COINCIDENCE AND COSMOS

[The following is from a letter sent to a friend, who had reported a troubling coincidence, some years ago.]

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COINCIDENCE AND COSMOS

I don’t see those two coincidences – yours or mine – as particularly startling.  But neither my being unimpressed, nor your being impressed, should weigh particularly heavily in the epistemological balance-pan.  For mankind is notoriously incapable of estimating probabilities in most instances.

One of the side benefits of faith is supposed to be  that it tends to preserve us from superstitions that might otherwise get sucked in to the vacuum where faith should be. (Chesterton was fond of emphasizing, and dramatizing, this point.)  Actually I was never superstitiously inclined, even before baptism; but now there is a warrant to just wave these things off – things superficially much more suggestive.   For, I don’t believe that God communicates via such hole-in-corner monkey-tricks.

Such incidents, when they crop up, are undeniably intriguing.  The appeal seems to be  that they hint at a pattern on the other side of the carpet, which we see only wrong-side-on.  But then, as theists, we already know that; we don’t need the occasional odd chiming of chance, to tell us so.  What is worthy only of Las Vegas, should stay in Vegas.

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One of the things  I’ve been doing with my new-found, fiber-furnished bandwidth, is watching free online episodes of a TV series, “Lost”.   The whole thing is predicated on Baader-Meinhof phenomena.   

The problem with that  as the basis for a multi-year series, is that it is all too easy to conjure up.  Just as magic tricks are yawners if performed on television, which can always resort to special effects, so spooky coincidences are startling only if they happen to you.   It’s a very lazy genre.   For comedy to work, it has to be funny; and even a decent car-chase demands artistry to stage.  But any footling apprentice can have a stranger say (after you meet him in an empty stadium in Australia, and then part company), “See you in another life”; and then a few minutes later, a world away on a mysterious island, in a bunker far below the earth, you run into the same guy, now wild-eyed and bearded, and stammer, “Y-y-y-you….!”   Still, “Lost” not a boring show.  The whole art consists in having an artfully selected Bridge-over-San-Luis-Rey set of castaways  -- the pert freckled girl, the doughty doctor whose stubble is never shorter nor longer than a four-day growth, the Black guy, the Fat guy, the this-and-that guy – and send them through a minuet of interactions, spiced by tingly synchronicities,  so that the coincidences become tonal, as in music.

Featuring prominently among the guiding coincidences of the show is a short sequence of small integers, arranged in order.  Fat Guy overhears a mental patient (whom the numbers have driven mad) muttering them over and over, and with them, wins the lottery!  Woo-ooo!  But then very bad things start happening to everyone he goes near!! Woo-oo-ooo!  And then they turn up engraved at the entrance to that bunker!  Woo-oo-ooo-oo-oooo!  The sequence, unremarkable upon inspection…

Actually, I must confess at this point, that I am loath to write the sequence down, though it is only the whim of a TV show.  It is not superstition exactly; more like, “Get thee behind me…”  For, although God does not communicate by such monkey-tricks, the Devil might…  Anyhow, it contains an old favorite “23”.   An otherwise highly intelligent (though atheist) friend of mine  was mesmerized by this number, whose spectral footprint seemed to be everywhere.  It turns out he is not alone in his obsession; an entire movie was made (unfortunately, not a good one), about the eerie qualities of this integer.

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There is one place where startling coincidences really are intriguing; and it is as far from Old Pagan or New Age spookery as possible.  I mean:  math and science.  For, the same underlying structures keep popping up in a variety of guises; the wild kaleidoscope of the world  appears, upon analysis, to be dreamed up out of a few symmetries  and a few bits of colored glass.

Here too it is possible to go astray, seeing significance where there is none.The great Eddington was much taken with the fact, that the Fine Structure Constant of physics (a dimensionless number, of course, otherwise its numerical value would be arbitrary) is very very close to 1/137 (or whatever the figure was).  Odd he should have noticed, this, actually; did he carry around reciprocals of all the integers in his head?  Anyhow, he hypothesized that the FSC was exactly 1/137; and busied himself attempting to explain the discrepancy as measured.  Well, it turned out to be mere gematria.  The FSC is not the reciprocal of an integer, and there’s an end to it.

The smaller the integer, the more it is likely to play a role in disparate structures essentially by happenstance.  Two is the king of them all – duality, binarism – and thus is indeed a very significant number, but rather in the way that water is a significant compound – you don’t get goosebumps when you discover another example.   Much more troubling are huge numbers, such as the ratio of the strength of the Coulomb force to that of gravity – how do you construct a cosmos out of such ill-matched yoke-mates?   Or, to take a recent example from mathematics, consider such apparently unrelated fields as the study of j-functions, and that of finite simple groups.  The first nontrivial factor in one of the series of the former is 196,884; the smallest number of dimensions in which the largest of the latter can operate, is 196,883.   A connection, or close but no cigar? 

~

Foot-note (tail-note, butt-note) anent the Dark Prince.

Two of my favorite Christian authors, G.K. Chesterton and C.S. Lewis,  offer antithetical depictions of the Devil.  Chesterton’s is more romantic and medieval:

Roses are redder  when you believe in the Devil.

Lewis’s, by contrast, in the Silent Planet trilogy, in Screwtape, and in The Great Divorce, depicts what we might call the Trivial Devil (though no less dangerous for all that).  There is no romance to him; there is, we may say, Nothing to Recommend Him.  He is no Satanic Majesty, but more like a Satanic Misery,  a Satanic Minionism -- a Mere Mechanism.  And as a mechanism, he is given to chitter-chattery repe(titi)tition.

