Showing posts with label analytic philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label analytic philosophy. Show all posts

Sunday, May 10, 2020

Informative tautologies (updated)


Technically, for a logician, or a semanticist of the Snow-is-White school, tautologies convey no information;  but to linguists and pragmaticians, in context they often do.  In fact, we may state that they usually do, since otherwise why utter them?  “Business is business” is flint-hearted;  “Boys will be boys”, tenderly exculpatory.

The opposite of an utterance that pretends to contain no information (and thus, in particular, to be inexpugnable) but actually does (and often of a trenchant sort), is a definition that, ex cathedra, is all about informing, but which melts to the touch.  Cf. our essay here:

~
Covertly vacuous uses of technical-sounding terms  have been scouted in histories of science.  As, “Things fall because of gravity, and rise because of levity.” Or Molière’s virtus dormitiva.  But more may be packed into such terms than may be initially apparent.  As, one philosopher pointed out that “The ball rebounded to the height that it did  because of its resiliency.”  But this is informative:  the height is owing to internal characteristics of that ball, rather than from the ball’s having been dropped from a greater height, or having been dropped on a more resilient surface.


Additionally, the initial tautological character of a sentence can  so to speak  “age off”, in accordance with semantic evolution of its terms. Thus, “Atoms are indivisible” was initially as circular as “Bachelors are unmarried”, since they were defined from the outset as indivisibilia (as their name, a-tom, etymologically implies).  But on its current interpretation, the sentence would qualify as false.

A mathematician looks at Newton’s Definition 1, in the Principia:

Quantity of matter is a measure of matter that arises from its density and volume jointly.

Great acumen is hardly needed to realize that this definition is hopelessly circular, since density is normally defined as the ration of mass to volume;  but Newton’s unhelpful phrase  does have some implicit implications.  For example, we expect the mass of an object to remain unchanged if we change its shape.
-- Michael Spivak, Physics for Mathematicians: Mechanics I (2010), p. 9
~

A 2015  example of the uses of tautology:

Robert Buissière on Médi1, re Presidential candidates:

Jeb Bush, frère de son frère,
et Hillary Clinton,  épouse de son époux.

As they stand, these statements are “analytic”; but we understand the import:  Jeb and Hillary got where they are today, largely owing to family association.

Cf. & contrast the common expression “He is his father’s son.”  Normally this means that he takes after his Dad, and not that he is getting any special favors from other people owing to that filiation.  To imply the latter, you might say “Daddy’s little boy” or something.  By contrast, the French phrases in the above context  do not imply that Jeb’s politics are a close match to Dubya’s, let alone that Hillary’s are a close match to Bill’s.


~

A bare tautology like “Business is business”, as a free-standing statement, invites contentful interpretation via a “Gricean implicature” (specifically, the Maxim of Quantity).   The following is a syntactically more complex case, there the tautology is embedded in a subordinate clause:

Ever since self was self, nature been keepin’ folks off of red-hot stoves.
-- Zora Neale Hurston, Their Eyes Were Watching God (1937)

The meaning is:  Common sense has been extant  from time immemorial.  Operationally, the (tongue-in-cheek) interpretation is:  Go back and back in time, sampling as you go. For each sample-point, verify whether  “self = self” holds at that time; and if so, then evaluate “Common Sense is in effect? Y/N”.  The sentence, for all its folksiness, has a kind of philosophy-class spin to it; the moreso as “self = self” calls up First-Order Logic with Identity.


~

Stylistic appreciation

Usually there is a summary “That’s that” finality to tautologies, whether used informatively or not;  stylistically, they are bare-bones.  But consider this:

Herod:  The moon has a strange look tonight. … She reels through the clouds like a drunken woman. … Does she not reel like a drunken woman?  She is like a madwoman, is she not?
Herodias:  No;  the moon is like the moon, that is all.

-- Oscar Wilde, Salomé (1891)

Here the barrenness of the pale white, plain round  far-floating body, is reflected in the unyielding tautological formula.


~

Enten-Eller

Philosophers have scribbled  much ink, and later worn out many a typewriter ribbon, and finally expended great bushels of pixels, discoursing upon the status of “logical truths”; such as, paradigmatically, the following:

            (I) Every man is either married or a bachelor.

