To begin, explicit talk of structural units:
The unit of social intercourse is
called a transaction.
-- Eric Berne, Games People Play
(1964)
Whence the label for the analytic/therapeutic movement he
launched, “Transactional Analysis”.
Birdwhistell calls each of these
movements a kine, or the smallest
recordable movement.
-- Julius Fast, Body Language
(1970)
… the collective unconscious and the functional units of which it is composed -- the archetypes.
-- Anthony Stevens, Jung: A Very
Short Introduction (1994), p. 47
~
The notion of a culture unit, the most
basic element of all, has been around for over thirty years, and has been
dubbed by different authors
variously as mnemotype, idea,
idene, meme, sociogene, concept, culturgen, and culture type. The one
label that has caught on the most, and for which I now vote to be winner, is meme.
Edward O. Wilson, Consilience
(1998), p. 136
Actually, in anthropological and folkloristic structuralism,
the notion of such units has been around rather longer than that -- Wilson
cites an example himself, George Murdoch’s “classic 1945 compendium”. -- Anyhow, Wilson believes that, by
working with such postulated units (how like an atom; how like a gene) we may
pursue “the central program of consilience, in this instance the causal
connections between semiotics and biology."
Causal, note; strong stuff. Even physics has in many areas backed off from this
terminology of the one-way street.
(What caused the pion to decay
at that precise instant, rather than another? Um…)
~
Psychiatry, like any branch of medicine, seeks to heal. And though a priori ills need not come packaged in discrete categories, it is so
much more convenient if they are.
Character disorders do not form a nosological unit.
-- Otto Fenichel,
The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (1945), p. 539
The old pathological approach, which
persists in general psychiatry to this day, describes mental illnesses as distinct ‘entia’, each presenting a
specific clinical picture.
-- Anthony Stevens, Jung: A Very
Short Introduction (1994), p. 123
The taxonomy of physical nosology was aided by the discovery
of pathogens, freeing the clinician from the
ambiguities of symptomatology.
Where these are absent or multiple, the disease is often ill-defined --
cf. the complexus of the various cancers.
A historical example:
As to the nosological status of paranoia, Freud agreed with Kraepelin that it
should be grouped together with the various forms of dementia praecox, rather
than being a distinct entity.
-- Ernest Jones, Freud: Years of
Maturity (1955), p. 271
Psychiatry gets even less guidance from microbiology or
histology, leaving its taxonomic task problematic. The attempt is made, nonetheless, every several years,
to formalize this down to the last detail, in the much-discussion DSM -- the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders. Aetiologically problematic to
begin with, their stabs at classification have by now been largely divorced
from genuine science, the DSM serving mainly simply as a tool for getting
reimbursed by insurance companies, rather than any actual assistance to the diagnostician. The whole enterprise descends to
the level of a reductio, as various
prickly pressure-groups veto the identification of the misbehaviors that typify
them. These, then, are meekly
deleted. (The labels vanish; the behaviors persist.) Yet the protestors have
won but a Pyrrhic victory, as they still need treatment, and want to be covered
by insurance; hence the medical
profession must invent euphemistic new categories to cover the old territory.
“There are no schizophrenics;
there are People with
Schizophrenia.”
-- Elyn Saks, 2013; professor of law, and herself a schizophrenic
That slogan, although posing as the denial of the existence
of a certain class of entities, while affirming that of another (oddly,
coextensive with the one that supposedly does not exist), has actually nothing to do with
ontology, but is simply a familiar move
in the game of rhetorical manipulation by interest groups. Whether schizophrenia
does or does not form a “nosological unit”, is a very open question; but this “People With …” ploy is a mere quibble.
A sort of upside-down version of that rhetorical move, from general
medicine rather than psychiatry:
Even the hard-headed authors of
current medical textbooks
sometimses find it necessary to inform their readers that [quoting from
a 1953 text] ‘there is no disease, only the diseased … disease has no real existence.’
-- Jonathan Cohen, The Diversity
of Meaning (1963), p.
138
~
While we’re (sort of) on the subject -- savor this tragic
disorder which The World of Doctor Justice was the first in the world to
identify: Oligophrenia mathematica. I shall be lobbying for its inclusion in
the next edition of the DSM, and expect gigantic retroactive payouts from my
insurance company.
[Update 1 Aug 2013] The current issue of the London Review of Books has an article by Ian Hacking on the new DSM-V. He acutely quotes Darwin saying: “All true classification is geneological”. For nosological taxonomy, whether physical or psychiatric, that translates to aetiological. And, remarkably, the NIMH has suddenly taken this philosophico-methodological precept to heart, having announced, just a week before the DSM-V was released (and thus rather spoiling the launch), “that it was going to abandon the DSM because it dealt only with symptoms.”
[Update 1 Aug 2013] The current issue of the London Review of Books has an article by Ian Hacking on the new DSM-V. He acutely quotes Darwin saying: “All true classification is geneological”. For nosological taxonomy, whether physical or psychiatric, that translates to aetiological. And, remarkably, the NIMH has suddenly taken this philosophico-methodological precept to heart, having announced, just a week before the DSM-V was released (and thus rather spoiling the launch), “that it was going to abandon the DSM because it dealt only with symptoms.”
*
For an ususual sort
of psychological thriller,
try this
Murphy Calls In a
Specialist
*
[Psycho-sociological appendix]
The more intensively we analyze the
“self system”, the the more apparent it becomes that the true unit in the social process is not
the biological entity comprised of man the organism: rather, each unit is a person-to-person context.
-- Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology
and Politics (1930; 2nd edn. 1960; re-issued 1977), p. 287
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