The New York Review of Books recently published a quite thought-provoking (and disturbing) series of articles by Marcia Angell, concerning psychoactive drugs, linked-to here:
I’m not competent to weigh in on the medical facts of the case. But as your Local Logician (Fallacy-Busters-R-Us ® ), I might comment on a disparity in public practice.
(1) On the one hand, the consensus in the broad public, as in the FDA, is that psychoactive drugs such as Prozac are safe and effective. This is attested by the fact that we gobble them by the mouthful.
(2) At the same time, judge and jury agree that Prozac is axiomatically so dangerous that a woman who killed her kids and blamed it on Prozac (though quite unable to demonstrate a causal connection -- cf. the notorious “Twinkie defense”) had a valid argument -- Not Guilty by reason of temporary insanity. (She is out on the streets, and even has custody of another woman’s kids.)
One detects a contradiction.
(In the nature of the case, any evidence of causal nexus in (2) would have to be probabilistic/epidemiological, rather than individual/anecdotal. This only heightens the clash with (1).)
(In the nature of the case, any evidence of causal nexus in (2) would have to be probabilistic/epidemiological, rather than individual/anecdotal. This only heightens the clash with (1).)
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