[I have noticed that some people fight shy of long essays --
doubtless an effect of the syndrome lamented here. Accordingly, as an experiment, we shall intitially put up
just a bit -- a “stub”, in Wikipedia’s terminology; or, as Professor Malkiel loved to say, a “torso” -- adding
to it as the days go by,
as the moon rises and the sun sets,
as the leaves
fly off the calendar in the
winds of Time ...]
The ontology, then, of “linguistics”: and not, note, of “language”. Similarly, we may speak of the
Ontology of Psychology (and not of the psyche), the Ontology of Geology (and
not of the Earth). All That
Is, is what it is; “I am that I
am”. But for purposes of
this or that variety of study, we structure things. Such structures are constrained by what is Out There, but
are not straightforwardly or uniquely determined.)
So, first of all:
‘What is linguistics?’
(We cannot pose this tiresome question, save in squotes,
just as we did for ‘What is Mathematics?’)
Two candidates present themselves:
(I) Linguistics is the
study of language.
(II) Linguistics is the
study of languages.
In many modern perspectives, these are distinct. And each, in its own way, is problematic.
(I) Already
with Saussure if not before, the nature of the pre-theoretical notion
‘language’ (langage) was split, for
precision, into langue and parole. Subsequently, this basic bifurcation acquired theoretical
heft with, in one corner (in the red trunks) those championing “I-language” and
the innate “Language Acquisition Device”, versus (in the blue trunks)
corpus-mavens, connectionists, frequentists, “usage-based” grammarians, and
other sundry nominalists. For a
riposte to the latter, confer Frederick Newmeyer, whose tautologically-titled
essay “Grammar is Grammar and Usage is Usage” (in Language, 2003), makes
many useful points.
(II) This
formulation is less problematic, as being less ambitious, and more
traditional. Indeed we may
say: Philology is to languages, as linguistics (in the
contemporary sense) is to language-tout-court. But then we are faced with
the question, what is “a
language” -- as opposed to a
different one, or a dialect, or some other semantic signaling system. And there we meet disagreements once
again.
~ Recommendation
posthume ~
“Si j’étais encore en
vie, et que je désirais un bon
whodunnit,
que lirais-je?"
(Je suis Ferdinand de
Saussure, et j’ai approuvé ce message)
~
This antinomy of language-per-se
versus languages, has become acute since
Chomsky, who has little interest in the endless gabble of actual tongues. If this seems an extreme position, it
is nonetheless exactly parallel to that of physicists, who seek general
physical laws, rather than endless
descriptions of individual objects falling or rolling or spinning or colliding
or what have you.
Chomsky bitingly writes:
The grammar is a function-in-intension … the language is epiphenomenal.
Its ontological status is the same as that of a set of
pairs of expressions that rhyme.
-- Noam Chomsky, Rules and
Representations, p. 83
Here he is using language
in the sense of ‘parole’ and not ‘langue’. But, epigrammatically, it is startling to see language as of but peripheral interest
to linguistics.
~
Marveling at the philosopher’s opacity, two
linguists write:
In a recent article, Ryle even
claims that sentences are not part of language,
but only of speech.
--Jerry Fodor & Jerrold Katz,
eds., introduction to The Structure of Language (1964), p. 11
Yet Chomsky would later also demote much of what
was traditionally thought of as language,
to a second-class status as “E-language”.
~
The units of social life are far less clearly defined than those of
language … Linguists are fortunate in possessing a domain whose units are at
least relatively self-defining and isolable.
-- Ernest Gellner, Contemporary
Thought and Politics (1978), p. 82
The minimal unit of spoken language
is not the sentence, but the utterance or intonation unit.
-- William Bright, ed. International Encyclopedia of
Linguistics (1992), vol. IV p. 11
Schuchardt enquires, “What is
dialect?” -- the neogrammarians having used the term in formulating their
theories -- and shows that it is an abstract notion, with no real existence.
-- I. Iordan & John Orr, An
Introduction to Romance Linguistics (1937), p. 32
With similar vigour, Schuchardt
opposes the notion of ‘linguistic periods’ .. Just as there are no fixed
boundaries between different vernaculars, so the chronological boundaries
between successive periods of a language
are purely fictions of our minds.
-- I. Iordan & John Orr, An
Introduction to Romance Linguistics (1937), p. 33
And indeed:
Die Gesamtsprache ist etwas
Abstraktes, ebenso wie die Gesamtseele
gegenüber der Individualseele.
-- Leo Spitzer, ed., Hugo
Schuchardt-Brevier (1921; 2nd edn. 1928), p. 386
The term language is … a relatively nontechnical term. If we wish to be more rigorous .. we
have to employ other terminology.
We shall use variety as a
neutral term to apply to any
particular kind of language which we wish … to consider as a single entity.
--J.K. Chambers & Peter
Trudgill, Dialectology (1980), p. 5
(Ontologically/methodologically, this picture is not
particularly reassuring.)
Structural linguistics has a favored suffix to denote status
as a unit in the ontology or theoretical apparatus: -eme. Familiar (though embattled) are the phoneme and morpheme; lexeme
(roughly: dictionary headword, so that eat and ate are part of one ‘lexeme’
even if you might call them different ‘words’ in one of the senses of that
pre-theoretical term). Hjelmslev
proposed seme (or sememe), as the atomic unit of sense
(the ‘semantic atom’), though these do virtually no work; and, getting into the borderline-silly
spirit of the thing, from outside of linguistics Richard Dawkins coined meme.
~
The ontological status of ‘meanings’:
Quine is quite correct in
protesting that meanings are not entities.
-- Harold Lee, “Discourse and
Event”, in: Hahn & Schilpp, eds., The Philosophy of W. V. Quine
(1986), p.
One might have thought that being an ‘entity’ would be rather a low bar.
(I recall one smitten young man, back in Berkeley in the
1970s, pleading with her whom he adored, “What do I mean to you?” -- And
she replied, wrinkling her young brow and thinking hard, “Well, … you’re a person
….” )
It goes even lower:
Though we sometimes need to
conceive meanings timelessly, we
do not therefore need to conceive them as subsistent
entitities.
-- Jonathan Cohen, The Diversity
of Meaning (1963), p. 161
(“Subsistent”:
cf. Meinong. Actually,
“subsisting” is a very low bar, lower than “existing” entities.)
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