Showing posts with label Platonism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Platonism. Show all posts

Sunday, May 10, 2020

Informative tautologies (updated)


Technically, for a logician, or a semanticist of the Snow-is-White school, tautologies convey no information;  but to linguists and pragmaticians, in context they often do.  In fact, we may state that they usually do, since otherwise why utter them?  “Business is business” is flint-hearted;  “Boys will be boys”, tenderly exculpatory.

The opposite of an utterance that pretends to contain no information (and thus, in particular, to be inexpugnable) but actually does (and often of a trenchant sort), is a definition that, ex cathedra, is all about informing, but which melts to the touch.  Cf. our essay here:

~
Covertly vacuous uses of technical-sounding terms  have been scouted in histories of science.  As, “Things fall because of gravity, and rise because of levity.” Or Molière’s virtus dormitiva.  But more may be packed into such terms than may be initially apparent.  As, one philosopher pointed out that “The ball rebounded to the height that it did  because of its resiliency.”  But this is informative:  the height is owing to internal characteristics of that ball, rather than from the ball’s having been dropped from a greater height, or having been dropped on a more resilient surface.


Additionally, the initial tautological character of a sentence can  so to speak  “age off”, in accordance with semantic evolution of its terms. Thus, “Atoms are indivisible” was initially as circular as “Bachelors are unmarried”, since they were defined from the outset as indivisibilia (as their name, a-tom, etymologically implies).  But on its current interpretation, the sentence would qualify as false.

A mathematician looks at Newton’s Definition 1, in the Principia:

Quantity of matter is a measure of matter that arises from its density and volume jointly.

Great acumen is hardly needed to realize that this definition is hopelessly circular, since density is normally defined as the ration of mass to volume;  but Newton’s unhelpful phrase  does have some implicit implications.  For example, we expect the mass of an object to remain unchanged if we change its shape.
-- Michael Spivak, Physics for Mathematicians: Mechanics I (2010), p. 9
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A 2015  example of the uses of tautology:

Robert Buissière on Médi1, re Presidential candidates:

Jeb Bush, frère de son frère,
et Hillary Clinton,  épouse de son époux.

As they stand, these statements are “analytic”; but we understand the import:  Jeb and Hillary got where they are today, largely owing to family association.

Cf. & contrast the common expression “He is his father’s son.”  Normally this means that he takes after his Dad, and not that he is getting any special favors from other people owing to that filiation.  To imply the latter, you might say “Daddy’s little boy” or something.  By contrast, the French phrases in the above context  do not imply that Jeb’s politics are a close match to Dubya’s, let alone that Hillary’s are a close match to Bill’s.


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A bare tautology like “Business is business”, as a free-standing statement, invites contentful interpretation via a “Gricean implicature” (specifically, the Maxim of Quantity).   The following is a syntactically more complex case, there the tautology is embedded in a subordinate clause:

Ever since self was self, nature been keepin’ folks off of red-hot stoves.
-- Zora Neale Hurston, Their Eyes Were Watching God (1937)

The meaning is:  Common sense has been extant  from time immemorial.  Operationally, the (tongue-in-cheek) interpretation is:  Go back and back in time, sampling as you go. For each sample-point, verify whether  “self = self” holds at that time; and if so, then evaluate “Common Sense is in effect? Y/N”.  The sentence, for all its folksiness, has a kind of philosophy-class spin to it; the moreso as “self = self” calls up First-Order Logic with Identity.


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Stylistic appreciation

Usually there is a summary “That’s that” finality to tautologies, whether used informatively or not;  stylistically, they are bare-bones.  But consider this:

Herod:  The moon has a strange look tonight. … She reels through the clouds like a drunken woman. … Does she not reel like a drunken woman?  She is like a madwoman, is she not?
Herodias:  No;  the moon is like the moon, that is all.

-- Oscar Wilde, Salomé (1891)

Here the barrenness of the pale white, plain round  far-floating body, is reflected in the unyielding tautological formula.


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Enten-Eller

Philosophers have scribbled  much ink, and later worn out many a typewriter ribbon, and finally expended great bushels of pixels, discoursing upon the status of “logical truths”; such as, paradigmatically, the following:

            (I) Every man is either married or a bachelor.

(We simplify, since the matter is not really of interest; leaving out of account, for instance, the curious case of Schrödinger’s groom.)
It is agreed that such a sentence tells us nothing about the world, unlike that time-honored exemplar of informativeness,

            (II)  The cat is on the mat.

which has been so oft repeated. down the years, that said cat has achieved the immobility and timelessness of an Egyptian idol.  (Presumably the mat lies in a patch of sunlight, so why ever move?)

            And yet its affordances are quite different from those of another statement of the same logical form; say:

            (II) Every number is either even or odd.

