 78:

“Readers were unprepared for Grassmann’s approach and for his idiosyncratic style… Grassmann’s first book was ignored by mathematicians.”

I.M.Yaglom, Felix Klein and Sophus Lie (1988), p. 148:

The letter that Gaulois wrote on the eve of his death was published, “but, obviously, the item was not understood by anyone at the time  and was ignored.”

I.M.Yaglom, Felix Klein and Sophus Lie (1988), p. 153:

“Typically, the officers who proposed the problem  refused at first to consider Monge’s solution, being certain that his mathematical training was insufficient for solving it.”

I.M.Yaglom, Felix Klein and Sophus Lie (1988), p. 177:

“Further explanations proving the mathematical validity of all of Klein’s constructions  were not convincing: he who does not wish to see, will not see.”

Hamilton's intellectual biographer calls that mathematician's  Lectures on Quaternions "hundreds  of all but impenetrable pages".

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Mathematical

First, certain subfields within mathematics are considered inherently substantially more difficult than others, at least for new entrants:

A Vertex Operator Algebra is an infinite-dimensional, Z₊-graded vector space with infinitely many products.  It is not an easy definition, and there are no easy examples.

-- Terry Gannon, in Timothy Gowers, ed., The Princeton Companion to Mathematics (2008), p. 539

In reference to a certain operation on elliptic curves:

This construction can be regarded as the very beginning of Hodge theory, a powerful branch of algebraic geometry  with a reputation for extreme difficulty.

-- Jordan Ellenberg, in Timothy Gowers, ed., The Princeton Companion to Mathematics (2008), p. 191
[As for garden-variety algebraic-geometry, that is formidable enough:
http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/2011/12/adventures-in-algebraic-geometry.html ]

Second, certain familiar problems, now considered elementary, turn out to be very difficult to solve in real generality and with proper rigor.    Thus, one of the first problems you meet in freshman physics is that of the Vibrating String.  Later, after mastering calculus and advanced calculus, you move on to Real Analysis -- and meet the thing again. Browsing through the standard textbok of F. Riesz & B. Sz.-Nagy, Leçons d’analyse fonctionelle [translated as Functional Analysis, 1955], I was surprised to find, well towards the end of the book, a chapter “Applications to the Vibrating String Problem”.

Similarly, one author remarks that only in recent times have certain classic problems in physics been settled rigorously, using the full arsenal of topology -- but that topologists are given scant credit, since the physicists imagined they had settled these matters long ago (though their proofs were fallacious).

Or cf. Charles Fefferman, who, in his article on the Navier-Stokes equation, places front and center  its status as a surprisingly tough nut to crack:

The Euler and Navier-Stokes equations describe the motion of an idealized fluid.  They are important in science and engineering, yet they are very poorly understood.  They present a major challenge to mathematics. … Although the Euler equation is 250 years old, and the Navier-Stokes equation well over 100 years old, there is no consensus as to whether Navier-Stokes or Euler solutions exist for all time, or whether instead they “break down” at a finite time. 

in Timothy Gowers, ed., The Princeton Companion to Mathematics (2008), p. 193-4

All this is of more than academic interest, since Navier-Stokes rules hydrodynamics which governs the oceans and the atmosphere, and hence determines whether we shall all go blithely on or whether shall one day disappear in a polar vortex or the like.  (As I write [7 January 2014], the temperature has been hovering around zero Fahrenheit, but with a high of 72 forecast for Saturday -- four days from now.  It feels as though we may have entered a region of unstable vorticity.)

(Thus spooked, I read on, and on p. 196 encountered this:

In the Euler equation … solutions can behave very strangely.  A two-dimensional fluid that is initially at rest, and subject to no outside forces, can suddenly start moving …

For the past few days, I’ve been reading a novel by Stephen King, and passages like that cause the hairs on the back of the neck to bristle like quills upon the proverbial porpentine.)

~

For more from this pen, try this:
http://www.linguasacrapublishing.com/justice.html

Climate Change (re-updated)

With a monster storm bearing down upon an already battered and now quivering New England (a storm felicitously named “Nemo” -- nice touch), and with the ominous enigma of Global Climate Change  oppressing the national psyche,

tonight seems an opportune time to repost the below.

[Note:  For an even more bone-chilling essay, suitable to being read by flashlight while banshee winds wail withoutdoors, check out this:

http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/2013/01/take-shelter-re-updated.html  ]

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For a mini-movie

of madness and salvation,

click here:

The Penitent and the Impenitent Thief

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[Last posted 26 Nov 2012]

Today's ironic update:

Le Qatar,  premier émetteur de CO2 par habitant

Le Qatar est l'hôte de la dix-huitième conférence des Nations unies sur le climat.

