Showing posts with label John Searle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Searle. Show all posts

Friday, December 26, 2014

Ontological Epigrams


Okhamians like Quine (for so I shall refer to him, out of deference to my former professor, so as to avoid the loathsome connotations of Nominalist) are concerned not to clutter up the ontology with extra entities like facts or meanings which parallel and move in unison with statements  without really adding anything useful.  Strawson (a reliable nutshell-stuffer) puts it in a nutshell  thus:

Facts are what statements (when true) state;  they are not what statements are about.
-- P.F.Strawson, “Truth” (1950; often anthologized)

~     ~     ~

Quantum superposition is ontological, not epistemological.  It is not that we don’t know what state the cat is in.

(Unfortunately I have forgotten who said this.  Mark Twain?)

~     ~     ~


The ontological touchstone for British analytic philosophy, whether of the Idealist or the Empiricist inclination, has ever been the Tree in the Quad.    For several thousand years, this noble oak has been under uninterrupted observation by a rota of pre-Chalcolithic druids, lest it pop out of being, unobserved.  What a shame that would be!  It was such a nice tree!

~     ~     ~

The first question of ontology is:  What is there?
The answer to this, as Quine put it: Everything.
(Yet adds the stern proviso:  But no more than that.)

The second is, of each thing:  What is it?
To answer this, we may revise good Bishop Butler thus.
=>  Everything is, what it is  --  along with several other things as well.

Thus: a diamond is:

* A costly gem, proverbial for hardness
* A face-centered cubic crystaline allotrope of carbon
* A girl’s best friend
* Forever.


Given this, the question, What is Being? (überhaupt or tout court), must be categorized as meta-ontological.

~     ~     ~

Meinong’s bizarre deviation(**) … was … jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein.  Oddly enough, I find this idea a good one, provided that we bolster it with Bentham’s theory of fictions.  Contextual definition, or what Bentham called paraphrasis, can enable us to talk very considerably and conveniently about putative objects  without footing an ontological bill.  It is a strictly legitimate way of making theories in which there is less than meets the eye.
--- Quine, “Existence and Quantification”

The concluding epigram of that paragraph  is particularly relished by Minimalists.

(** Note:  The reference is to that philosopher’s ontological exuberence,  and not to any possible undue familiarities with capybaras during off-hours.)

~     ~     ~

Thus far the apophthegmatic epitome.  If these have whetted your appetite, click here.

[Orthoepic update]  Since folks keep clicking on this post, I'll add this:
The fifty-dollar first word of this essay  refers to the Nominalist, William of Okham.  That last word is pronounced OCK-um.  But the adjective, Okhamian (which I possibly just made up, but on a proper model) would be pronounced ock-HAY-mee-an.
Try to work this into your next singles-bar conversation.  It's guaranteed.


~     ~     ~

« Ontology can be saved  with a sufficient ideology. »
-- Saul Kripke, “Is There a Problem about Substitutional Quantification?”,
in: Evans & McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning (1976), p. 343

Not sure what that means, exactly;  but it has a lilt to it, like “Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist”;  of which, perhaps, it is a paraphrase.

Thursday, January 2, 2014

The Golden Mountain does not exist

At Berkeley, in the 1970’s, I audited an introductory philosophy class taught by John Searle.  He is not a deep thinker by any means, but he’s an engaging guy, and I enjoyed it. 
With us in the class (so the whispers went) was Jerry Mathers, aka “The Beaver”, now quite silent and overweight.  Hard to be an ex-child-star.  No-one ever outright asked him “Are you…?”, and he for his part was just silent, taking few notes, so I don’t really know whether it was The Beaver or not.  And in particular, I have no juicy celebrity anecdotes to sell.  Anyhow, be well, man, wherever and whoever you were/are.

To resume.
In the course of this class, arriving at the subject of Ontology, Professor Searle, introducing the views of (one whom we would then have described as) “one Meinong” (later known to his admirers as “Alexius the Great”), pronounced (in his typical, slightly nasal, “but I want to argue that…” voice, as far as can be from mysticism or reverie) the following astonishing sentence:

The Golden Mountain     does not exist
(pause)
(* sigh *)
………………………………. (dream  dream  dream  dream  dream ) ………

What a beautiful sentence.    What a wonderful collection of words.