An example of what we could term a “diabolical” coincidence, in this Lewisian sense,  occurs in “The Matrix”, when a black cat (Satan in miniature, as it might be) passes, right to left, outside the doorway, and then, right after that, or sort of seguing into it, a -- a black cat passes, right to left, outside the doorway.   Neo remarks on the coincidence, merely curious, but his more seasoned team-mates are instantly more knowing and alarmed, for they recognize a revealing glitch in the diabolical master-program that runs the Matrix.   The faults and behaviors of the dark lords who run the place, are eminently mechanical, since they are, in fact, machines.

On Crunchy Numbers

In the Ike era, we grew up on Wonderbread® :  a sort of Brot ohne Eigenschaften whose edulcorated transmogrification is known as Twinkies.

Since that time, we have learned to abjure, not only such treif, but anything not calling itself wholegrain.   Or, better still, multigrain: some brands boast seven grains, a few claim twelve; disparate mixtures  full of gritty, grainy, crunchy goodness.

 

Now  our local upscale supermarket offers a variety of own-branded bread, that boasts (in large letters) no fewer than

27 GRAINS

That really surprised me.   It’s one of the main points of Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel  that digestible, domesticable, feasibly growable grains  are not to be had for the asking;  there just aren’t that many of them.   The explanation is that, a little lower down and in smaller font, the label reads

AND SEEDS

In other words, this brand of bread is equally at home in the bakery and in the bird-feeder.

Our son, scoffing at this terminological legerdemain, inquired why the market chose “27” of all things.   Unhesitating I replied, “Because it is three to the third power -- the trinitarian pinnacle of the Perfect Cubes”.  -- Said heir and offspring, himself a nascent mathematician, appreciated the point, but doubted that your average shopper was aware of such things.

And indeed, there is a larger point.   For number-theorists like Ramanujan, each integer has its own flavor, its own biography and backstory -- cf. the famous incident of the taxicab numbers (in which G.H. Hardy plays the straight-man or fall-guy).  But for ordinary folks, like rocket scientists (who deal with contingent analogue quantities, rather than integral transcendent entities) or English professors (surrounded by a midge-cloud of  pre- or sub-arithmetical post-modernists), all but a very few -- small -- integers  will be featureless.   Some will be visually familiar:  3 and 4 (the triangle, the square), 5 (the quincunx on dice), 6 (boxcars, ditto),  7 (a “lucky” number for the superstitious) or 23 (ditto, for the more cerebral), 10 (count your fingers), 20 (with its portrait of Jackson).   Some will be familiar for incidental, non-mathematical reasons, like 100 and 1000 (which owe their prominence to the accident of base-10 notation -- a case of decimal fetishism).   --  Those associations are widely shared;  but there may be others  more individual;  as, (mostly for girls), “sweet sixteen” (or in Latin America, la quinceañera).   Indeed,  any integer small enough that you have lived that number of years (particularly those for which you still kept track of your birthdays).    As, the poem(-collection) “Now We Are Six” (by A.A. Milne), an anniversary in memory still green (and which I teach to the neighborhood children when they reach that delightful threshold).  Or…. 27;  which, even before I had attained that age, always seemed numinous (probably, indeed, for its prime-power nature), and which was ratified as such by my marrying at exactly that age, quite close to my birthday.    Whereas, for most folks, a number like 81 (pourtant a perfect square, as well as  3^2^2, to boot) tells no tale, sings no melody.

~

The preceding remarks are of psychological or anthropological interest, but of no moment for mathematics itself:  They present an external, human-centered view of the integers.  But further considerations suggest a subtle distinction between two ways a given integer may be “interesting” (a more bloodless equivalent of our anthropomorphic term crunchy).   We might dub these internal and external:  both times internal to mathematics as a whole, but in one case only, internal to number theory in its most elementary sense.

Thus, consider 5.  Number-theoretically, it’s a prime and that is pretty much that; but in the geometry of three-space, it is the number of Platonic solids.  Or 17:  Number-theoretically it is both a prime and a Fermat number; but in the geometry of two-space, it is the number of crystallographic planar symmetries.  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallpaper_group

Or: 230, the number of space groups.

Here, the integer in question is not a creature or crystal considered distinct and in itself, but a stopping-point one arrives at by calculating and counting.  There might have turned out to be, say, 18 plane symmetry groups, without upending the world; but the internal structures of 17 and 18 are unrelated.

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This dichotomy of internal versus external interest  chez the integers, represents ideal poles, which are not exhaustive, but bookend a spectrum.  As, probably intermediate: the “crunchiness” of natural numbers as viewed by students of finite groups.    (Here the masticatory metaphor  returns unbidden, for I always imagine finite groups along the lines of a wrinkly-surfaced walnut.  Finite simple groups -- those for which no homomorphism can split out any subchunk as its “kernel” -- the hardest nuts, the ones you can’t crack.)  Simon Norton seems to have had such an intimate gustatory appreciation of individual finite groups, before he Threw It All Away and went off to ride the bus.

~

In light of our training, we know at least one thing to do, should we ever be given an unfamiliar integer and locked in a room, with no other toys to play with.  Namely, we can probe for primality.  (An activity that becomes, indeed, crucial, for cryptographers.)

But now imagine that instead we had been handed some fraction like

      (2 +  √137) /4081

Untrained, we react with dismay.