[Earlier post:]

Just a couple of observations.

(1) Logical

That the planet has entered a period of climatic instability, seems reasonably well-established, both anecdotally, and by more systematic scientific analysis.

That said instability has been caused by human activity, to   (a) some  (b) a significant  (c) an overwhelming  extent,  are distinct propositions, each necessarily  (and progressively) less certain.  -- Nothing disputable is being asserted here:  for any propositions P, Q, the joint assertion "P&Q" is (if anything) less certain than either proposition asserted separately.  Remarkably, there are experiments apparently demonstrating that many people do not recognize this.  But that would get us into the psychological.  Those who cannot appreciate the point, are invited to turn on the television.

However --  a point generally overlooked in the chatter on the airwaves (we shan’t dignify it with the name of ‘debate’) is this:  None of these latter propositions need be true, for the solution to the empirical problem (aetiologically agnostic)  to require human activity -- such as reduction of certain greenhouse-gas emissions, or giant mirrors in space, or what have you.

In exactly parallel fashion:  If a patient is in pain, it need not be the case that this pain was inflicted by some ruffian, for us to be able to do something about it.  And though the pain is  in any case  not the result of an aspirin- or opiate-deficiency, still it may be mitigated by the administration of such analgesics.
People are concerned about the economic costs of dealing with climate change, as well we should be.  But the need for action, and the kind of action needed, is logically largely independent of the politically fraught question of the exact degree of "blame" to be assigned to human activities.

An elementary observation, but often lost.

A note to Teabaggers:  Ignore the big words in this post, and think about poor Mr Bear

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The term "climate change", which has been gaining curency, is preferable to the previously popular (and more visualizable) "global warming".  For even if a slow secular rise in temperatures is the motor of the various changes that eventuate, it is but a small part of the resulting human experience.  Moreover, the rise per year looks trivial on paper, next to the much larger daily fluctuations.  The point is not that, on some particular day, instead of being a sizzling eighty-one, the mercury hits a sizzling eighty-one-and-a-half, but that more heat is being dumped into a hydrodynamic system, which feeds local instabilities, and may nudge changes in overall pattern.
Indeed, as a (counterfactual) thought-experiment:  Imagine rotating the climate-sphere partway around the globe, while keeping all the numbers (temperature, humidity, etc.) initially fixed.  Now nothing has statistically changed, but on a human level (agriculture, housing, transportation -- everything),  it would wreak havoc.  

Another serious problem, not related to heat per se, is that the process, rather than being self-regulating (as has fortunately been the case for much of what goes on over the earth) is in some ways self-accelerating.  "Warming" sounds like just bumping up the thermostat, a linear process.  But warming melts snow and ice-caps, which in turn decreases the earth's albedo, and (moreover) releases greenhouse gases from melting tundra: a vicious circle.  If ice were black, we'd be in luck.

(2) Psychological

(i)  The attempts by such scoundrels as Rick Perry or Donald Trump, to impeach the basic honesty of a significant proportion of climate scientists, is -- putting it at a minimum -- implausible simply on psychological grounds.   The motivations for scientists include recognition by their peers, the discovery of truth, the fun of solving puzzles, not having to wear a necktie, etc.  Very few get into the game for hope of fame or fortune;  and nobody goes into climatology (meteorology, geology….) for such reasons.  Certainly such folk are to be trusted, within their area of expertise, at least as much as casino magnates and Texas politicians, outside of theirs.

[Note:  Informed criticism of the consensus, such as that by Freeman Dyson, is certainly in place;  the consensus has been wrong before.  I am myself skeptical of modeling in general, and of long-term extrapolation over nonlinear, chaotic systems. But that is not the level at which the likes of Trump and Perry operate.]

(ii)  The frantic opposition of the wingnuts of the Right, to scientifically uncontroversial propositions, is in some ways puzzling.  If you actually own a polluting plant, or are captain of a polluting industry, your opposition is comprehensible, though reprehensible.  But most naysayers are by no means in that position.   The ferocity of their denial  cannot well spring from cool economic calculation;  there is something else going on, at a deeper level.  Something broken;  something sick.

Thus -- antedating the current climate debate by many decades -- consider the case of Ronald Reagan, as described by one who know him well, having written more than one biography about the man, Lou Cannon:

Reagan attracted … attention with his discovery that trees and other vegetation were primarily responsible for air pollution, and with his wildly incorrect ‘suspicion’ that the Mount St. Helens volcano had released more sulfur dioxide into the atomosphere ‘than has been released in the last ten years of automobile driving’.”