Now, Professor Searle is a busy man; having dispatched the matter of Existence and Subsistence and suchlike Meinongian curiosa, he hurried on to the next topic (if it’s Tuesday, this must be the Theory of Descriptions).   Yet did I continue to dream…

How sweet the fragrance of thy meadows, O mountain of gold!  Thy brooks -- how pure!  How melodious, thy larks!
Thy non-existence -- but a gentle defect, we forgive it freely.

Well.
I shall have nothing further to say about the Golden Mountain, here;
nor about Saint Alexius.

Supposedly a photograph of Meinong, but more likely a spectral image

This post is simply to have something to link to, when, in other essays,
when the fit comes on me, I blurt out “Golden Mountain!”
and the readers wonder, What the F---?!?

So now you know all about the Golden Mountain.


[Update 2014:


~

For further mystical insights, click here:
 Also available for your Nook

Ein Schloß am Meere;    später liegt es  nicht direkt am Meer
-- Freud, Traumdeutung (1900)

Thursday, May 31, 2012

Morality and mindlessness


Today’s headline in the Washington Post:

Appeals court rejects Defense of Marriage Act
Federal appeals court says law discriminates against married gay couples

I’ll not say a word here for or against homosexual marriage: that is a matter for moral reasoning, personal preference, legislation, etc., not for a logician.   But it does fall within our purview to observe that the wording above is absurd, and a travesty of law.   Legislate for gay marriage if you wish, fine;  but to justify overturning existing law with such paltering tergiversation as that above, is to degrade your legal, moral, and linguistic understanding.

In exactly the same sense:
=> Laws against incest “discriminate against” married brother-sister pairs.
=> Laws agains polygamy “discriminate against” plural marriage.
=> Laws against bestiality “discriminate against” anyone who wishes to wed his pet goat.   (That last is no satire;  such things have happened.  One woman actually “married” the Berlin wall.)
=> Laws against burglary "discriminate against" burglars.
And so on.
An elementary logical point, but one increasingly beyond the grasp of an infantilized electorate.

~


See the Comments section below for Dr Massey’s thoughtful reply.
Yet I must observe that, strictly, he is changing the subject -- or rather, introducing a subject, since my original point, being strictly one of logic, was (as such and eô ipsô) independent of any particular subject-matter (in particular, of anything to do with sex per se).   The point concerns legal and moral reasoning; if we go wrong there, then we shall err in any particular case as well.


The point was first brought home to me in John Searle’s ethics class, at Berkeley, lo these many years ago.    The Right being considered on that day was not Marriage, but Free Speech.    Professor Searle wished to clear up the confused thinking that says, say, that banning or restricting access to movies that wallow in romanticized paraphilia is Censorship (bad);  likewise when a government, while nowise banning certain art, declines to continue to subsidize it (bad, very bad);  whereas mulcting someone for falsely crying “Fire!” in a crowded theatre  is no infringement upon the sacred and intangible Right to Free Speech.
“What I want to say is” (said Searle, in characteristic phrasing) “that of course it’s an infrigement upon Free Speech -- a limitation of its exercise.  It simply happens to be one which, when all the countervailing factors are considered,  society has decided to approve.”

In similar fashion, various societies at various times may decide to infringe Free Speech by crimping treasonable speech, slander, blasphemy, "speaking evil of the dead" (a law of Solon) or incitement to riot.

~

Consider, further, this, from this morning’s New York Times:

Once again, it is no part of my brief, in this thread, to comment on the ins and outs, the whys and wherefors of public financing of education, let alone upon The Idea of a University and beyond.   But simply to point out that the following two quotations (from different public figures) that appear uncommented in the article, are in fact in direct contradicition:

“This is the code red we’re in,” he said. “We’re not cutting into muscle or tissue, we’re cutting into artery.”
vs.
 “Like anything in California, the delivery of higher education is not performance based. They’ve created new campuses and programs based on politics and not need.”