Yet later, learning of the Golden Section, (1 + √5)/2, and its many remarkable properties -- not the least of these being that it can be represented as the infinite continued fraction consisting of nothing but ones -- we conclude that the critter is crunchy indeed;  and that there are more things in heaven and earth, than are dreamt of here below, and that we must anticipate the afterlife, before we could begin to embrace them.

~

Our treatment focused on what the innumerate are missing, much like what the Daltonist, unbeknownst, lacks of the hues.   But there is such a thing as unearned crunchiness --  a bogus significance assigned to certain numinous numbers, like 19 among the Baha’i’s; the “23 enigma”; 666; 1000 AD as the Millennium; the mumbo-jumbo numbers in “Lost” and "Touch"; for all which, cf. Wikipedia on apophenia.   In the face of such things (which have snared some otherwise rational people -- a close friend of mine, critically brilliant but unmathematical, fell for the “23” business), we are inclined to say, along with Nulla  extra ecclesiam  salus,  that  Nulla  extra mathematicam  ratio.

~

For a rather recondite example of crunchiness, consider the ‘amicable numbers’  (  الآعداد المتحابة) reported by the medieval historian Ibn-Khaldun in his Muqaddima .   Apparently only two of these were known to the Arabic medievals (or: they are the only two numbers characterized by a theorem of Thabit ibn Qurra), and they are not much to look at:  220 and 284;  but they meant something to contemporary practitionars of the talismanic art.

The modern view is summarized here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amicable_numbers

Constructivist Angelology

But yet when considered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts  towards greater perfections of it  in superior ranks of spirits. … The several degrees of angels  may probably have larger views.

-- John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690)

Man’s understanding, though allied to the angelical, operates differently.  The angels understand intuitively, man by the painful use of the discursive reason.

-- E. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture (1942)

It is presumably not obvious to the chimpanzee (or, if this be setting his smarts too low, to the humble woodchuck) that for all m, n in Z, m + n = n + m.  Nevertheless, in his daily scurryings and burrowings, he will repeatedly meet up with particular instantiations of this modest truth.

            For the woodchuck (at any event the southern northeastern lesser striped variety) builds a number of nests and other temporary dwellings, each of which has the framework of a variously triangulated  polyhedron, built tinkertoy-fashion from a fixed number of sticks.  Now, gathering them one by one would take too long, nor can the tidy woodchuck stand to have any sticks left over.  So when constructing his summer dwelling -- an icosahedron, which needs thirty sticks (did I get that right? My calculating powers are not much beyond those of a woodchuck) -- he normally harvests a jubjub bush, which has twenty-two sticks of exactly the right specs and which blooms in the spring, then rounds it out with the eight-sticked glubglub bush, which sprouts slightly later. 

But then one year, the blooming of the jubjub was delayed, and the woodchucks despaired.  All but one, the enterprising Willie, who went doggedly (or groundhoggishly) ahead  and harvested the available glubglub, supplementing this  when the jubjub arrived slightly later.  This remarkable exploit was recorded in the annals: for 22 then 8, one may substitute 8 then 22.

            It was subsequently found that a mubmub bush (18 sticks) followed by a nubnub bush (12) would do just as well – und zwar, in either order!  This fact too was recorded.

            The years went by, then the centuries, and the millennia, and the annals grew to seven times seventy stout volumes, densely filled with such arcana as: a cube-for-cubs may be constructed of a lublub (7) plus a rubrub (5), and this in either order; and so on for billions of examples.  All this was considered a branch of botany, a purely empirical science.

            By this means, the woodchucks arrived at an analogue of Babylonian mathematics.

Interlude:   A physicist depicts the arithmetical state-of-play in a papyrus from Egyptian/Babylonian times:

It records the resolution of a great number of fractions  into a sum of aliquot parts,  the original numerator always being 2:  as, for instance,

2/97 = 1/56 + 1/679 + 1/776

But no rules are given for effecting such resolutions, and the whole treatise seems to be a mere compendium of results obtained by repeated trials.

-- James Jeans, The Growth of Physical Science (1947 [posthum.]; 2^nd edn. 1951), p. 11

            Until one day one Wisedome Woodchuck, a distant descendant of Willie, figured the whole thing out, and in a remarkable demonstration of only eighty pages (rather hard to follow, but sound), showed that m + n = n + m  was a perfectly general fact, replacing the seven-times-seventy volumes at a stroke, and freeing up his brethren for yet further architectural innovations, which previously had been shunned, as their particulars were not yet in the book.  The annals were placed in a museum, which the elder woodchucks might still visit, marveling at favorite exhibits (as who could forget that remarkable winter, when 5,878 + 519 turned out to be equal to 519 + 5,878?  A tour de force!). Meanwhile generations of young woodchucks (the pride and despair of their parents, who could not follow them into Canaan, with their aging brains) studied Wisedome’s proof, breaking their little heads against it.

           

Meanwhile in Metropolis… The humans, learning of this, politely saluted Wisedome’s modest accomplishment, and experienced a pang of sympathy for woodchuck-kind; yet felt no inclination to visit their Museum of Particular Results: for which they felt, indeed, a kind of horror.  And even the general result, while true, is somehow to us not truly interesting. In any case we are all too busy wrestling with the Riemann Hypothesis, to have time to look back.

Meanwhile in Elysium, where throne the angels sensu strictior, the lowest order of angelic beings sensu lato, a mock compliment is paid to Andrew Wiles, who finally figured out that little Fermat puzzle, with which the angel-kind  are wont to amuse the nursery.  Not that the angels arrived earlier at his proof, nor any refinement thereof.  They simply scoop up a few infinities of integers with their fractal fingers, twist them this way and that—and see, it doesn’t fit!  Simple.