(We simplify, since the matter is not really of interest; leaving out of account, for instance, the curious case of Schrödinger’s groom.)
It is agreed that such a sentence tells us nothing about the world, unlike that time-honored exemplar of informativeness,

            (II)  The cat is on the mat.

which has been so oft repeated. down the years, that said cat has achieved the immobility and timelessness of an Egyptian idol.  (Presumably the mat lies in a patch of sunlight, so why ever move?)

            And yet its affordances are quite different from those of another statement of the same logical form; say:

            (II) Every number is either even or odd.

For, although the sentence (I) does not perhaps baldly state anything substantive about the world, its presuppositions speak volumes.  For one thing, it gives us to understand that there is a sharply defined institution, Marriage, into which a man may enter or not; and that his resultant state is either-or. Even so much will give our Martian anthropologists  sufficient grist  for many turns of the mill.


~

The above are mostly individual linguistic parlor-tricks.  Much more generally, there is the matter of the status of the equations of mathematics.  A view put forward by the dessicated and ennervating tendency called formalist (nominalistmaintained that, being mathematical, they are tautologies, and being tautologies, they are uninformative -- semantically vacuous.  Practical experience shows that doctrine to be false.  As a way to see how such equations manage to be informative, consider the number pi.
Pi can be defined, qualitatively, in a number of different ways, most familiarly as the ratio of a circle’s circumference to is diameter.  It  is, moreover, a Given of the invisibilia, woven into the fabric of the noöspheric pattern;  and -- crucially -- it can be reached in a startling variety of precise quantitative ways, along this strand or that of the warp and the woof -- and the woorp and the wahf, along any of the dimensions of the multidimensional mathematical textile.   Pi is itself ever one, the peak of the Golden Mountain;  but the paths that climb to it are numberless.  It can be expressed as a definite integral; as an infinite continued fraction; as an infinite product; as an infinite sum; with many variations of each.  (Behold some of them at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pi.)  That fact that any one of these equals π is informative and indeed amazing, for in effect each one constitutes hiking instructions -- a trail-map -- to the summit, each from a wildly different base-camp.  And each one of these infinitely intricate expressions  is equal to any other, in an equation which is as distant from tautological or uninformative as can be imagined.


~

[Update 13 May 2020]  An aborbing article by Evan Osnos, in the 11 May 2020 issue of The New Yorker, maps out the paths by which the Greenwich Connecticut  tennis-and-boating-club crowd  came to support Trump.  The notables of that town have a patrician heritage, in principle at variance with the flashy style of the vulgarian from the Bronx, but as one blue-blood testifies, his conversion came while witnessing an early speech by the candidate:  “He had that line that he would use: ‘Folks, we either have a country or we don’t.’ And I felt the chill .. I’m, like, ‘Oh, my God, this is a really good line.’

Apart from the formally tautological character of that line, it puzzles by its vagueness:  out of context, it is unclear what at all is being hinted at.  Presumably the line is a dog-whistle, a bit of Rorschach rhetoric from which the listener will extract whatever meaning he likes.

The line does nothing for me; but it does recall such successful political antecedents as “The business of America is business.”


~

[Update 14 May 2020] 
Some of you may be familiar with the British sport of trainspotting.  That may or may not be in accordance with current U.K. guidance on coronavirus lockdown.  But here’s a hobby you can practice in the safety and comfort of your own home:

Tautology-Spotting !

As:
Headline in this morning’s New York Times:

The People Behind the Counter Are People
Remember this the next time you order takeout.

That one recalls those sleep-inducing example-sentences from introductory logic class (All brave Athenians are Athenians).  But in this case, it has a punch, and the source of that punch is not logical but lexical.  For, people has a variety of senses;  from the neutrally classificatory

(a)  an instantiation of the species Homo sapiens, near-cousin of Pan troglodytes, sometimes known as “a forked radish”;

to the “pregnant sense”  (I phrase it freely)

(b)  an ensouled being created in the image of the Lord of Hosts, whom Christ died to redeem.

In the cited sentence, the first occurrence of the word people has the (a) meaning; the second occurrence, (b).