For, although the sentence (I) does not perhaps baldly state anything substantive about the world, its presuppositions speak volumes.  For one thing, it gives us to understand that there is a sharply defined institution, Marriage, into which a man may enter or not; and that his resultant state is either-or. Even so much will give our Martian anthropologists  sufficient grist  for many turns of the mill.


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The above are mostly individual linguistic parlor-tricks.  Much more generally, there is the matter of the status of the equations of mathematics.  A view put forward by the dessicated and ennervating tendency called formalist (nominalistmaintained that, being mathematical, they are tautologies, and being tautologies, they are uninformative -- semantically vacuous.  Practical experience shows that doctrine to be false.  As a way to see how such equations manage to be informative, consider the number pi.
Pi can be defined, qualitatively, in a number of different ways, most familiarly as the ratio of a circle’s circumference to is diameter.  It  is, moreover, a Given of the invisibilia, woven into the fabric of the noöspheric pattern;  and -- crucially -- it can be reached in a startling variety of precise quantitative ways, along this strand or that of the warp and the woof -- and the woorp and the wahf, along any of the dimensions of the multidimensional mathematical textile.   Pi is itself ever one, the peak of the Golden Mountain;  but the paths that climb to it are numberless.  It can be expressed as a definite integral; as an infinite continued fraction; as an infinite product; as an infinite sum; with many variations of each.  (Behold some of them at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pi.)  That fact that any one of these equals π is informative and indeed amazing, for in effect each one constitutes hiking instructions -- a trail-map -- to the summit, each from a wildly different base-camp.  And each one of these infinitely intricate expressions  is equal to any other, in an equation which is as distant from tautological or uninformative as can be imagined.


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[Update 13 May 2020]  An aborbing article by Evan Osnos, in the 11 May 2020 issue of The New Yorker, maps out the paths by which the Greenwich Connecticut  tennis-and-boating-club crowd  came to support Trump.  The notables of that town have a patrician heritage, in principle at variance with the flashy style of the vulgarian from the Bronx, but as one blue-blood testifies, his conversion came while witnessing an early speech by the candidate:  “He had that line that he would use: ‘Folks, we either have a country or we don’t.’ And I felt the chill .. I’m, like, ‘Oh, my God, this is a really good line.’

Apart from the formally tautological character of that line, it puzzles by its vagueness:  out of context, it is unclear what at all is being hinted at.  Presumably the line is a dog-whistle, a bit of Rorschach rhetoric from which the listener will extract whatever meaning he likes.

The line does nothing for me; but it does recall such successful political antecedents as “The business of America is business.”


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[Update 14 May 2020] 
Some of you may be familiar with the British sport of trainspotting.  That may or may not be in accordance with current U.K. guidance on coronavirus lockdown.  But here’s a hobby you can practice in the safety and comfort of your own home:

Tautology-Spotting !

As:
Headline in this morning’s New York Times:

The People Behind the Counter Are People
Remember this the next time you order takeout.

That one recalls those sleep-inducing example-sentences from introductory logic class (All brave Athenians are Athenians).  But in this case, it has a punch, and the source of that punch is not logical but lexical.  For, people has a variety of senses;  from the neutrally classificatory

(a)  an instantiation of the species Homo sapiens, near-cousin of Pan troglodytes, sometimes known as “a forked radish”;

to the “pregnant sense”  (I phrase it freely)

(b)  an ensouled being created in the image of the Lord of Hosts, whom Christ died to redeem.

In the cited sentence, the first occurrence of the word people has the (a) meaning; the second occurrence, (b).

For more on perspectival semantics and pregnant senses, check out this essay:


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In all the instances above, tautology is used in its traditional logico-philosophical sense.  But technical terms sometimes get picked up by a wider audience, where their use may be lax.  Thus, the literary critic V.S. Pritchett, in his article on the novelist Anthony Powell, wrote:

Mr. Powell is excellent with the raffish…. I think the sententious irony succeeds. … It adds a very English flavor, either of comic tautology or deflation.

The sense of tautology is unclear here.  Perhaps it refers to mechanical repetition, a standard component of broad humor.

Saturday, March 29, 2014

Thoughts 'n' Things

  Rudy Rucker, Infinity and the Mind, p. 38:

(**) Just as a rock is already in the Universe, whether or not someone is handling it,  an idea is already in the Mindscape, whether or not someone is thinking it.

This is itself a pleasant thought, recalling the ditty about God-in-the-quad; but in actual fact – I don’t think so.

(So you see—I am not an uncritical Platonist.  Platonic heaven must be so gerrymandered, as to exclude such things as cheese doodles and Sponge Bob Squarepants.)