            Moreover, all facts about all structures of ordinal type omega, whether or not deducible by any finite axiomatization, are equally transparent to the angels. They just look.

            So, is Elysium the mathematical Paradise?  Not quite…

            In a remarkably lucid and accessible article*, which should be packed into every pupil’s lunchbox by a considerate mom, Gödel observes that our continuing failure to resolve Cantor’s continuum problem, left over from the previous century, is quite an embarrassment.  It means that we are unable to wrap our minds around the very simplest multiplication problem possible, beyond the finite ones that these days can scarcely stump a woodchuck. Namely, two times two (times two, times two – keep going).  He writes:

            “It is easily proved that the power of the continuum is equal to 2^(aleph-nought). So the continuum problem turns out to be a question from the ‘multiplication table’ of cardinal numbers: namely, the problem of evaluating a certain infinite product (in fact the simplest non-trivial one that can be formed).  There is, however, not one infinite product (of factors > 1) for which so much as an upper bound for its value can be assigned. […] It is not even known whether or not m < n implies 2^m < 2^n.” 

            We are  so to speak  staring helplessly  at a pile of sticks.

            Nor does the subsequent Cantor+Cohen demonstration of the independence of the continuum hypothesis  from a particular system of axioms for set theory   set the matter aside. Gödel had already anticipated Cohen’s result, and wrote:

A proof of the undecidability of Cantor’s conjecture from the accepted axioms of set theory (in contradistinction, e.g., to the proof of the transcendency of pi) would by no means solve the problem.  For if the meanings of the primitive terms of set theory … are accepted as sound, it follows that the set-theoretical concepts and theorems describe some well-determined reality, in which Cantor’s conjecture must either be true or false.

            Indeed Gödel suspects that the Cantor conjecture is actually, factually false: which means that somewhere, among the actual literal real numbers, there is hiding a set of cardinality intermediate between aleph-nought and its power set, with definite members which the angels could name.  Not, however, the lowest order thereof; this lies beyond them.  But at the next step up, the archangels hang these sets from mobiles over their infants’ cribs.  In fact a woodchuck may somewhere inadvertantly have used one of these sets for nesting materials, and even now lies sleeping on it – a night of troubled dreams.

            So much for a simple pancake-stack of omega-many deuces – the limit of the lower-angels’ ken.  What about the square root of omega-to-the-omega; or cross sections of fibre bundles on toroidal cap-omega-cross-theta space? For each level of angels, there will be something beyond them that they just don’t get.

*

There are two poles of the range of approaches to the problem of infinities.  One is that of the badger-like Brouwer, who simply sweeps the chessmen to the floor, folds up the board and goes home.  (An only somewhat more amenable figure, says Gödel, is Weyl, who allows as how there might be something to board games, but suggests we play checkers – or Chutes ‘n Ladders – rather than chess.)  The other pole says:  Infinities are tricky, but they all exist, and are present to the Infinite Mind. Gödel himself uses that term, e.g. noting that Ramsey’s admission of formulae of (countably) infinite length  might be constructivistic for an infinite mind  but not for our own.  Gödel does not, however, seem to feel much need for any desperate appeal to such a mind, in the course of an ordinary day, since he -- like Badger’s amiable friend the Water-Rat-- is a thoroughgoing Realist, and comfortable as such in his own skin.  For him the assumption of infinite classes “is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies, and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence.”  The outwardly gloomy Austrian  is really the jolly Dr. Johnson of set theory.

            Only now there’s a problem, of a sort which did not confront the schoolmen, who never counted on the uncountable:  the Infinite Mind is all very well, but -- Which infinity did you have in mind?

            Who comprehends *everything*? God does, by definition. Yet He cannot be simply the crown on a tower of constructively ascending intelligences.  He is like an “inaccessible cardinal” – and not the first.  Nor perhaps ‘the last’, if there is no last.  Whatever He might be, there is Cantor in the wings, grinning, waiting to perform a Power Set on God, yielding – what?  -- Nothing one can begin to commence to pretend that we can approach with our sadly finite understanding.

            All of which suggests, if nothing else does,  that God is something more and other than an alternately wrathful and affectionate granddad  with a perfectly enormous white beard – however much longer that beard might be, than the stubble which disfigures your chin or mine.  Who one day, apparently from sheer idleness, as one might choose chocolate, chose the Jews.  Who later, some say, cast a Jove-like eye  on a certain Palestinian virgin.  And who at present is very angry indeed with the Democrats (or the Ravens, or whomever).  Yet what He in fact might be, we cannot even begin to imagine anyone’s beginning to conceive.  (Cf. the suggestion of 1 Kings 8:27  that the heavens themselves have heavens (and so on up); and that the whole omega-tower of them  cannot encompass God.)

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We now return you to your regularly scheduled essay.

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            We actually wind up with a sort of hamstringing of the Ontological Argument. Notoriously its conclusion does not really follow from its premise;  but now even its premise limps: “Since we can imagine a Perfect Being…”  But that’s just it, we can’t!  Not even little infinite bits of one! Yet paradoxically (and God reportedly loves paradox – at least Chesterton does, His publicity agent on Earth), this seeming stomping on the prostrate corpse of the offspring of Anselm, this despairing cry that somehow even Infinity does not suffice, so far from opening the agora  to legions of snickering atheists chanting “Toleja so!”, points somehow upward, -- outward,   -- onward ….  Praise Him!

