“Refutation” inflation (re-updated)

[The present note is an exercise in logic and linguistic hygiene.  It is not political per se, and in particular is agnostic as to the facts and merits of the tangled case under discussion.]

[Original post-date 16 May 2017]
One of the top stories in today’s crowded news:

The family of slain Democratic National Committee staffer Seth Rich rejected Fox News reports that he had leaked work e-mails to WikiLeaks before he was fatally shot last year in the District.

The reports, which gained traction on social media, said an FBI forensics examination showed Rich transferred 44,053 DNC e-mails and 17,761 attachments to a now-deceased WikiLeaks director.

Rich’s parents, Joel and Mary Ann, said Tuesday through a spokesman that they do not believe their son gave any information to WikiLeaks.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/family-of-slain-seth-rich-says-reports-he-fed-wikileaks-dnc-info-are-untrue/2017/05/16/9b32ef9c-3a46-11e7-8854-21f359183e8c_story.html?utm_term=.f0f43ca07a0f

That is admirably and neutrally stated.  However, some news sources are reporting the same facts with headlines like “Seth Rich Parents Refute New Claims On Wikileaks Contact”.   Therein lies a confusion.

To refute is (in its original, non-catachrestic sense) to disprove.  The allegations in question are perfectly precise and emprical, subject to either (partial) refutation or (partial) confirmation.

But the only party in a position to refute the allegations is someone who professionally and forensically examined the laptop in question.    Does it contain such material, or does it not?  The family is in no position to “refute” the allegation, however false it may be.  Indeed, on the Post account, they cannot really be said even to have denied the allegations;  they simply said they don’t believe them.  A perfectly rational stance; but not exactly a denial (for after all, how would they know -- if their son had been secretly betraying his employer, why would he inform his family?), and certainly not a refutation.

Increasingly, the less careful media uses refute where deny would be appropriate.  Part of this may be simple semantic weakness on the journalists’ part (to which many other technical terms, like impeach, are subject), but partly also to the fact that deny has accumulated invidious connotations, as though anyone who “denies” X  is himself shady in some way.   That is a legitimate worry;  other synonyms are available (the family discounted/pooh-poohed/scoffed at/… the allegations) which lack such connotations.  Better to use these than to induce a crucial ambiguity in the verb refute, in a way that renders it inapt for precise usage.

Part of the problem in the fluidity of use of refute  might be  not political, but cognitive and linguistic:  confusion with the paronym rebut.  A rebuttal is not quite as decisive as a refutation, but supposed to be more evidential and structured than a mere denial.  Mere denial is a weak defense indeed, available even to the ghosts of five-year-olds, as in the comic strip "The Family Circus".

A further semantic distinction:  re discussions within the first Nixon administration, of Kevin Phillips’ The Emerging Republican Majority:

Phillips had not been refuted by the West Wing,  but his thesis had been rejected.
--  Patrick Buchanan,  Nixon’s White House Wars (2017), p. 146

Note:  There are other ways of disposing of an allegation, other than outright refutation:  you may undermine, or infirm, or discredit it, in various ways.   Thus, if a witness presenting himself as Dr. Smith (M.D. Harvard) testifies that the deceased died of psoriasis, another doctor (or team thereof) might refute that testimony (on its own ground) by presenting evidence that the deceased had a huge malignant brain tumor but had never had a skin condition.  But anyone -- say, a lowly clerk at Harvard Medical School -- could discredit the testimony on entirely other grounds, by showing that Smith never attended Harvard Medical School, nor (with a bit of extra digging) ever so much as finished high school.  That would be devastating counter-evidence, but not a “refutation” in the technical sense.  (Logically, Smith might nonetheless have blundered upon the correct explanation of the demise.)

One can’t help suspecting that the media’s terminological laxity might be connected to an epistemological weakness:  presenting counter-allegations as evidentially telling (whether or not they are actually awarded the accolade “refutation”) although (consider the source) they are suspect or undermined at the outset, as coming from the accused's family, or attorney, or partner in crime.  Some of these are treated with great journalistic reverence, and actually pass into folklore  --  "he didn't do nuttin' " (spoken while the perp is actually in flagrante), or, post-hoc, “he didn’t have a gun” (though one was found in his possession, surrounded by spent cartridges), and where all else fails and guilt is  ... irrefutable, “he was hoping to go to college”, “he was starting to turn his life around”.

[Update 17 August 2017]  Bringing it back to Wikileaks:

Assange once told me that he did not “accept” the allegation that Russia had provided him e-mails through a third party,  which of course was different from saying that the allegation was untrue.

-- Raffi Khatchadourian, in 21 Aug 2017 The New Yorker]

But nor did he make any move to refute or cast doubt on the allegation:

I asked if he was even able to know the chain of custody of his election material before it came to him.  He declined to answer.

[Side-note:  for that phrase of forensic science chain of custody,  cf. the term of hadith stemmatology,  isnâd.]

