It is not the aspirations of
nations which create
nationalism: it is nationalism
which creates nations. … But the
world is richer in cultural differentiations, and in systematic injustices, than
it has room for ‘nations’.
-- Ernest Gellner, Thought and
Change (1964), p. 1974
In The Lonely Crowd, we sought to
indicate that political bossism in America was not entirely evil, and certainly
not as evil as are attempts to extirpate it totally.
-- David Riesman, 1969 preface to The
Lonely Crowd, p. lxv.
And what -- the Ukrainian people --
Do they wish to live a life separate from Soviet Russia? -- No!
-- Leon Trotsky, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3cFGOLS-BU
Kerry to Visit Kiev to Show Support for Ukraine Government
A detailed local argument,
which I shall not present, would point out the parallels between Yanukovych and
Morsi -- both duly elected, both evicted by a kind of coup. Not a palace coup, a popular coup;
but still. Quite possibly
both are scoundrels; but there is the larger point.
Overarching this, and of far more general significance, is a
global argument, of quite wide
applicability since it applies as
well (both empirically and provably) to the Internet. Namely:
No-one can micromanage anarchy and chaos, which is the essence of World History, as of the World Wide Web; but
the existence of spheres of influence
is in both cases a stabilizing factor. I am
speaking now, not politically nor morally, but virtually mathematically. However unpleasant Mr Putin, however
enchantingly coiffed Ms Timoshenko -- Stay the aitch out. “Entre
l’arbre et l’écorce, il ne faut pas mettre le doigt.”
Such is the reality of Realpolitik. Not saying it’s pretty; that doesn’t make it less real.
Bringing it back down a notch: Russia has ever let us play in our hemisphere
(remember, we have invaded several nations -- can you even name them? do you care? -- in our Monroe-doctrine/Platt-amendment
private sandbox, with no protest from the Russians); let them play in theirs.
~
~ Posthumous Endorsement ~
"If I were alive
today, and in the mood for a mystery,
this is what I'd be
reading: "
(I am James Monroe, by jingo,
and I approved this message.)
~
~
~
In antiquity,
by and large it
is the empires which require explanation, whilst their break-up, or the
persistence of fragmentation, do not.
[But] the
situation is now changed. It is
the large and effective units which seem natural, and it is their breakdown and
fragmentation which is eccentric and requires special explanation. Small units do indeed survive, but one
may well suspect that they are parasitic on the larger ones.
-- Ernest Gellner, “Scale and
Nation” (1973), repr. in Contemporary Thought and Politics (1978), p. 140
~
[Footnote] A
less-general observation, of more limited validity, since not a truth of
graph-theory, but merely a rule-of-thumb of history: using, this time, an economic metaphor. Namely: We have only so
much diplomatic capital to spend.
And, as a philosopher once said (Pliny the Elder, perhaps): Don’t let your mouth write a check that your ass can’t cash. (Don't challenge Russia unless you're willing to throw a punch.)
This brings up a further meta-consideration, owing nothing
to the specificities of this crisis, and applicable to any political/military
initiative whatsoever. Namely,
however carefully crafted your immediate response might be, it is not enough
simply to advance your rook and then take the rest of the day off: like a grandmaster, you have to look
ahead several ply. What if the bastard deploys his queen? Dang -- Hadn’t thought of that!
Here we outlined such an exercise:
[quotable-quote: “You can’t vote
just for the nose of the camel; you’ll be embracing the whole beast.”]
~
[Update 3 III
2014] From an excellent op-ed in
this morning’s New York Times:
This interpretive frame may be hard
to understand, but some things are not wrong just because Russians happen to
believe them. Russian news crews were covering a real story in Ukraine: the
chaotic dismantling of a legally sanctioned government, the quick breakdown of
an agreed framework for new elections, and the creeping transformation of
political disputes into ethnic ones.
There are, thus, parallels worth pondering with the cascade of recent political
events in Egypt. In such
embroiled situations, it does little good to invoke violations of “International Law” (an ill-defined and
rumored entity, always invoked selectively), Roberts Rules of Order, or
Principle P of the Binding Theory.