The actual universe has (for example) -- whatever geometry it has:  regardless of whether there are rational creatures capable of understanding it, let alone deriving it.  Likewise the landscape of math.  But particular formulations of physics, and perhaps even of math – matrix mechanics v. wave mechanics, Cauchy analysis vs. non-standard analysis – do not exist in complete independence from their proponents.  They are, one might say, propositions, not objects.  The objects (or patterns, or whatever they are)  exist  even in the absence of  a person to spout propositions about them; but the propositions require a proposer.  – Nothing specially abstract here; the same thing is true of rocks.  This rock exists independently of any finite mind, but: “There lies a rock” and “Behold that rock!” and “What a rock that is!” must come out of some actual someone’s mind or mouth.

            The unbridledly idealistic view in (**) conjures up a skyscape of untethered thought-balloons.  It is pleasant to contemplate, in a comic-strip sort of way, but not to be taken too seriously.  For one thing, unlike the situation with mathematical truths, where anyone at any place or time might discover them, there is no way for a rational creature in another galaxy or dimension to reach out and grab one of those thought-balloons by the tail;  he is required to blow his own bubbles.  Whereas the structures of mathematics are like fixed landmarks, which one encounters again and again, from different approaches.  For instance:  Yang-Mills gauge theories, discovered by the physics expedition; and connections on fibre-bundles, discovered by the math team; and lo, they meet in the middle.  Likewise group-theory.  Different body-parts of this have been grabbed onto by matrix theory, algebra (symmetries of solutions to equations), geometry (the Erlangen program), particle physics (glad you could get here; meet Sophus Lie), and in time it becomes clear that it’s all part of the same elephant.  Whether they come from physics, or mathematics, or computer science, two such explorers may not realise that they have come upon the same mountain, till they have circled around it a bit and compared notes.  And this happens repeatedly.  We may summarize in an epigram:  The mindscape of mathematics is a multidimensional torus:  whatever direction you set off in, you eventually wind up back at Hilbert’s Hotel.

It turns out that Shing-Tung Yau likes this montane metaphor as well.  Cf. The Shape of Inner Space (2010), p. 103:

A mathematical proof is a bit like climbing a mountain.

And he nicely outlines the Yang-Mills case (p. 290):

The physicist Chen Ning Yang was similarly astonished to find that the Yang-Mills equations, which describe the forces between particles, are rooted in gauge theories in physics  that bear striking resemblances to ideas in bundle theory, which mathematicians began developing three decades earlier, as Yang put it, “without reference to the physical world”.  When he asked the geometer S. S. Chern how it was possible that “mathematicians dream up these concepts out of nowhere,” Chern protested, “No, no.  These concepts were not dreamed up.  They were natural and real.”


            Contrast the case with “thoughts”.  Supposititious entities of the mindscape, even some popular thought-balloon, tethered to a billion different heads, need never be rediscoverable by another explorer, nor acknowledged as real should he simply be grabbed by the lapel by one of the thinkers, and treated to an exposition of same.  For example, the notion held dear by countless generations of schoolboys around the globe, of the uniquely funny nature of flatulence, will never appear among the gravely ellipsoidal thought-balloons of the solons of Fdrmrphlandia; even “funny”, for them, is not well-defined, and not particularly worth defining.

Now, probably Rucker meant to restrict the realm of “ideas” to just some of them.  Not, “Wouldn’t it be fun to dip Suzy’s pigtail into the inkwell!”, but things like “The square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides.”  Fine; but careful, here.  The Pythagorean theorem has  as its basis  a fact about Euclidean geometry, in every possible world; just as Fermat’s Last Theorem expresses (in a possibly somewhat contingent and imperfect way) a fact about the natural numbers.   But a fact is not the same thing as an idea.  As a matter of fact, there is a coffee stain on this shirt; but “the idea of this coffee-stained shirt” is no strut or girder of God’s architectonics.  An idea concerning a fact of mathematics, in a finite mind,  may bear – must bear -- but an imperfect relation to the fact itself (‘fact’ here used broadly: it may refer to a wildly transfinite complexus of relations, some of them perhaps perceptible only to angels).   Most people’s ideas of mathematical truths bear as much relation to the truths themselves  as does a crayon scribble to the Sistine Chapel  which it might (based merely upon memory of a fleeting ill-lit glimpse) attempt to depict.  To posit that all truths of mathematics exist as Ideas in God’s mind, is logically allowable, but really adds nothing, and is in any case unknowable. To identify these truths with the neuronal states of the pitiful meat-wads sloshing around in our half-cracked crania, is to add nothing at all, but is rather to detract.



[Appendix]  Karl Kraus apparently entertained a notion of independent or pre-existent thoughts.  He speaks of someone being

von der Präformiertheit der Gedanken  überzeugt, und davon daß der schöpferische Mensch  nur ein erwähltes Gefäß ist; und davon, daß die Gedanken und die Gedichte da waren  vor den Dichtern und Denkern.
-- “Heine und die Folgen”, reprinted in J. Franzen, The Kraus Project, p. 88

The whole ‘meme’ idea (itself a meme) is similar -- not that the various Chiclet-thoughtlets were truly Platonically pre-existing, but that, once hatched, they lead a promiscuous existence, wandering into people’s minds  like pollen into our air-passages.

