“Truth” is, on
the one had, a bland and boring concept:
“Paris is the capital of France” is true, “Las Vegas is the capital of
France” is false.
Yet in other venues, fraught: as in, Pravda.
Shading into metaphysical mysticism (“The Search for Truth”). If I am trying to find out, for which X
the sentence “X is the capital of Albania” is true, then in a sense I am
Searching for Truth; but really, only for a
truth; and indeed, not really under that description: I merely wish to know what Albania’s capital is called.
~
Ernest Gellner on
Truth
Relevant quotes, bridging the gap, from works by Ernest
Gellner. (For our full essay on
the subject of truth, click here.)
Re Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four:
Freedom is the recognition that 2
plus 2 makes 4 : not because there
is no escaping such necessity, but because only such necessity is a refuge from
arbitrary social power. [It is] an extra-social objective truth, which account
for why such fuss should be made
of a morally and emotionally rather neutral piece of arithmetic.
-- Ernest Gellner, Contemporary
Thought and Politics (1978), p. 4
On a strategy of self-validating beliefs (which he dubs
“auto-functionalism”, a term which seems not to have caught on):
It consists of establishing the
soundness of one’s beliefs, not directly, in the ordinary and straightforward
way, by showing them to be true, but, on the contrary, of deriving their
soundness by showing them to play an essential role, to be ‘functional’, in the
internal economy of one’s own personality or society … The first step is to put
forward a theory of truth: truth ‘really is’ the fulfilment of a biological,
or social, linguistic, etc., function.
-- Ernest Gellner, Contemporary
Thought and Politics (1978), p. 14-15
(Truth, soundness, validity, provability -- actually an interesting Wortfeld; a topic for another day.)
And, re the egregious Althusser:
And, re the egregious Althusser:
He argues, in effect, not that
Marxism is true, but that the Marxist epoch is still with us. What is defended, in the end, is not
the truth of a doctrine, but its alleged role.
-- Ernest Gellner, Contemporary
Thought and Politics (1978), p. 17
Now, that all
sounds rather feckless and po-mo; but to add some perspective, it is
reminiscent of the “regressive justification” in axiomatics, particularly for set theory. (More here.)
A somewhat more degenerate version of this
auto-functionalist approach, endemic to the America of “pot, pop, and protest”
-- degenerate in that, unlike that of Althusser et alia, it makes little
reference to the world outside the speaker’s individual ego-bubble (indeed, it
works best for pure solipsists, for whom the external world need not exist):
In America, it possesses a theory
of knowledge, and above all an associated style of expression, which goes back
to populism and beyond it … Its basic idea is that sincerity is the key to truth.
-- Ernest Gellner, Contemporary
Thought and Politics (1978), p. 82
(It’s amusing to hear such a stance referred to as a “theory
of knowledge”, but social scientists really do talk that way, speaking for instance of a baby’s “theory of the world”.)
“The hysteria of
complacency of the postwar period,
and the hysteria of
protest of more recent times.” (1971)
|
And again, back to the math connection, reporting the
fantasies of Michael Oakeshott:
What is proof? -- he asks. There is no such thing as proof in
general, he answers himself. There
is only proof persuasive for this,
that, or the other kind of man. Cogency of proof is relative to what you are. he notices that this does not seem to apply to mathematics,
and brazenly comments that just this has always made him suspicious of
mathematics.
-- Ernest Gellner, Contemporary
Thought and Politics (1978), p. 180
Actually Oakeshott
put his case too weakly:
varying standards of proof are
relevant in mathematics -- indeed, it is only within mathematics that such scruples have structure and
are in point. In
pre-Cauchy/Weierstrass analysis, proof was a bit of a kludge. Later on, Constructivist
qualms came into play. And in our own day, we distinguish
between theorems whose proof requires the (disputed) Axiom of Choice, from
those that can dispense with it.
The ultimate selbst-aufhebung of all such alethic
egalitarianism is plain:
If almost everything is true in its
own fashion, truth cannot matter very much.
-- Ernest Gellner, Contemporary
Thought and Politics (1978), p. 16
~
Bonus nuggets, from the bottom of Gellner’s
crackerjacks-box:
It is a travesty to say that
martyrs die for Truth. Real truths
seldom require such dramatic testimony.
-- Ernest Gellner, The Devil in
Modern Philosophy (1974), p. 55
the feminine theory of
cognition: that truth is not a
matter of exploring or penetrating an external reality, but of gestation and
parturition.
-- Ernest Gellner, The Devil in
Modern Philosophy (1974), p. 62
Only psychoanalytic interpretations
that tally with what is real in the patient, can mediate veridical insight.
-- Adolf Grunbaum, quoted in Ernest
Gellner, The Psychoanalytic Movement (1985; 2nd edn. 1993),
p. 185
.
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