For more on perspectival semantics and pregnant senses, check out this essay:


~

In all the instances above, tautology is used in its traditional logico-philosophical sense.  But technical terms sometimes get picked up by a wider audience, where their use may be lax.  Thus, the literary critic V.S. Pritchett, in his article on the novelist Anthony Powell, wrote:

Mr. Powell is excellent with the raffish…. I think the sententious irony succeeds. … It adds a very English flavor, either of comic tautology or deflation.

The sense of tautology is unclear here.  Perhaps it refers to mechanical repetition, a standard component of broad humor.

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

When is the Task Force not the Task Force?


In May 2020, with the coronavirus still raging, President Trump said he was ready to “turn the page on all that”, and announced that the covid Task Force that had been led (apparently at the bottom of a mine-shaft somewhere) by the Vice-President (whose name  escapes me at present, and shall continue to do so in future) was being “disbanded”.  (In the French press reports of the anouncement, this verb was rendered démantelé -- ‘dismantled’, which sounds even more alarming.)  That offhand ad-lib caused consternation, so he “re-spoke” himself (verb ©WoDJ 2020, All Rights Reserved).  He now states that the Task Force will continue "indefinitely" -- albeit with substitute members and different mission. -- The young reporter who was obliged to recount all this on NPR, noticed a certain “philosophical question” here, whether this would be the “same” task force or not.

The philosophical problem alluded to  is that of Continuity of Identity, with many ramifications ancient and modern.  We have touched on some examples in these posts:


Meanwhile, herewith a handful of miscellaneous quotations, illustrating the variety of concerns:

Simon Blackburn (Think (1999), p. 127) quotes the joke about Irish axe that had been in the family for generations, the head having been replaced three times and the helve six; and asks whether Theseus’ ship, rebuilt plank by plank over the course of the voyage until no original molecule remained, was the “same” ship; and if so, what if someone had saved all the discarded planks and built a replica, this with all the original molecules, was that the “same” ship as well.

.

A modern example, with wry phrasing:

The truck had been a Renault back in the twenties, but had become, over time, a collection of replacement parts  cannibalized from every sort of machine.
-- Alan Furst, The Spies of Warsaw (2008), p. 146

And with a quite different topology:

The Romans who traversed the plains of Hungary  supposed that they passed several navigable rivers .. but there is reason to suspect that the winding stream of the Theiss  … might present itself in different places  under different names.
-- Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-1788)

Of current concern among Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers:

Since these world-lines define the individuals we quantify over when we use modal logic (more accurately, when we ‘quantify into’ modal contexts), we do not have well-defined individuals at our disposal in any realistically quantified modal logic.
-- Jaakko Hintikka, “Quine on Who’s Who”, in Hahn & Schilpp, eds., The Philosophy of W. V. Quine (1986), p. 210

The Quinean position (on the "block universe" picture):

The space-time view helps one appreciate that there is no reason why my first and fifth decades should not, like my head and foot, count as parts of the same man, however dissimilar.  There need be no unchanging kernel  to constitute me the same man  in both decades,  any more than there need be  some peculiarly Quinian textural quality, common to the protoplasm of my head and feet;  though both are possible.
-- W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (1960), p. 171


Monday, November 18, 2019

Betrachtungen eines Unphilosophischen (quater)




I don’t like purely philosophical works.  I think a little philosophy should be added to life and art, by way of seasoning;  but to make it one’s specialty  seems to me  as strange as eating nothing but horseradish.
-- Boris Pasternak, Doctor Zhivago (1957) (ch. XIII.16; Lara speaking)



Nicht vom Wetter spricht sie, nicht vom Schneider,
höchstens von den Grundproblemen  beider.
-- Christian Morgenstern

[I wrote the following around twenty years ago, before I was baptised.  Just stumbled on it while cleaning up some files. 
Since that time, I’ve read a fair amount of philosophy, often with pleasure, and dabbled in composing some.  But the treatment here of the cognitive problem does not need revision or retraction.]

I must conclude, reluctantly, that I am of a  not very philosophical cast of mind.  Intellectual, yes; thoughtful, I hope so; but philosophical, in the sense of spontaneously grappling with the questions that engage those denominated philosophers, alas not.
Had I never read a line of academic philosophy, I could contentedly have walked for seven decades down the lanes of life, kicking at stones and appreciating the trees, without once wondering, let alone worrying, whether a name denotes a universal, or rather a concept, rather than (snicker snicker) a thing. Left to my own devices, I would likely never have asked whether Being even had a nature. let alone what the bugger might be.