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Footnotes from the 19th century:

Dedekind … allowed his philosophy of mind  much reign, with a ‘proof’ that “there are infinite systems”;  for he gave  as evidence “the totality S of all things, which may be objects of my thought”, since  as well as any of its elements s,  it contained also “the thought s’ that can be the object of my thought …This ‘proof’ did not gain a good reception.”
-- Grattan-Guinness, The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870 - 1940 (2000), p. 105


For Frege,
In contrast to subjective ‘ideas’ (Vorstellungen), ‘thought’ was intended in an objective sense, rather like state of affairs, sharable among thinkers  and indeed independent of anyone thinking then.
-- I. Grattan-Guinness, The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870 - 1940 (2000), p. 190

Sunday, February 23, 2014

Discovery vs. Invention, again


In our essay on Hadamard,  we remarked (as did he)  that his title The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field would more felicitously have been : The Psychology of Discovery in the Mathematical Field -- and this, for reasons internal to mathematics.

Another consideration, unrelated to math per se, lies at quite another angle to all that.  Namely, that the psychology of someone who discovers (or who purports to), may differ widely from that of one who invents.
Whoso wishes to learn more about the Creation, wherewith he was confronted when (all unbidden) he first came into our sphere here below,  keeps his eyes and mind wide-open, as he walks through the world.  Whereas the inventor could be shut-up in his Fortress of Solitude, his basement tinkering-shop. 

Sometimes these cognitive stances are difficult to separate, as in experimental physics (discovering phenomena,  vs. designing experiments and inventing your own equipment).  In biology, the split can be stark.
The Naturalist observes, and notes, and ponders, and sleeps and dreams upon it, until a pattern becomes clear -- a pattern  in whose creation, he had no hand.

The Biological Blasphemer, by contrast,  one such as Dr. Frankenstein, or ‘reassignment’ surgeons, or those latter-day famuli of Dr. Moreau, 
busily sticking mouse-genes into Drosophila,
or pig-livers into people,
or cockroach-souls into orangutans,
or attempting to get a scorpion to mate with a Lamb --

these, indeed, do not discover what already lies (in some bioPlatonic World of Forms) beyond the creation of His hand,  but merely the extramarital whelping of their own: 
they rather denature Nature, until,  with Satanic originality, they reign alone, unchallenged, in a godless cosmos,  surrounded by devilkins of their own devising.


[Update 25 February 2014]  In only the latest development along these lines -- for new ones are announced almost daily, a drumbeat that deadens sensibilities -- there’s this:


Already, Heather has two mommies;  now she can have a daddy and two mommies right from conception, three people contributing genes to the gallimaufry.  In this way, Inventors hope to come up with a child born with three eyes, each of a different color.

~

These thoughts (or fulminations)  were prompted by re-reading the essay by C.S. Lewis, “Christianity and Literature”, reprinted in Rehabilitations (1939), and Christian Reflections (1967).  From  p.7 of the latter collection:
 
If I have read the New Testament aright, it leaves no room for ‘creativeness’ … Pride [in particular, that of the self-regarding artist] does not only go before a fall, but is a fall -- a fall of the creature’s attention  from what is better, God, to what is worse, itself.

-- Yet I must refrain from quoting further, since, once begun, I must needs quote the whole of it.   Therefore, reader, rather lay this present trifle aside, and study that essay for yourself.

Lewis did not live to witness  the iridescent developments of our (post)modern arts scene;  yet I doubt if these would have moved him to revise his views.  Contemporary artists (“artists” -- I would place the word in indignant quotes, save that, by now, the notion is past protecting), ever striving for something truly new,  have managed to come up with some strikingly original ideas, such as: 
* sticking a crucifix into a beaker of piss;
* masturbating onstage;  or
* nailing their penis to a plank of wood.
(Would we were making those up;  not so.)
Yet what must be their chagrin, to learn, that they thereby have done no more than recycle the shenanigans that began back in the nineteen-teens, with Dada, in Paris and Zurich (though, then, served up  with less frenzy  and more wit) !