The former quote is rhetorically arresting, ratcheting the usual metaphor of “by now we’re not cutting fat, we’re cutting muscle [or bone]” up one eye-catching notch.  But the second quote suggests that there is in fact plenty of fat, and that if the surgeon is hacking up arteries, he must be impaired.


Note that, in the Labels section below, you will not find either “sex” or “education” (subjects on which we have elsewhere explicitly blogged), since this particular post concerns neither.


~

Or indeed, this, from the radio, just a moment ago.   (This sort of  offense against logic and bare empiricism  goes on all the time, all the time.  Mostly we filter it out;  but having just posted the above, my antennae were up.)

Husni Mubarak has just been sentenced to life-imprisonment.  The gravamen of the charges against him:  having ordered his security forces to fire on the Tahrir Square protestors with live ammunition.
Now NPR reports the same story but saying that the core of the case was that Mubarak “failed to stop the killing of protestors”.

Well, so failed we all.   -- Wipe from your mind all political preferences in this particular case, and notice the rank contradiction between the two characterizations.  
The former version of the charges is narrow;  the analogue might apply to President Hoover and General MacArthur for their assault upon the Bonus Army in 1932;  under the broader, we might all be in the dock.

Tuesday, January 25, 2011

I’d Like to Add Just One Thing


[This is a continuation of a thread begun here.]


The fundamental theorem of enumeration, independently discovered by several anonymous cave dwellers, states that the number of elements in a set  is the sum over all elements of that set  of the constant function 1.
-- Doron Zeilberger, “Enumerative and Algebraic Combinatorics”, in Timothy Gowers, ed., The Princeton Companion to Mathematics (2008), p. 67

The very simplest thing one can do with the natural numbers, beyond simply admiring them, is to add two of them together.  Do we understand how to do this?


[Update:   My mistake.
The very simplest thing you can do is, given one of them, take its successor.  Addition is a binary relation; whereas

Counting-one-more is a unary operation in the set of numbers.
-- Andrew Gleason,  Fundamentals of Abstract Analysis (1966), p. 88]

            I don’t mean practically:  that we occasionally get our sums wrong, no more shows that we can’t add – let alone that there is any paradox at the heart of addition – than an occasional stutter or solecism  shows that we can’t talk – always provided that, in each case, we recognize our error when it is pointed out. (“You’re right; I meant to say ‘357’/’palimpsest’.")  I mean, conceptually:  Do we truly understand what addition is, beyond our comforting successes up to this point, in stacking one smallish number on top of another?

            Time for a parable.  Farmer John pulls into his long driveway, rolls to a stop, turns off the ignition, and announces that he knows how to drive; been driving for up’erds o’ forty years, in fact.  To all appearances, we must agree.  But then we learn that he has never driven over 5 mph, never used reverse gear  nor indeed any gear beyond the first, never driven on a highway  nor indeed any route but that half-mile stretch between his driveway and the barn, and thus never had to use turn signals (or headlights, or windshield wipers, etc.), or the brakes.  We might then say that he doesn’t quite know how to drive.   He then retorts:  But this is driving, this is what I mean by the word, just this and nothing more; and I do it perfectly. 
            At this point one could make the usual observations about language-games, you say tomahto I say tomayto, all that, but I wish to point to something quite different: to something not linguistical at all, nor a “matter of semantics”, nor of convention: something out there, and quite real:  the automobile itself.  A top-of-the-line Mercedes, as it happens (seems rather wasted on our farmer friend).  John does what he does with it, and may call that what he likes; but we may note as an objective fact  -- true, as it were, across all possible worlds – that he has not exhausted the capabilities of the actual machine.  Can you say that you have eaten, if you have chewed, but not swallowed?