Such questions as these have never troubled my sleep; and it is only with the greatest difficulty than I can induce them to trouble my waking hours.  Yet we read, in the letters of our betters:

"What distinguishes a man from a word?  There is a distinction, doubtless."
--C.S. Pierce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities".

This I no more ponder than whether a hawk may be discerned from a handsaw -- indeed, it rather recalls the grotesque title of the neurologist Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat.  Yet Peirce concludes, alarmingly, that "The word or sign which man uses  is the man himself."  Should we be troubled by this?

Doing philosophy – well, I seldom do.  But when reading philosophy – something never undertaken save after a sound night's sleep, in the company of pots of strong coffee – I have often had the horrible experience of carefully lucidly processing each phrase of a sentence as it comes along, then finding, when I reach the sentence end, that the meanings of the initial phrases have evaporated:  as were intelligence but a porthole on a passing landscape, seizing each piece clearly as it looms into view, but at the expense of losing the last.  (That was rather a long sentence itself; let us pause.)
            (Pause.)
            Herewith a specific instance, taken from a little work in paperback (Arthur Danto, What Philosophy Is) known for being a relatively clear and non-technical introduction for the layman:
            "It is demonstrable that, for any system of sentences – any theory, say – which satisfies exceedingly weak and undemanding formal criteria, just this alleged desideratum can be achieved."
            This is not a long sentence; and for the first two-thirds of it, it actually calls up to me very visual ideas.  "Any system of sentences – any theory, say": I picture these sentences as speech-balloons, dangling from a mobile, with little hand-icons pointing at other sentences which they imply or from which they derive.  "Which satisfies exceedingly weak and undemanding formal criteria":  here our hypothetical theory is embodied as a sort of Doctor Watson, waving his hand with bluff good humor, in dismissal of the trifling demands made upon him: "No trouble at all, sir!"  And as for that initial "It is demonstrable that", well, we all know that "It is demonstrable that P" means (for the plain man) just that "P", and moreover gives you license to swallow P without troubling yourself to prove it or make it plausible, or even to understand it very deeply:  just one of those solid facts that people our Watsonian society, which the tradespeople have somehow seen to.
            Then comes "just this alleged desideratum".  Alas: this sends you haring back to the previous paragraph, or previous page.  And the "alleged" is troubling:  do we desire this (whatever it is), or do we not?  This centrifugal tension makes subtly more difficult the task of going back and finding the antecedent for "this".  It's not like "she": hmm, hmm, complicated, this, -- aha, Natasha Nikolayevna.
            Now:  one fact about philosophy, which makes the subject hard to follow, is rather to its credit.  Namely:  we never know what might be called into question.  So we can't just sit back and nod  as bits of received opinion are spooned into our open mouths.
            In many non-philosophical areas of life, we can count on so much that is unchallengeable, that their arguments are like sermons in a lazy church.  We can doze; we can idly watch the fly buzzing across the stained-glass windows; and miss nothing that is essential, for we have already all that is essential, the rest is embroidery.  As, in the radical Sixties, syllogism went rather like this.

Granted:
     (1) Amerikkka is a honkey-assed imperialist pig
     (2) The righteous Vietnamese people are righteous, popular, and Vietnamese.
From this it follows:
     (3) Blah de blah de blah de blah (rahht ohwn!) 
Everyone goes home satisfied.

What does it mean, to be "unphilosophical"?  It cannot spring simply from stupidity – which is a general term; too much counter-evidence in collateral fields.  Nor ignorance – not after having sat at the feet of the philosophical:  for, failure to absorb their wise lessons would have to be due either to stupidity (already ruled out of court) or "unphilosophicality" : quite possibly present, but this is the quality to be explained.  (I recall a case from some years ago, in which some Brazilian peasants, or Indians, were brought to trial for having killed quite a number of people: and were acquitted, on the grounds of "invincible ignorance".  A charming verdict; egomet etiam, nolo contendere; but again, this is the explicandum, not the explicans.)
            One possible partial explanation is that, apparently, despite gross this that and the other thing, I do actually, more or less, in some sense, believe in God.  This may even be largely unconscious, but it does determine things.  As:  Good heavens!  Here He went and made Eden for our grandsires to saunter in, and angels to attend our fallen birth – and you're worried about the existence of tables??!??!*  Get a life, man!  Get an afterlife!
[*On page 100 of Danto's booklet, we have an image of the philosophically inclined scientist  swallowing an atom  but straining at a table.]