~

A particularly piquant use of the term “refutation” occurs in the mathematical polylogue by Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations (1976).  The title impishly echoes that of Karl Popper’s better-known Conjectures and Refutations (1962).  But whereas that title reflected the expection rough-and-tumble of normal science, Lakotos’ phrase produces a double-take:  if a “proof” gets “refuted”, it wasn’t really a proof to begin with, but only a purported proof.  But Lakatos is not referring to those (relatively rare) instances of purported proofs that turned out to be fatally flawed, and left no progeny in mathematics.  Rather, he considers mathematical demonstrations that were all right so far as they went, but which contained hidden assumptions.  These being unearthed in a “refutation”, the original proof, or something much like it, gets deepened, until further unsuspected subtleties become revealed.    He offers a dialectic analysis of the process of mathematizing.   The result does not demote mathematical truth to a mere just-so story, as among nihilists and relativists.  It rather offers a more epistemologically modest picture of the mathematical enterprise (the fallible human excavation of a transcendental reality, a Platonist would say), in which the notions of “proof” and “refutation” both get toned down a bit, and the process becomes a bit more like developing a software package, finding and fixing bugs along the way.  The result is real progress.

For a more technical discussion of refutation and its semantic field, try

http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/2016/01/refutation-vs-disconfirmation.html

~

The flip side of the coin, by which the media use artificially strengthened language when presenting the allegations of the victim class and their attorneys, is artificial down-grading when the allegations come from the authorities.   As, a headline from a moment ago:

South San Francisco police officers on Wednesday morning shot and killed a man who they say was allegedly armed with a shotgun.

Either “they say” or “allegedly” would be an adequate and appropriate editorial distancing from the official police statement.   Together, they are at best redundant, or, if taken literally, false:  the police did not state “He was allegedly armed with a shotgun”;  such a statement would be in place if, say, the police had not actually seen the shotgun, but a bystander reported -- alleged -- such possession of a shotgun (which had  been abstracted from the crime scene by the time the police arrived).  

~

[Addendum] Further vocabulary.

In the following sophisticated example, the verb nullify is used, not in the sense ‘refute’ exactly, but ‘to render null and void’

-- not to prove the falsity of a statement, but to disable its presuppositions:

I turn now to the objection that, even if probability-scepticism does not nullify the concept of truth, it does nullify the idea that science should aspire after truth.

-- John Watkins, Science and Scepticism (1984), p. 162

Indeed, Lakotos’ impish use of refute is roughly the same idea.

~

A bonus from Classical Antiquity:

Pericles, also, was a hearer of Zeno, the Eleatic, who treated of natural philosophy  in the same manner as Parmenides did, but had also perfected himself in an art of his own, for refuting and silencing  opponents in argument;  as Timon of Phlius describes it --

Also the two-edged tongue  of mighty Zeno, who,

say what one would, could argue it untrue.

-- Plutarch’s Lives (Dryden’s translation)

Refutation vs. Disconfirmation

We continue our observations about Verification (essay here) and Modus Tollens (essay here).

It has been maintained that there is an important asymmetry between the verification and the refutation of a theory in empirical science.   Refutation has been said to be conclusive or decisive, while verification was claimed to be irremediably inconclusive. … The falsity of [the theory] is indeed deductively inferable by modus tollens.

-- “The Falsifiability of Theories”, in: Adolf Grünbaum, Collected Works, vol. I (2013), p. 62

That is basically because an empirical law is, in general, a universal: ∀x P(x).   Given any  ¬P(a), that is falsified.    Whereas successive confirming instances, while perhaps increasing one’s confidence in the hypothesized law, do not deductively entail it.   Nor need that fact be, in practical terms, a mere quibble, in cases of an infinite domain:  thus, a conjecture in number theory might be verified for all values of n up to a billion -- a trillion -- a googolplex -- yet still turn out to be false.  (Indeed, toy conjectures of this sort  are trivially easy to dream up.  E.g. “No integer is evenly divisible by a googolplex.”)   Taking confirming instances ‘too seriously’, is the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent.

Grünbaum then, however, in a Duhemian vein, weighs in against such modus-tollentic tyranny, with the observation that, in empirical science, you are really assuming (ex hypothesi) not merely a theory, but (in unspoken conjunction therewith) various Auxiliary Assumptions:  and one or more of these, rather than your pet theory, might be the ones to suffer the fury of the tollendum.  Thus,  “Isolated component hypotheses of far-flung theoretical systems are not separately refutable but only contextually disconfirmable” (id., p. 63).

The same idea, more sociologically stated:

Typically  a theory is abandoned, not because of recalcitrant observations on their own, but because of these together with some, perhaps quite complex, reasoning from them:  in the extreme case, the observations may all be quite well known already, and all that is new  is the reasoning.

-- Michael Dummett, Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 409

Compare:

… that falsity, not truth, is the primary notion.