            In his Wittgenstein, Kripke tries to outline a skeptical problem about addition, by defining a new operation, quus, which corresponds to plus sometimes and not others, and getting all into a lather about that.  The move is much like Nelson Goodman’s celebrated/execrated blue vs. grue, a nice enough puzzle that was funny the first time.  Essentially, quus is plus when the summands are small enough, and collapses thereafter.  It’s the sort of artificial move that can give skepticism a bad name. (Nor am I here to clear that name.  Doubt the existence of your own head, if you must; but go do it behind the barn.)
            Now in fact, real arithmetical puzzles do exist, even in the matter of addition, without the invention of any artificial operations.  (I shall now sit down and sup with the devil of skepticism; but observe this long spoon.)   If you go on long enough, addition does totter – and almost falls; yet at that point where the nominalist bellows, “Ist gerichtet!”, a sweeter and yet mightier voice calls: “Ist gerettet!”; as we shall hear.

            Meanwhile back in parable country, Farmer Jim has been introduced to a horseless carriage for the first time. He admires its sleek lines, its metallic glint, its rumble when the engine is turned on.  He gets in, rolls forward one foot, and gets out.  “Nice,” he says, “very nice.  But I can go farther on my horse.”

            Likewise with addition.  Although the core and essence of addition is indeed simply that of tacking one number onto another, it is of the essence of math, as of language, that the operation is recursive: having done it  you can do it again, with the output of the first addition  an input to the second one;  and so forth, for a while; then stop.
            Now  we could in fact stop here, with no further concepts or developments, and have a perfectly coherent, and quite useful, operation of addition.   Had we not been created but a little lower than the angels, we probably would.  Every sum, let us say of a, b,c, d, and e, is to be performed thus:
            (((( a+b) + c) + d) + e)
This model for addition we may dub that of the Downs Syndrome Grocery Clerk (a familiar figure).  The items to be tallied  come along a conveyor belt, seriatim, and are rung up  one by one  until the items run out.  The details of the arithmetic have been exported to the cash register, just as the details of definite integrals are often exported to computers or math tables.  Let's not have any Searlian "Chinese Room" nonsense now: So long as the clerk punches in the integer written on each item as it comes, he is indeed adding; he has the entire system under his belt, as far as it goes.
            Consider now a more advanced grocery clerk.  After some glitch on the conveyor belt, two items (let’s keep it simple) arrive together.  Which shall he ring up first?  At this point, the Downs Syndrome model breaks down; we need something a little stronger.  Well, infinitely stronger, in fact, but let’s not emphasize that point just yet.  We add the proviso that addition of natural numbers is commutative: take the addends in whatever order you like.  Moreover, this clerk – who, let us say, has no cash register, but must do the sums in his head or on paper --sometimes saves himself some trouble, thus:  Presented with
            apple (25 cents) plus banana (30 cents) plus ten oranges @15 cents each
he does not add each orange successively to the previous sum of the apple and banana, but adds their own total sum to what proceeded:  .25 + .30 + 1.50    To justify this, we require that addition be associative:  for instance,  (a + b) + c = a + (b + c). 
            Put these two operations together, then, given that there is no upper limit on the (finite) number of things that can be added, you have now added either one mighty fire-breathing rule involving advanced quantification over infinite sets and strings, or else an infinite number of finite rule-schemata, each of which is an instance of the taboo’d fire-breather.  Either way, you’ve made a huge step, and you’re still just a grocery clerk.

            This strengthened system of addition is adequate to all the needs of the grocery.  But now we step out to the playing fields, where Achilles is racing a tortoise (who was given an advance lead).  A philosopher who (here with some reason) doubts his own head, points out that Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise.  We point out that he can – indeed look, he just has – but to do so we had to add up an infinite series,
            1 + 1/2 + 1/4  +1/8 + ….
Now we are facing yet another sort of infinity: not any actual infinite number (we shall still shun that, for now), nor infinitely many rule-schemata describing finitary processes, but a procedure with infinitely many terms.   So, are we cool with that?  We’d better be;  because look:  Achilles won.