~

[Boring and unimportant, merely-personal footnote:
It is psychologically odd that, while the pursuits I favor  are generally those that do not involve getting shot at, or tramping through mosquito-infested marsh, or fiddling with explosives in the lab,   yet my attitude to mathematics  resembles more that of the naturalist -- or even a lepidopterist -- than that of a rocket scientist.
(My own such propensities would fall well beneath the notice of Hadamard;  here I address only my fellow oligophreniacs.)  ]

Friday, May 10, 2013

Practical Platonism

 
We have  again and again  glanced  at the question of Realism in mathematics, from a philosophical perspective.
Here is a case in which the Platonist perspective is actually integral to daily practice, rather than merely something to be speculated about postprandially, over brandy and cigars:

The complication with impredicative definitions  is that we lose track of how new sets are introduced.   To justify them, we have to assume that sets are more or less already there, so that the definition merely serves to describe certain properties of pre-existing things, rather than to bring the set defined  into being.
-- Hao Wang, From Mathematics to Philosophy  (1974), p. 78

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Bertrand Russell writes, (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, chapter 13 – p. 137 of the Dover edition):
Classes are logical fictions; and a statement which appears to be about a class  will only be significant if it is capable of translation into a form in which no mention is made of the class.

Now, if anyone has a right to such nominalism about classes (a.k.a. sets), it is Bertrand Russell, who gave up the best and most difficult years of his life, laboring on Principia Mathematica, which attempted to found the whole of mathematics upon no more than logic and set theory – truly the case of angels dancing on the mosh-pit of a pin. The man has earned his stripes.  But if classes are logical fictions, please inform me what is not.

            Consider the humble hamburger.  The following are the available entrees for Friday, March 41st, at the Gödel Middle School:

            hamburger; hot dog; mystery meat.

We do not say “the singleton set consisting of the hamburger”, although really that might be more accurate (an actual *hamburger* is hot, and made of meat; how could *it* figure on a menu? and would it have ketchup if it did?).  But consider this.  The following are the meals available at said Middle School, for the price of two lunch coupons:

{hamburger, french fries, pickle}; {hotdog, potato chips; cole slaw}; {mystery meat; mystery fries; unidentified side-dish}.

            You can’t strip the set-parentheses out of that:  you’d get a jumble, the leftovers from some legendary food-fight.  Three classes, each consisting of three members, are staring us in the face.  And the food-lady is getting impatient.  Anyone have a Loewenheim-MacDonald’s model, in which the classes somehow disappear?

~

Back to Wang:

A Platonic world of ideas, unlike material things in space and time which form the basis of the physical siences, seems to have very little explanatory power in mathematics.
-- Hao Wang, From Mathematics to Philosophy  (1974), p. 49

My heart sank as I read this.  Yet on the very next page  he contradicts that diffuse and unsupported sentiment,  in quite a concrete way:

Extensions of the usual set of arithmetic axioms  seem to be just as natural, e.g. the addition of transfinite induction to the first epsilon number.  This tends to indicate that there is something absolute in the concept of number, and that we only gradually approximate it through mental experimentations.  Or, at least, we have no full control over our intentions and mental constructions, which, once in existence, tend to live a life of their own.
-- Hao Wang, From Mathematics to Philosophy  (1974), p. 50

Saturday, March 2, 2013

The Urysohn Metrization Theorem: an Adaptationist Account (updated)


People in labcoats have been puzzling over the preponderance, over a wide range of far-flung and disparate societies, of belief in the Urysohn Metrization Theorem, to the effect that every regular topological space with a countable basis is metrizable.  How to account for this strange coincidence?

A rear-guard of Platonists and theists would persist in maintaining, that every such space is, as a matter of sheer fact, metrizable;  that the fact is “out there”, like a mountain, whether or not you or I are aware of it, and whether or not we can assemble some semblance of a demonstration to “climb” it -- to clarify the assertion, make it plausible, or to ‘prove’ it in some sense.

This, however, is not the method of modern science, which spurns the affordances of mere reason, and denies the evidence of our eyes, relying instead on various  techniques and equipment in well-funded laboratories.  Accordingly, herewith an account of how belief in the Metrization Theorem arose spontaneously, by the proven processes of Natural Selection.

You see, many many years ago, a number of tribes roamed the savannah.  Some went picturesquely naked, others were draped in animal skins.  And one of these tribes, fancying that the stronger separability criterion of normality was required, whereas the only spaces to be found in their ecosystem at the time were merely regular, despaired of ever metrizing anything; sickened, and died.   Another tribe failed to reckon with the necessity of a countable basis (mere first-countability being insufficient), and promptly went extinct.  Still another lowballed the separation condition, imagining that merely being Hausdorff was enough;  their metrizations went awry, and they were eaten by mastodons.

In this way, in the fullness of geological time, the only tribes remaining  possessed an innate belief  in the so-called Theorem (which is itself, of course, completely meaningless.)   Current estimates place the gene for this Theorem on Chromosome 14.


*     *     *
~ Commercial break ~
We now return you to your regularly scheduled essay.

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[That was a philosophical satire.  For something a bit more substantive concerning the theorem in question, click here.]