-- Ronald Reagan (1991), p. 129

Note further that these were not the impromptu ravings of some dipso in a bar, but the considered public pronouncements of someone very much in the public eye.  They cannot thus be easily dismissed.

RFI:  I had thought that the classic line “If you’ve seen one tree, you’ve seen them all” had been spoken by Reagan’s ecocidal Secretary of the Interior James Watt (you’ve got to credit the Gipper with a gift for irony, in that appointment);  but the Web consensus attributes it to Reagan.   Anyone have facts?

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Miscellaneous anecdotal attestations of shifting weather-patterns (other than a slow secular rise in average temperatures):
Weird storms expected through Monday in Southland

[Update 26 July 2012]  Oof!  And now this.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/science/earth/strong-storms-threaten-ozone-layer-over-us-study-says.html?_r=1&ref=global-home
(Several astute Readers' Comments here, btw.)

This is a genuine threat.  Already in the south of Patagonia, people can't be outdoors for more than a couple of hours without being exposed to a harmful dose of radiation.

-- Oy veh, and now this!
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/us/rise-in-weather-extremes-threatens-infrastructure.html?src=me&ref=general
"From highways in Texas to nuclear power plants in Illinois, the concrete, steel and sophisticated engineering that undergird the nation’s infrastructure are being taxed to worrisome degrees by heat, drought and vicious storms.

On a single day this month here, a US Airways regional jet became stuck in asphalt that had softened in 100-degree temperatures, and a subway train derailed after the heat stretched the track so far that it kinked — inserting a sharp angle into a stretch that was supposed to be straight. In East Texas, heat and drought have had a startling effect on the clay-rich soils under highways, which “just shrink like crazy,” leading to “horrendous cracking,” said Tom Scullion, senior research engineer with the Texas Transportation Institute at Texas A&M University. In Northeastern and Midwestern states, he said, unusually high heat is causing highway sections to expand beyond their design limits, press against each other and “pop up,” creating jarring and even hazardous speed bumps.

Excessive warmth and dryness are threatening other parts of the grid as well. In the Chicago area, a twin-unit nuclear plant had to get special permission to keep operating this month because the pond it uses for cooling water rose to 102 degrees; its license to operate allows it to go only to 100. According to the Midwest Independent System Operator, the grid operator for the region, a different power plant had had to shut because the body of water from which it draws its cooling water had dropped so low that the intake pipe became high and dry; another had to cut back generation because cooling water was too warm."

[Update 4 August 2012]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/climate-change-is-here--and-worse-than-we-thought/2012/08/03/gJQAW75NVX_story.html :
"This is not a climate model or a prediction but actual observations of weather events and temperatures that have happened. Our analysis shows that it is no longer enough to say that global warming will increase the likelihood of extreme weather and to repeat the caveat that no individual weather event can be directly linked to climate change. To the contrary, our analysis shows that, for the extreme hot weather of the recent past, there is virtually no explanation other than climate change."

[Update Sept 2012]  For discussion of a cinematic reflection of Climate-Change Anxiety, click here:
http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/2012/09/take-shelter-updated.html

[Update 23 Nov 2012] Paul Krugman weighs in on the Republican mindset:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/opinion/krugman-grand-old-planet.html?src=me&ref=general

[Update 27 Nov 2012]  Zum Thema;
http://www.dradio.de/aodflash/player.php?station=3&broadcast=348687&datum=20121127&playtime=1354028931&fileid=d93c64ee&sendung=348687&beitrag=1933959&/

 

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Was für Krimi liest wohl Dr. Sigmund Freud?

Schauen Sie mal!

Sigmund Freud und Sherlock Holmes

[Update 10 Jan 2013]   As wildfires rage:

   Australia is so hot  they had to add new colors to the weather map

   "Deep purple" now represents the heat dome.

[Update 18 Jan 2014]  A chilling -- or rather searing -- anecdote about the toll of rising temperatures:

At the Australian Open, It’s Not the Heat, It’s the Stupidity

 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/sports/tennis/players-are-not-cool-with-australian-open-heat-policy.html?hp

[Update 19 Jan 2014]  

HERE’S a scary fact about America: We’re much more likely to believe that there are signs that aliens have visited Earth (77 percent) than that humans are causing climate change (44 percent).

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/opinion/sunday/kristof-neglected-topic-winner-climate-change.html?ref=nicholasdkristof