            Now the finitist pounces.  “Does your grocery store allow rebates?”, he asks, innocently enough.
            “Why, yes.”
            “A-ha!  Then you must allow negative numbers in your sums.”
            “Well, yes, that can be done.  Our cash register is actually programmed for that.”
            “Good.  For now I’ve got you.” And he shows us the infinite sum
                1 – 1 + 1 – 1 + 1 – 1 + 1 ….
            Now, as it stands, that expression is ambiguous – though no more so than “1 + 2 + 3…”.  We allow ourselves to make do with expressions like the latter, because we agreed that you may group the terms however you like; it makes no difference.  Only now it does:
            (1 – 1) + (1 – 1) + …
yields partial sums  0, 0, 0, … and so converges to 0;
            1  (-1  + 1) (-1 + 1)
yields partial sums 1,1,1,… and so converges to 1; whereas
            ((…((1) – 1) +1) -1) ……………..
yields partial sums 1, 0, 1, 0, and so doesn’t converge at all.
            And worse is to come.  In steps the concierge of the Hilbert Hotel, and reassigns the guests to new rooms:  each guest in a room of even number k, is moved to room 2k.  Now the sum looks like this:
            1 + 1 -1  + 1 + 1 – 1 + 1 + 1 – 1 ….
which, suitably grouped by the threes of the minimal ecurring pattern, yields
            1 + 1 + 1 + ….
which diverges to infinity.
            So much (our finitist cries in triumph) for your easy accomodation of infinities – it has led you right over a cliff!  Be ye content therefore with finite sums, with finite everything.  Let Achilles  forever lag  behind that tortoise, in this finite life; abjure for aye the everlasting; and worship ye the finite godling, Mbumbo, lord of all the dumbos, creator of all things visible and that’s it.

            At this point, we really are properly chastened; we do not know what to reply.  But let us look back, to earlier testaments, and see if they provide guidance.
            Often in history, mathematicians have shrunk back, with something like horror, upon encountering something ontologically unprecedented.  So it was with the irrationals, the imaginaries, the non-Euclidean geometries, the infinitessimals (here the shrinking was much delayed, and the unshrinking rather recent), and much else.  And had they experienced a permanent failure of will – or of trust in the creations (or as it may be, lineaments) of our infinite Father – and never returned to the subject, the initial shock might have attained, in time, the force of a precept, an Awful Warning.  Yea, it is related, that in the distant past, a sailor proclaimed the irrationals, and was cast into the sea.  Yea and another, in a farther age, did espouse the imaginaries, and was crucified head-downwards.

            It turns out, though, that the problem of indefinitely iterated addition  can be tamed, at least partially.  Doing so involves a conceptual detour, to the notion of “absolute convergence”.  Once that is understood, infinite sums separate essentially into sheep and goats:  the sheep-series converge as nicely as you like, with shepherding (re-arrangements) allowed; the goat series stink, and are to be shunned (save as further techniques may allow us to herd a few of these).

            This fable is reasonably reflective of the actual developments, though it has been compressed, and truncated before subsequent ingeniosities like Cesaro-summation.  An even clearer instance of a case, in which we thought we understood a concept, and had even become rather adept at slinging it around, only to discover that we didn’t know how to proceed when we came to the edge of a certain cliff, is provided by integration.  Here the infinite process was present from the start (even for a bounded function on a compact domain): the ever-shrinking rectangles of the Riemann integral.  Thus, the case is not like that of mere addition, where indeed we might have planted our flag without ever crossing over the line (and how soon it came! right in the grocery store!) into infinite collections of rule-schemata or infinite processes.  (There is, so to speak, no analogous Downs Syndrome Theory of Integration, and those suffering from that affliction  are advised to steer clear of integrals.) Yet some otherwise-lovable functions  are not Riemann-integrable; others still are, yet their collection can converge to a function that is not.   The perplexities led to a new kind of integral, called the Lebesgue integral: and thus to a realization that what we had thought was integration tout court, was really only one species of what turns out to be a more general idea.
            The latter saga has an after-fable: for it was this general perplexity that impelled Cantor down a path that led eventually to something quite unlooked-for, and which still lifts the bristles at the back of the neck:  the topless tower of uncountable infinities.  These were thus sired   not of a fever, nor an opium-dream,  but from (at origin) the quite practical matter of adding stuff up.  If you open Cantor’s closet, that’s what falls out.

            And so, to reply to the imaginary speaker of the title:  You might like to add just one thing, but, unless you shut your eyes to the bloom and truth of the Creation, you’ll wind up adding much more.  In for a penny, in for a pound; in for an integer, in for the infinite.