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Analytical appendix:

‘Twere a mug’s game, to cite specific instances of sociobiological overreaching -- just-so stories that purport to explain Love, Music, Art, what have you.  Chesterton already skewered these several generations back.   More worth noting are the (rare) cases where such thumb-sucking is found among mathematicians themselves.
Thus Reuben Hersch (apparently during a brief psychotic episode) wrote (“Some Proposals…” (1979); repr. in Thomas Tymoczko, ed., New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics (1986, rev. 1998), p. 23):

Our mathematical ideas fit the world  for the same reason that our lungs are suited to the atmosphere of this planet.

Yet the author knows better.  Just a bit further up the page (with his customary lucidity) he wrote:

Consider the theorem  2^c < 2^(2^c), or any theorem in homological algebra.  No philosopher has yet explained in what sense such theorems should be regarded as referring to physical ‘possibilities’.


[Update 2 March 2013]  There is yet another, and deeper, level, to this Gedankensotie, which has only just now  become apparent.

At the very most superficial level, the piece is an attack of mathematical Realism.  Hopefully  none of my readers  understand it as such.
At the next, and still obvious, level, it is a defense of the same against Ultra-Darwinism (namely:  No conceivable considerations of mere individual survival can attach to these arcane topological considerations; ergo, the fact that the qualified international community is unanimous in embracing the truth of e.g. the UMT, is evidence for the transcendental truth of the latter.).  This is the spirit in which it was written, quite parallel to our essay “On the Existence of Penguins”.
But now (having re-read Freud, and been reminded of the role of the Wish-Fulfilment in dreams), I notice something quite further in this scenario of tribes perishing for misprizing the higher truths of topology:   namely, the wish that our evolution had been guided, not merely by such paltry contingencies as tricks of climate and the bite of the sabertooth, but by the very beckoning of such transcendant truths.  In pursuit of such ends,  gladly, I, and my tribe, would strive and maybe die!

Thursday, April 7, 2011

More on Minimalism


-- “More on minimalism??!!!  Isn’t that a contradiction in terms ???????”

(ahem)
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then,  I contradict myself.

~

The post below is essentially a jest -- a poetic exercise, like a haiku; 
glancing sidewise at these --
            =>  a poem without a title
            =>  a poem without words

But a serious project lies behind it.  One I am not yet ready to grapple with,
for it does go deep.


Just some hints and crumbs, to follow  whithersoever they may lead:

Reductionism:  the one-word summary of the scientific enterprise überhaupt.
Minimalism:  Principally, historically, a term about the arts;  but adopted (wisely, slyly) by Noam Chomsky, for his later program.
Platonism: a spare roster of Forms, from which mere mortals and materials are the fallout.
Euhemerism:  explaining myths (and miracles) away.
Occam’s razor:  Bold blade, slice wisely -- for indeed, our fallen world does need a shave !


Related matters:
  Axiomatics.  The logicist program.
  Isomorphism;  homeomorphism.
  The Decalogue;  the Credo; the Lord’s Prayer.
  The Constitution.

--- !!!   I have just conceived a remarkable proof and elucidation of the whole shebang!
But alas  the 140-character limit of Twitter  does not permit its exposition …

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Platonism is not the problem


Thomas Tymoczko, introduction to New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics (1986, rev. 1998), p. xiii:

To account for the indubitability, objectivity  and timelessness of mathematical results,  we are tempted to regard them as true descriptions of a Platonic world outside of space-time.  This leaves us with the problem of explaining how human beings can make contact with this reality.

Well, yes, that is indeed a question;  but not a new one.   The same conundrum confronts us in the Mind-Body problem; the problem of Free Will; and more simply, the problem of how you and I can communicate at all.  There are even puzzles at the level of mid-level objects.  The thesis of Mathematical Realism may or may not be valid, but it does not introduce a problem which we might otherwise avoid.

Monday, March 7, 2011

Realism: What (concluded)


We conclude our lexicographic exercise on the usage of the term Realism, with its application to mathematics.

The philosophy of mathematics has its own vocabulary for Realism and its rivals:  mathematical realism is called “Platonism” (in a somewhat Pickwickian sense of the term);  that we nonetheless treat this as a special case of Realism sensu lato, is itself tendentious, being part of our contention that coffee-cups are more like Riemannian manifolds than you might surmise, and that Riemannian manifolds are themselves (once you get to know them) more like coffee-cups  than is generally appreciated.


Here is an uncontroversial characterization:

Mathematical realists, or ‘Platonists’, have emphasized the non-mental nature of mathematical entities.  The addition function is not in any particular mind, nor is it the common property of all minds.  It has an independent, ‘objective’, existence.
-- Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), p. 53

By whatever name, the  plainest rival to Platonism is Constructivism.  Thus Michael Dummett, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics” (1959), reprinted in Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 166:

In the philosophy of mathematics, Platonism stands opposed to various degrees of constructivism.  According to platonism, mathematical objects are there...