Postscript:

John Locke himself, normally regarded as the Poster Boy for Empiricism, of I'm-from-Missouri common-sensicality, yet delivers himself of this (Essay, III.vi.12):

That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence:  that in all the visible corporeal world, we see no chasms, or gaps.

That is to say:  The gap between ourselves, and God, must somehow be filled, according to the Principle of Plenitude.

And again (IV.iii.23):

He that will consider the infinite power … of the Creator of all things, will find reason to think, it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a creature, as he will find man to be;  who  in all probability, is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings …

Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery, and all those intelligences, whereof ‘tis likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances, are things, whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all.

Since theism is far from central to Locke’s Essay, it is curious to see the emphasis on this scala naturae idea.

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*”What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?”, repr. Benacerraf & Putnam, eds., Philosophy of Mathematics.

~

Postscript:  For the possibility that the structure of certain mathematical truths relating to an infinite domain  might resist any but a case-by-case “Babylonian” approach, cf. the quotation from Michael Dummett towards the end of this post:

http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/2012/01/what-is-truth.html

Compare further (re ascending ranks of abstraction and generality):

"The Ladder of Abstraction"

.

Alexander Grothendieck

From the graceful pen of Edward Frenkel  comes this appreciation of the prodigious mathematician Alexander Grothendieck:

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/science/the-lives-of-alexander-grothendieck-a-mathematical-visionary.html

Frenkel’s summary of Grothendieck’s approach  is phrased in distinctly Platonistic terms:

Grothendieck’s genius was to recognize that there is a “being” hiding behind a given algebraic equation (or a system of equations) called a scheme. The spaces of solutions are mere projections, or shadows of this scheme.

That formulation goes beyond the basic assumptions of mathematical Realism, adding a quasi-personalistic, quasi-spiritual metaphorical dimension.   We might epigrammatize the matter thus:  bare-bones Realism (embraced by most mathematicians as a lower bound) is to the view attributed to Grothendieck, somewhat as deism is to theism.

Frenkel concretely illustrates this (neo-)Platonistic / Plotinean stance of  seeing the relatively concrete and familiar, as but a pale and lesser projection of some higher, transcendent, but paradoxically more solid Reality (which dwells in Platonic heaven, sipping some higher-dimensional nectar), in his justly celebrated book for the layman:

Imagine a world in which natural numbers are replaced by vector spaces;  that is, instead of number 1  we have a line, instead of number 2  we have a plane… Addition of numbers is replaced by the direct sum of vector spaces,  multiplication by their tensor product.  The number 3 is a mere shadow of the 3-dimensional space, reflecting only one attribute of this space, its dimensionality.

-- Edward Frenkel, Love & Math (2013), p. 155

That insight is superficially reminiscent of Bertrand Russell’s definition of, say, the integer three as being not basic, but the rather the (infinite) set of all triads { {Moe, Larry, and Curley}; {Huey, Dewey, and Louie}; {the Andrews Sisters}; ..}  Russell’s move always struck me as, at best, an obscurum per obscurius (or even a clarum per obscurius);  at worst, a parlour-trick.    Frenkel’s suggestion likely goes much deeper -- indeed, to a depth I am in no position to assess.

Finally, without the structural richness of Frenkel’s proposal, but perhaps more accessibly, this from a pair of noted philosophers-of-science:

The abstract objects of thought  such as “numbers” [or] “perfectly straight lines” .. are real parts of nature, even though they do not exist as particular things, but as the relations or transformations of such particulars.

Morris Cohen & Ernest Nagel,  An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (1934), p. 372

~

Frenkel reminds us that Grothendieck, dramatically and notoriously, Threw It All Away, resigning his institute and seceding from the mathematical world, upon learning of its defense funding.   Frenkel points indeed to the possibility that even a subject so “gloriously useless” (as it was seen back in G.H. Hardy’s day) as number theory, can have crucial cryptographic applications which, in turn, invite subversion by the intelligence community.   He states, indeed, that such subversion did take place, at the hands of a three-letter Agency too numinous to name, in the case of Elliptic Curve Cryptography.  Yet ironically, that very field was pioneered by a theoretician politically of the far left, Neal Koblitz.  (I knew him slightly when we were both math majors and antiwar activists at Harvard, and recall him fondly here.)

[ A parallel:   For a highly entertaining, though painful, account of Simon Norton,  once Conway’s collaborator, but who likewise Threw It All Away, see the book by Alex Masters, The Genius in my Basement  (2011) ]

I never met Grothendieck, nor so much as approached the foothills of his cloud-surmounting summits;  but my introduction to mathematics did come via one of Grothendieck’s students, Robin Hartshorne, here portrayed:

http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/2011/12/adventures-in-algebraic-geometry.html

We touch upon Grothendieck tangentially in several essays;  here they are:

worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/search/label/Alexander%20Grothendieck

[Another parallel:  Grothendieck’s abrupt withdrawal from mathematics, and his sometimes surly subsequent comments on its practicioners, recalls that more recent self-reclusion of the Russian topologist Grigori Perelman, who quit his institute in 2005, with the remark that “I have been disappointed in mathematics and I want to try something else.”   Now, to anyone who grasps the subject, disappointment with mathematics is almost inconceivable -- it’s like being disappointed with the Universe, or with penguins, or with life itself.   Other statements he has made suggest that his quarrel is not with math per se  but with certain mathematicians.