Pieces are in motion on the
giant chess-board, reminding us that chess was originally conceived as a game
of war.
A reflection on the break-up of the Soviet bloc, in longer historical perspective, by a European with no reason to be an apologist for Russia:
~
Added factors skewing perceptions specifically by Americans are these national traits:
(1) A tropism for dividing any broiling situation into two camps, Good Guys versus Bad
Guys (often with absurd results);
(2) Sentimentalism for ‘grass roots movements’.
Bear in mind that the Tea Party is ‘grass roots’; the NSDAP began as ‘grass roots’; virtually every cockamamie and
eventually violent movement began as ‘grass roots’, including even some
now-narcoterrorist organizations like the FARC. "Grass roots" my boots.
A lot of it is crabgrass.
[Update 26 March 2014] Well-put in an op-ed:
*
* * *
~ Commercial break ~
Relief for
beleaguered Nook lovers!
We now return you to
your regularly scheduled essay.
* * *
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/opinion/a-tortured-policy-toward-russia.html?hp&rref=opinion&_r=0
By IAN BREMMER MARCH 26, 2014
THE United States has once again
twisted itself into a rhetorical pretzel. As when it threatened military action
against Syria if a “red line” was crossed, the Obama administration’s rhetoric
about Russia and Ukraine goes far beyond what it will be willing and able to
enforce.
Earlier this month, President Obama
warned that America would “isolate Russia” if it grabbed more land, and
yesterday, he suggested that more sanctions were possible. Likewise, Secretary
of State John Kerry said the Group of 7 nations were “prepared to go to the
hilt” in order to isolate Russia.
But Washington’s rhetoric is
dangerously excessive, for three main reasons: Ukraine is far more important to
Vladimir V. Putin than it is to America; it will be hard for the United States
and Europe to make good on their threats of crippling sanctions; and other
countries could ultimately defang them.
First, the United States needs to
see the Ukraine crisis from Russia’s viewpoint. Threats from America and Europe
will never be the determining factor in Mr. Putin’s decision making. Ukraine is
Russia’s single biggest national security issue beyond its borders, and Mr.
Putin’s policy, including whether to seize more of Ukraine, will be informed
overwhelmingly by national security interests, not near-term economics.
Furthermore, Russia has provided
Ukraine with some $200-$300 billion in natural gas subsidies since 1991. With
an anti-Russian government in Ukraine, Moscow is likely to stop these
subsidies, lifting a major economic burden just as the West tries to squeeze it
financially. ... The Obama administration needs to preach what it will
ultimately practice. Otherwise Washington’s credibility will erode further as
it walks back its words.
~
A reflection on the break-up of the Soviet bloc, in longer historical perspective, by a European with no reason to be an apologist for Russia:
The strange, self-initiated
dismantling of that system after 1985, culminating in the total un-shackling of
Eastern Europe in 1989, has led to a situation similar to that which followed
the dismantling of the Habsburg Empire. … It would seem that some solution
along the lines proposed by Malinowski
is the only humane one, the only one with some prospect of
implementation without major loss of life. Colonise simply
everybody -- i.e. deprive their political units of sovereignty -- whilst
allowing them absolute cultural freedom of expression.
-- Ernest Gellner, Language and
Solitude (posthum. 1998), p. 143
[Update 14 September 2014] In the Book Review of this morning’s New York Times, John Micklethwaite has a punchy,
perceptive review of Henry Kissenger’s new book, World Order. Both reviewer and
author champion Realpolitik:
Might a little realism have been
useful in Iraq, rather than the “stuff happens” amateurism of the Bush years?
Would a statesman who read Winston Churchill on Afghanistan (“except at harvest
time . . . the Pathan [Pashtun] tribes are always engaged in private or public
war”) have committed America to establishing a “gender sensitive . . . and
fully representative” government in Kabul?
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/books/review/henry-kissingers-world-order.html?ref=books&_r=0
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