-- Michael Dummett, Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. xl

~

It is seldom that a theory is decisively k.o.’d by a Popperian uppercut to its predictive jaw.   Often the process happens slowly, like a river silting up;  there is no single Aha! moment (or rather, Oy veh! moment).   In science, as in life,  sometimes love grows old and love grows cold.  As, assessing a certain philosophical program:

The further one goes down the reformist path, the more implausible the consequences of one’s theory are likely to become, until  at some point  the implausibility of the consequences  comes to outweigh the initial attractiveness of the theory.

-- Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century (2003), vol. I, p. 299

That gradual, einsickernd, process of disenchantment, lacks the drama of Popperian refutation, or of Kuhnian paradigm-shift;  it is more reminiscent of the dissatisfying phenomenon (if it even is one) of truth decay.

~

The history of science -- though not the historiography of science -- is littered with once-flourishing theories that somehow just … faded, without necessarily ever having been decisively confronted or refuted.  It is no fun to research and write about these, since
(a) they are losers in the lottery (rightly or not), and scarcely known today (so that one’s potential readership is infinitessimal -- and indistinguishable from zero among working scientists); and
(b) there is seldom a clear-cut moral in the tale.

The occasions on which one does get an insight into some defunct theory  tend to be biographies of otherwise-great scientists -- e.g.  Theodore Porter’s fine account of the (as we now reckon him) statistician Karl Pearson, which must needs notice that hero’s period of infatuation with, mm, ahh, … ether squirts (pas devant les enfants!);  or Thomas Hankins‘s  of William Rowan Hamilton.  Or, sometimes, a historian of science rolls up his sleeve and deconstructs/resurrects  some particular thread of experiment.  As, Gerald Holton’s commendable study of “Subelectrons and Presuppositions”, involving the “classic” Millikan experiment, of which we all get a telescoped and sanitized version in high school physics.  The actual saga is more anfractuous, and less rich with easily digestible lessons.

[Millikan] found himself working with the wrong presupposition, but he knew how to rid himself of it eventually.  Millikan launched into that work with the same energy and obstinacy  as into his earlier work on the quantization of the charge of the electron, yet with the opposite assumption.

-- Gerald Holton, The scientific imagination (1978), p. 72

And re the related experiments of Felix Ehrenhaft:

There was never a direct laboratory disproof of Ehrenhaft’s claims.  … Lorentz … remark[ed]:  “The question cannot be said to be wholly elucidated.” In his review of the case, R. Bär noted …: “the experiments left, at the very least, an uncomforable feeling.”  Like most such controversies, this one also faded into obscurity, without anything as dramatic as a specific, generally agreed-upon falsification taking place at all.  Indeed, Ehrenhaft continue to publish on subelectrons into the 1940s, long after everyone else had lost interest in the matter.

-- Gerald Holton, The scientific imagination (1978), p. 79

And that, within (central, classical) physics.  The less rigorous (natural and social) sciences  are much pocked with such as well.

~

Science, not as logically implying some new phenomenon (such as the gravitational bending of light), but as suggesting likely places to look.   Thus:

The search, which has proved so successful, for chemical atoms  having specific nuclear and electronic constitutions, and for chemical molecules having specific atomic constitutions, has been stimulated by the previous construction of theories to explain the consitution of atoms or of molecules already known, theories which had, as it were, ‘gaps’ in them.

-- Richard Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (1953), p. 70

And indeed, not only the existence of, say, atoms or isotopes with a given atomic weight and atomic number  are thus -- not exactly ‘predicted’ in the deductivist sense, but pointed to -- but additionally, we shall expect certain behaviors, or ranges of behaviors, based upon the place in the periodic table of that species (should it exist).

Thus, when the eka-aluminum that Mendeleev hypothesized  was eventually identified (by a Frenchman, who thus had naming-rights and called it gallium) and turned out to have behavioral values very close to those predicted,  while not proving the theory of atomic chemistry as it then stood, was still much more than just one more danged black raven.

[A footnote on another such predicted discovery, that nicely illustrates consilience in the sciences, combining both forefront atomic physics  and practical geology:

At the time Bohr was developing his theory, the element following lutecium was undiscovered.  But Bohr … asserted that, in this unknown element, the added electron would have to be placed in the level n = 5. This would imply that the unknown element would have an electronic configuration analogous to that of zirconium.  Inasmuch as elements that are chemically analogous  are usually found in the same minerals, Bohr claimed that the missing element should be sought in minerals containing zirconium.  It was indeed in such ores that the missing element, called hafnium [after the Latin name of Bohr’s hometown] was detected.

-- A. D’Abro, The Rise of the New Physics (1939),  p. 549.  ]

This “guiding-light” role of a theory, not being a formal entailment, is likewise not subject to modus tollens (though of course it might be abandoned in the face of an accumulation of recalcitrant instances):

Whereas discovery of observable properties which fill such gaps in a theory  is rightly thought to provide a weighty confirmation of the theory …  failure to discover such properties would not be regarded as weighing against the theory, except perhaps in very special cases.

-- Richard Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (1953), p. 70