For a poignant glimpse of the daily routine of this semi-recluse, try this:

http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/le-genie-qui-s-est-retire-du-monde-30-09-2010-1246189_24.php  ]

~

In other cryptographic news … This week’s New Yorker has a review by Anthony Lane of “The Imitation Game”, which takes us back to the WWII code-breakers at Bletchley Park, with mathematician Alan Turing at the center.   With his welcome skeptical eye, Lane punctures the movie’s superstar approach to the material:

No word is breathed, for instance, of the Polish cryptographers who did much of the heavy lifting on the project  before Turing came on the scene.  As for the cracking of codes, it is shrunk to single, Oh-my-God epiphany, triggered by a comment in a pub.

That last motif is strikingly reminiscent of the trumped-up Eureka moment ascribed to Gauss in the movie “Die Vermessung der Welt” (which we reviewed here), whose insights into differential geometry were supposedly engendered -- in a flash, on the spot -- by a buxom mädchen handing him an apple from the knowledge-tree.

Another warning-sign:   The role of Turing’s  Comely Female Sidekick (de rigueur in Hollywood these days) is played by Keira Knightley, an overactress whose pornographic approach to proximity to great men of science, in the movie “A Dangerous Method”, we earlier had occasion to denounce.

~

[Late-evening update]  And now, fellow devotees of that supreme queen of the noösphere, math -- now that we have all stuffed our tummies with turkey, and are sprawled upon the couch:  as we are probably not just now engaged in settling the Hodge Conjecture (and making but scant progress if we are), let us rather refresh the neurons with a bit of mathematical merriment:

How Now, Round Cow

~

Sotie : 

le mathématicien  et la conspiration Riemann

Борис Березовский

~

[Update, 30 November 2014]  Further thoughts.

(1) Integers as shadows

That epigram, that petite phrase,  “The number 3 is a mere shadow of the 3-dimensional space”, continues to intrigue.  Further thoughts on the subject here:

From Finitude to Infinity

The point being that Frenkel/Grothendieck are here proceeding in the less-familiar opposite direction.

(2) “Goodbye to All That”

The catchphrase “I Threw it All Away” is from Bob Dylan.   An earlier more familiar expression is “Goodbye to All That”, the title of a memoir by the poet Robert Graves.

To fascinate a public beyond the circle of connoisseurs, a mathematician (or physicist, or chess-player) needs to sport some quirk, some handle onto which the layman can hang his attention.  That is massively true of Turing, first because of his role in the thrillingly clandestine -- and militarily crucial -- cryptographic factory at Bletchley park;  and more recently -- and less relevantly, from any mathematical standpoint -- by reason of his personal predilections (held in common with such extra-scientific figures as Ἀντίνοος and the Baron de Charlus) which at present have reached an apogee of public celebrity.   On a more modest scale (no blockbuster biographies, no movies) the careers of Emmy Noether or Ada Lovelace come to mind.

For anyone not a member of the identity-groups in question, such chance affiliations are mathematically and philosophically boring.   But not so a figure like Groethendieck, who reached intellectual levels that most of the rest of us can only pant and sigh for -- then threw it all away, in a contemptuous gesture.   For that is a challenge to all of us, whatever our private identities;  it calls into question the very value of the ‘it’ for which we so painfully and vainly strive.

A well-known example from chess:  Bobby Fischer, who withdrew from the sport at the top of his game.

Or, in the sixteenth century, the pioneering anatomist Vesalius, who, having published the book that settled his fame forever, and still a young man, left the field and became a simple physician to a valetudinarian Emperor.

A grey-area variant of this motif is found in the case of Simon Norton.   True, he voluntarily withdrew from the field;  but in view of his later pointless eccentricities, we cannot avoid the suspicion by then he had largely Lost It.

That variant motif forms the spine of Rebecca Goldstein’s fascinating mathematico-philosophical novel,  The Mind-Body Problem.

And while Goldstein manages to craft a good read out of the tragedy, in the typical case of gradually fading powers, it is just sad.  Thus Lagrange, and other victims of Oligophrenia mathematica tardiva,  chronicled in the appendix to this essay:

De Stultitiâ

 

Other examples of burnout:  

Newton had a nervous breakdown a few years after publishing his Principia, and never did real science again.

Russell seems to have fried many of his math neurons in the course of writing his Principia (memo to prodigies:  Don’t try to write a Tenth Symphony, and don’t write a book called Principia).   He did much interesting philosophical work after that, but mostly with other areas of his capacious brain.

Somewhat in the spirit of the Stith-Thompson index of folkloric motifs, to I Threw It All Away (TaleType #1729a), we add:

* Taken all away (#1729b):    Persecution took them out of the game, at the height of their powers: Galois (permanently) and, for those who considered that he was hounded to death, Turing.  Temporarily: André Weil and Neil Koblitz (during their imprisonment -- though both managed to use their ‘time inside’ more profitably mathematically  than most of us do with all the free time in the world).

* Would throw it all away, if had to do it over again (#1729c):

Wolfgang Pauli in 1925:
"At the moment, physics is again terribly confused.  In any case, it is difficult for me, and I wish I had been a movie comedian or something of the sort, and had never heard of physics."

Schrödinger, to Niels Bohr:

“If all this damned quantum jumping were really here to stay, then I should be sorry I ever got involved with quantum physics.”

[quoted in: -- Roger Penrose,  The Road to Reality (2004), p. 516]

More such anecdotes here:

http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/2012/06/on-truth-and-beauty-golden-oldies.html

* Should throw it all away, if that’s how they feel (#1729d):  String theorists who have wound up at the dead-end of the Landscape picture.  (“The reductionist voyage that has taken physics so far  has come to an end.  Since that is what they believe, I can’t understand why they don’t take up something else -- macramé, for example.”  More here.)