And Michael Dummett, “Realism” (1963), in Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 163:

In mathematics, an anti-realist (i.e. constructivist) position  involves holding that a mathematical statement can be true only in virtue of actual evidence, that is, of our actually possessing a proof.

Note how Dummet uses “realist” (in a mathematical context) and “Platonism”  interchangeably.  He solidifies the identification by his use of the general term “nominalism” in a mathematical context as well. Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 166:

As Frege showed, the nominalist objection to platonism -- that talk about ‘abstract entities’ is unintelligible -- is ill-taken.


Michael Dummett, “Truth” (1959), repr. in Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 18:

Intuitionists speak of mathematics in a highly anti-realist (anti-platonist) way:  for them it is we who construct mathematics; it is not already there ….

Note:  only the term “constructivism” was (so far as I know) specifically confected to contrast with “Platonism”, in the way that nominalism is the antonym of realism.  But intuitionism is a whole program, not just an anti-stance.  Likewise Hilbert’s formalist program.  According to Reuben Hersh (“Some Proposals”, repr. in Thomas Tymoczko, ed., New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics (1986, rev. 1998), p. 16), 
Hilbert’s writings and conversation display full conviction that mathematical problems are questions about real objects

-- i.e., full-bore Platonism.  But for foundational reasons he championed a program called formalism.  As such, they need not logically stand in contradiction;  but in practical, psychological terms, they do tend to.  Again Hersh:
We can see the reason for the working mathematician’s uneasy oscillation between formalism and Platonism.


The view of a Dutch ‘Intuitionist’ constructivist, who balks at taking that simplest of progressions, the Natural Numbers (which even the nominalist Kronecker could swallow):

Brouwer … characterized his view on mathematics  as opbouwende wiskunde (‘constructive mathematics’) … [He] presents the natural numbers as a sequence characterized by a law, not as an infinite set.  [Yet] the continuum is introduced by a special continuum intuition.
-- Dennis Hesseling, Gnomes in the Fog:  The Reception of Brower’s Intuitionism in the 1920s (2003), p. 36

Surely this is to strain at a gnat  and swallow a camel.
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Quine, in “On What There Is” (reprinted in From a Logical Point of View), rather surprisingly uses the term logicism where we would expect Platonism:

The three main mediaeval points of view regarding universals  are designated by historians as realism, conceptualism, and nominalism.  Essentially these same three doctrines reappear in twentieth-century surveys of the philosophy of mathematics  under the new names logicism, intuitionism, and formalism.

Russelian logicism, as I understand it, and as Wiki outlines it, was something quite other, or so I thought, bearing really no relationship to Platonism at all.  But Quine knew a vast amount about all this, so perhaps there is some deep connection that I am missing.  In any case, this terminology is not widely used.



Saturday, February 12, 2011

Realism: Contrasting Terms


 [This continues a lexicographic/definitional thread begun here.]

Rather the way information about an analytic function in the interior of a region  may be gained from an examination of its values on the boundary,  the nature of Realism -- a multifaceted body of thought -- may be illuminated by various contrasts with what it is not.

Michael Dummett writes, in “Realism” (1963), repr. in  Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 145:

I was told at school that the scholastic doctrine known as realism, and opposed to nominalism, had nothing whatever to do with that opinion known as realism in later philosophy, as opposed to idealism.  It was only much later that it struck me that the two disputes bore to one another an analogy which made the use of the same designation ‘realism’ for one side in each of them  more than a pure equivocation:  although the subject-matter of the two controversies differed, there was a rememblance in the form of the disputes.

(We heartily concur in this formulation.)

Dummett goes on (p. 147) -- to the admiration of this former lexicographer -- to present a list of dichotomies:

realism about material objects, opposition to which has traditionally taken the form of phenomenalism;
realism about the theoretical entities of science, which is opposed by scientific positivism:
realism about mathematical statements, for which I shall use the standard name ‘platonism’, employed (not altogether happily) by Bernays and Quine, opposition to which is known as ‘constructivism’;
realism about mental states … to which is opposed behaviourism.

He finishes this useful roster with “realism about the past and about the future”, but provides no antonym.  We might name it for him:  “relativistic Wal-Martia".

Further dichotomies from Dummett:

Michael Dummett, “The Structure of Appearance” (1955), repr. in Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 29:

nominalistic [vs.] platonistic:  … those which do not, and those which do, use class-theory as part of the logical framework …

Michael Dummett, “Nominalism” (1956), repr. in Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 42:

The platonist is he who employs in his formalism  the machinery  either of set theory  or of higher-level quantification;  the nominalist is he who dispenses with these  and uses at most  the calculus of individuals.


Michael Dummett, “Truth” (1959), repr. in Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 18:

Intuitionists speak of mathematics in a highly anti-realist (anti-platonist) way:  for them it is we who construct mathematics; it is not already there ….

