Historians have long wondered, how, as late as December
1941, with a world war raging, and a litany of Japanese grievances against the
U.S., the officers and sailors at our principal Pacific naval base were all sitting around with their
thumbs up their butts, the ships berthed cheek-by-jowl, an impossibly alluring
target.
A secondary puzzle was, did FDR have any advance intel that
such an attack was likely, but ignored it?
(Let us set aside the conspiracy-theory that he knew
but let it happen.) If so, he would take a seat beside Stalin, who likewise had
been remarkably lackadaisical with respect to Nazi Germany, which had been
waging blitzkrieg, but from whom he felt safe, owing to the piece of paper
known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
Stalin actually did have warning, from Japan-based master-spy Richard
Sorge, and quite precise warning at that:
“Der Krieg wird am 22. Juni beginnen, ” a
message sent on 15 June.
This was ignored.
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Toleja so ... |
A lesser-known possibility is that Washington did receive
warning of an impending sneak-attack, and indeed from Sorge’s circle. A Comintern memoirist who had
repeated contact with Sorge
writes:
Kurz vor ihrem Hochgehen in
Tokio gab die Gruppe “Ramsay” [i.e., Sorge] noch eine hochbedeutsame
Meldung an zwei Adressaten
durch: Moskau und
Washingtron. Gewiß gelangte sie
auf auf den Schreibtisch Stalins, vermutlich nicht auf den Schreibtisch Präsident
Roosevelts: die Meldung, daß die
Japaner ohne Kriegserklärung auf den wichtigsten Flottenstützpunkt
der USA im Pazifik, Pearl Harbor, für Anfang Dezember unter strengster Geheimhaltung vorbereiterten.
-- Ruth von Mayenburg, Hotel Lux (1978), p. 144
She goes on to state that Sorge’s Yugoslav coworker Branko
Vukelić tipped off an American friend as to the impending attack, to no avail.
In any event, the lesson of 7 December was not promptly
learned, for on 8 December, in the Philippines, another branch of the service
was likewise caught with its breeches down. Let Professor Wiki tell it:
Even though tracked by radar and
with three U.S. pursuit squadrons in the air, when Japanese bombers of the 11th
Kōkūkantai attacked Clark Field at 12:40 pm, they achieved tactical surprise.
Two squadrons of B-17s were dispersed on the ground. Most of the P-40s of the
20th PS were preparing to taxi and were struck by the first wave of 27 Japanese
twin-engine Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers; only four of the 20th PS
P-40Bs managed to take off as the bombs were falling.
A second bomber attack (26
Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers) followed closely, then escorting Zero
fighters strafed the field for 30 minutes, destroying 12 of the 17 American
heavy bombers present and seriously damaging three others. Two damaged B-17s
were made flyable and taken to Mindanao, where one was destroyed in a ground
collision.
A near-simultaneous attack on the
auxiliary field at Iba to the northwest by 54 "Betty" bombers was
also successful: all but four of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron's P-40s, short on
fuel and caught in their landing pattern, were destroyed No formal
investigation took place regarding this failure as occurred in the aftermath of
Pearl Harbor. The Far East Air Force lost fully half its planes in the
45-minute attack, and was all but destroyed over the next few days, including a
number of the surviving B-17s lost to takeoff crashes of other planes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines_Campaign_(1941%E2%80%9342)
Thus, not only December seventh, but December eighth, is draped in crape.