Our BFFs the Integers

(That should probably be BFsF, on the model of attorneys-general;  but let it pass.)

Richard Dedekind wrote a book with the delightful title Was Sind und Was Sollen die Zahlen? 

He proved that “the natural numbers are uniquely characterized by their induction properties.” (Wiki).

~

Elementary arithmetic -- the times table, long division -- you might find fun or you might find rebarbative, depending on the way you’re wired.  But every child loves learning to count.  It’s like the alphabet song only better;  because, unlike with the alphabet, you can keep going if you like.

Our pleasure in integers  traces back to our time in the nursery, playing with blocks.

My approach to the integers  is that of the milkmaid to the udder.  (Saying a blessing before she begins.)

Notice that the word integer is related to the word integrity.  Integers are our friends!

~

ONE little TWO little

THREE little Indians;

FOUR little FIVE little

SIX little Indians;

SEVEN little EIGHT little   NINE

little Indians:

TEN  little   In-di-an

Boys !!!

To chant that ditty

is like telling-over worry-beads --

soothed by their satisfying

click - click - click …

~

Certain integers have fan-clubs, like “23”.  That is idolatry.

One integer is much like another.   Each has various combinatorial/arithmetical properties,

but apart from primality,  it is not clear that any of these are of particular significance.

(“Perfect” numbers.  “Taxicab” numbers.)

They amuse us, is all.

They have no hidden meaning, neither individually nor collectively.

God does not speak in riddles;  gematria is false.

~

I bought some coleus the other day, each in its little pot.    I didn’t plant them right away, but set them here and tried them there, to see how they’d do.  Coleus are quite finicky about how much sunlight they’ll tolerate.  In fact, when the heat wave hit, I was glad I hadn’t planted them yet, for I brought them indoors for the cool and the shade.  But eventually I had to plant them, lest they become root-bound:  finally deciding on some spots beneath the skirts of a bushy shrub, where they are hard to see but at least won’t bake.  It took some doing.  That, and they are thirsty plants, clamoring to be watered.   Taking on coleus is a responsibility;  it’s like tending to a pet.

You can say this for the integers:  They don’t need much maintenance.

On “Rounding Out”

The shortest and best way between two truths of the real domain  often passes through the imaginary one.

-- Jacques Hadamard, The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field (1945), p. 123

We have noticed Quine’s grudging acceptance of the irrationals given his unquestioning acceptance of the rationals, a process we alluded to as “rounding out”.

But it is really not so much rounding out as filling out -- or rather, filling in: filling in the gaps between the rationals.  And the result is, unfortunately, not so rational as the rationals themselves.  The rationals -- that is, fractions -- are forced upon you by Nature already in nursery school:  How shall we divide these two cupcakes among the three children? (Answer:  Each gets two-thirds.)  But the Reals are (we admit this, despite our Realism) a bit unreal.  Full of all manner of set-theoretic paradox.  Inscrutable.  You can still work with them in practical terms, because the rationals, which are well understood, are, though no more numerous than the integers, dense in R, providing a sort of well-defined ladder or footbridge along which we may proceed.

Here in any event  is the testimony of a first-rate mathematician,  to the effect that the transition to the full reals  is essentially a forced move:

We shall show how to construct a complete ordered field  from a simple chain [Think:  the natural numbers].  This … proves that any contradiction inherent in the postulates for a complete ordered field -- that is, the real number system -- is latent in the postulates for a simple chain, which is a far less complicated structure  whose consistency is almost guaranteed by our intuition.

Note that we do not discuss the existence of the simple chain.  In spite of its intuitive simplicity, a simple chain carries within itself  the germs of all the difficulties in logic and mathematics;  we are obliged to take its existence as axiomatic.

-- Andrew Gleason,  Fundamentals of Abstract Analysis (1966), p.  112

Such is the very axiom -- we need but two -- which we seized upon to begin this whole series of essays.   We quoted it in the form made famous by the Nominalist (and our otherwise-foe) Kronecker, which invokes the deity -- possibly casually or ironically, but perhaps more pertinantly than he knew:  for whence this “intuition” of which we are so sure?

~

The next step beyond the reals were named the “imaginary” numbers, and the name stuck.  Adjoin these, and you generate the Complex Plane.   And, unforced and arbitrary as this move might initially feel, it is on the Complex Plane  that you at last truly get a notion of a Natural Setting.  Everything just suddenly… works, and works better than you ever thought it could.  You have, all of a sudden, a Circle of Convergence -- sounds like something out of Lord of the Rings, and it is just as good.  Differentiable functions turn out to be perfectly smooth, and with a natural notion of their own domain.  (Try to define them on too small a region, and they will propagate themselves by analytic extension till they are nice and fat.)

On the complex plane, things are rounder.  (Note:  Round is good.) In R, a ‘ball’ is a line-segment, and a ‘sphere’ (the surface of a ball) is two points.  In C, they’re a disk and a circle respectively.  And you can round out or rather round off the complex plane yet further, by adjoining a single ‘point at infinity’, which is the limit of any ray pointing in any direction.  The plump, rotund result:  the Riemann Sphere.  This is homeomorphic to the surface of a penguin,  the world’s most perfect shape.

As Penrose puts it:

It is as though Nature had herself entrusted to these numbers  the operation of her universe.

(Again, note the theistic language which, all unbidden, surges forth at such a time, from even the driest of nibs.   It is a very early and natural theology, such as is depicted in that fine chapter of The Wind in the Willows, "The Piper at the Gates of Dawn".)