Intermediate between the anti-realist just-so-story view, and the fullbore realist account:

Fregean notion of a mathematical reality waiting to be discovered
-- id.

To all this, Dummett offers a compromise (one  to my mind, incoherent):

If we think that mathematical results are in some sense imposed on us from without, we could have instead the picture of a mathematial reality not already in existence, but as it were  coming into being as we probe.  Our investigations bring into existence  what was not there before, but what they bring into existence  is not of our own making.


Michael Dummett, “Frege’s Philosophy” (1967), repr. in Truth and other enigmas (1978), p. 88:

Frege would have to be classified as a member of the realist revolt against Hegelian idealism … but apart from his assault upon psychologism, Frege barely troubled to attack idealism at all; he simply passed it by.

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Miscellaneous further dichotomies:

William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890), vol. II, p. 617:

This structure is supposed by the apriorists to be of transcendental origin, or at any rate  not to be explicable by experience;  whilst by evolutionary empiricists  it is supposed to be also due to experience, only not to the experience of the individual, but to that of his ancestors as far back as one may please to go.

Note that one can consistently hold both positions, in the following sharpened sense:  and in this sense it is in fact the position of Chomsky and his followers vis-à-vis our linguistic apparatus.   John’s linguistic (tacit) knowledge is not (fully) explicable by his own, personal experience;  one is however at liberty to suppose that his connate Language Acquistion Device may have been moulded by Natural Selection, acting upon untold generations of his ancestors.


Quine, in Hahn & Schilpp, eds., The Philosophy of W. V. Quine (1986), p. 619:
Duhem’s fictionalistic attitude toward physics  and my realistic attitude

Thomas Tymoczko, ed., New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics (1986, rev. 1998), p. xvi:
the dichotomy between realism and constructivism:  is mathematics discovered or invented?


Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (1993), p. 188:
At the strongly irrealist end, there is Rorty's proposed identification of 'true' with 'what you can defend against all comers'.
 

Reuben Hersh, in Thomas Tymoczko, ed., New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics (1986, rev. 1998), p. 11:

The typical working mathematician is a Platonist on weekdays  and a formalist on Sundays.

Friday, December 10, 2010

The Urysohn Metrization Theorem: an Adaptationist Account


People in labcoats have been puzzling over the preponderance, over a wide range of far-flung and disparate societies, of belief in the Urysohn Metrization Theorem, to the effect that every regular topological space with a countable basis is metrizable.  How to account for this strange coincidence?
A rear-guard of Platonists and theists would persist in maintaining, that every such space is, as a matter of sheer fact, metrizable;  that the fact is “out there”, like a mountain, whether or not you or I are aware of it, and whether or not we can assemble some semblance of a demonstration to “climb” it -- to clarify the assertion, make it plausible, or to ‘prove’ it in some sense.
This, however, is not the method of modern science, which spurns the affordances of mere reason, and denies the evidence of our eyes, relying instead on various  techniques and equipment in well-funded laboratories.  Accordingly, herewith an account of how belief in the Metrization Theorem arose spontaneously, by the proven processes of Natural Selection.

You see, many many years ago, a number of tribes roamed the savannah.  Some went picturesquely naked, others were draped in animal skins.  And one of these tribes, fancying that the stronger separability criterion of normality was required, whereas the only spaces to be found in their ecosystem at the time were merely regular, despaired of ever metrizing anything; sickened, and died.   Another tribe failed to reckon with the necessity of a countable basis (mere first-countability being insufficient), and promptly went extinct.  Still another lowballed the separation condition, imagining that merely being Hausdorff was enough;  their metrizations went awry, and they were eaten by mastodons.

In this way, in the fullness of geological time, the only tribes remaining  possessed an innate belief  in the so-called Theorem (which is itself, of course, completely meaningless.)   Current estimates place the gene for this Theorem on Chromosome 14.


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We now return you to your regularly scheduled essay.

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[That was a philosophical satire.  For something a bit more substantive concerning the theorem in question, click here.]

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Analytical appendix:

‘Twere a mug’s game, to cite specific instances of sociobiological overreaching -- just-so stories that purport to explain Love, Music, Art, what have you.  Chesterton already skewered these several generations back.   More worth noting are the (rare) cases where such thumb-sucking is found among mathematicians themselves.
Thus Reuben Hersch (apparently during a brief psychotic episode) wrote (“Some Proposals…” (1979); repr. in Thomas Tymoczko, ed., New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics (1986, rev. 1998), p. 23):

Our mathematical ideas fit the world  for the same reason that our lungs are suited to the atmosphere of this planet.

Yet the author knows better.  Just a bit further up the page (with his customary lucidity) he wrote:

Consider the theorem  2^c < 2^(2^c), or any theorem in homological algebra.  No philosopher has yet explained in what sense such theorems should be regarded as referring to physical ‘possibilities’.