Another indication of the greater naturalness of the complex plane as a nursery for functions:  A real function may be C-infinity (infinitely differentiable) at a point, yet somehow “off” at this point, a fact revealed by the fact that its complex analogue is not there analytic.   Thus, as one writer put it, (complex) analytic functions are “smoother” than real functions.

[Example:  exp(-1/x), for x > 0; 0 at x = 0.  That last point is artificially “tacked on”, and in the complex picture, it shows.]

 

This Complex Plane  is a real find; it is not just a waystation to something better yet.  (David Berlinski calls complex numbers "instruments that providence had provided for the recovery of lost symmetries," a neatly postlapsarian formulation.)  There is very little beyond this, by way of fields suitable for the calculus -- certainly nothing that approaches the leap that the complex numbers represented beyond the reals.   There are the quaternions, which have their points, but are a very poor cousin indeed: the theory is poorer, not richer, for the extra generating elements, since the field of quaternions offers no analogue of holomorphic functions. ( “Quaternions have more or less dropped by the wayside.” -- Thomas Hankins, Sir William Rowan Hamilton (1980), p. 325)

Then there are the octonions, for which no-one has ever found much of a use.  And there’s an end to it.

~

Other mathematical instances of “rounding out”:

*  The adjunction of zero to the natural numbers, and of the empty-set to the world of sets.  Both function exactly like their less spectral congeners.

And a nice aesthetic note -- both are represented by a round symbol: respectively, a goose egg, and a goose egg barre sinistre.

* There are various elaborate ways of constructing things out of other things, like a Stone-Cech compactification.  But in “taking the power set”, we just stand back and let it happen.  Again and again.  Yielding the “beth numbers”, and more infinities than most folks know what to do with.

* The mathematics of string theory adds extra tiny “compactified” spatial dimensions to the three of everyday experience; in these, you just go round and round.  But this isn’t rounding-out, really, since the large spatial dimensions may themselves be compact, in which any sufficiently long journey circles back on itself.  (“Compact” doesn’t mean “tiny”;  it’s a topological, not a metrical notion.)  Space could even be flat, yet finite -- thus having the topology of a three-torus.

~

Footnote:

It is well-known that it took mankind a long time to recognize zero as itself a number.  Less well known is that “not until modern times was unity considered a number” (D.E. Smith, History of Mathematics, vol. II, p. 26.)  Or that the negative numbers were long qualified as "false".

Compare the uncertainty over whether white qualifies as a “color”.  (And if it does, what about black, or grey?)

~

So where is Minimalism in all this?  Are we just tacking on turrets and wing-additions to some increasingly sprawling McMansion?

Not a bit of it.  The operative word here really is round.  For, round things are minimal surfaces -- indeed, the very simplest class of these -- in the sense of using-up a minimal area to enclose a prescribed volume.   Our purpose is, indeed, to group like with like, and to enclose them in some stable structure.  This is no multiplication of entities for their own sake -- the itchy-clutching witchfingers of insensately proliferating fractals, which is the very architecture of the dungeons of Hell.   In rounding out, the mathematician is seeking a coherent minimal structure to regiment and account for what he has hitherto seen:  one which, upon acquaintance, may become more intuitive than the partial structures initially encountered.  (The “upon acquaintance” part may of course require a bunch of Ph.D.’s and several hundred years.)

            And the things which we have seen, and which need explanation -- or at least for agencement into some larger and more natural whole -- do keep arising.  Connections are detected among them which cry out for elucidation.  So we ascend to a yet loftier bird’s-eye -- eagle-eye -- phoenix-eye view.  To arrive, it may be, eventually at Topos Theory, or the Lord of Hosts.

(For the latter, though note:  that ladder reaches only so high.  We quote the saint:

Remaneret igitur humanum genus, si sola rationis via ad Deum cognoscendum pateret, in maximis ignorantiae tenebris.
-- Thomas Aquinas,  Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 4 n. 4 )

~

The examples we gave were mathematical, merely for clarity.  But the principle of Rounding Out  applies to any field with structure.

These vague words ‘capable’ and ‘normal’  allow the grammarian scope for shaping his task to suit his convenience.  Seeking simplicity, he will round out and round off.

-- Quine, “Reply to Harmon”, in The Philosophy of W.V.O. Quine (1986)

~

Footnote re the irrationals:

Dedekind sttressed the distinction of category  between cut and number  in 1888; against the view of his friend Heinrich Weber  that “the irrational number is nothing other than the cut itself”, he explained that “as I prefer it, to creat something New distinct from the cut, to which the cut corresponds.  We have the right to grant ourselves such power of creation”,  and cuts corresponding to both rational and irrational numbers were examples.

-- Grattan-Guinness, The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870 - 1940 (2000), p. 87

A seemingly slight, even pedantic distinction;  but like many another such, it might have its point.   Cf. my astonished delight in junior high-school, upon meeting the distinction between  x (the thing itself) and ‘x’ (the name of x) -- already adequately foreshadowed in Alice in Wonderland, but encountered now in a new context.  Likewise the difference between  x and {x} (the singleton-set of x).

In the case of an algebraic number like √2, a simple number staring you in the face out of a hypotenuse  versus the infinite train of rational pilgrims (never quite arriving at their destination) of a Dedekind cut,  one is reminded of the variety of definitions of something so familiar as a tangent:  the slope of a curve (at a point); the closest linear approximation to the curve (at that point); versus the distressing definition in Loomis & Sternberg as an infinite equivalence-class of curves (through that point).