It is a stylistic characteristic of the philosophic genre, that its reported combatants are generally abstract and shadowy, unnamed figures.  Not Gould vs Dawkins, or Quine vs Chomsky, but: the Realist; the Representationalist; the Phenomenalist, each with his separate agenda; curiously dispassionate partisans, like players in a masque. 
            In one sense, this should make for clarity.  As, I may know a whole bunch about Chomsky, or Chesterton, or Orwell, but it is different from the bunch of things known by disputant P., and different still from the sub-bunch of things that have caught P's attention in the present case.  Hence, when P. says: "….(Orwell)….", a million bells go off in my head, which may obscure his message.  Whereas, when the don refers to the Realist, there is no clanging, nothing to refer to but the Realist's résumé.
            And yet and yet… It is with this as with the medieval allegories, where ((Danger)) orates to ((Faithful)) anent ((Beauty)), and the eyes turn to glass.  These creatures have no form – no warts – no tits – it is difficult to attend, hard to become engaged.

            This lack of philosophical engagement has few consequences for the practical matters of life, such as renewing a driver's license.  Still, it bothers me.  For, philosophy is reputedly fundamental – indeed, is so virtually by definition.  Smart people are presumably interested in problems of ontology, while stupid people are interested in football scores.  [A surprisingly large number of smart people are interested in baseball.  This cannot, then, be an intellectual failing; but it may be a perversion.  The question remains open.]


*     *     *
~ Commercial break ~
We now return you to your regularly scheduled essay.

*     *     *

Yet I am troubled by questions of epistemology, for the good and simple reason that certain people whom I know  (those notorious Other Minds, in whose complete integrity I believe implicitly) seem to know (or say that they know) what I don't know; nor know I  how (or whether) they do know it.
As:
CEO (cigar clenched in right mouth-corner, speaking laconically out of the left):  Nyaahh… Dis noo magneddic-stawritch standid, it'll nevah catch on, da mahhkit'll riject it.
Me (thinks): How the F*** does he know that?!?!?

~

On a good day, then, and with a good book, I can – granted, not do, but at least – read philosophy, and engage with it:  an EKG would reveal busy little blips and bumps, I'm not just flatlining with the book open, the mental equivalent of an all-day sucker.  And admittedly, most of the enjoyment comes from the crackling style (as with Quine) or the apt examples (Strawson, Geach), rather than from any genuine penetration into the delicious mysteries of what it means, what it really means, to say that x equals (wait for it) x.  So the author of the book need not feel that his labor is wasted:  here is John Q. Public with his engine turning over and that author's very book in his hands (those hands which might equally as well have held a breast, or a beer).  And yet – the book once laid upon the night-table, all its arguments and all its concerns  go out like a light.
            It is not so with, say, poetry.  To read poetry before retiring is as dangerous as drinking espresso for a nightcap: I toss and turn, the lingering rhythms like a hot blanket, which cannot be cast off till I drag myself out of bed, snatch a bathrobe, and WRITE - WRITE - INDITE!  Whereas philosophical propositions  spark no further fever.  I lay down the volume, fall into a dreamless sleep, and perhaps the next day have some vague lingering recollection – "Yes, that 'x' thing, it was equal to, let me see, was it 'y'? -- no!  'x', that's it!  x = x.  My, the things one learns."  Or:  “Is it true, that snow is white?  Mmmm..mmyes!”

            Perhaps a policy of not asking overmany fundamental questions too often, is not so much intellectual laziness, as the better part of epistemological valor.  For, truly to nail down the simplest everyday phenomenon, is largely beyond the reach of science.
(Physics is really good at addressing problems that it invented itself, like muons;  not so much when it comes to snowflakes, or lightning, or wind.)

            In addition, when you go to the scientist, thou sluggard, you find him not exactly bent over the philosophy-of-science books either.   And this, not only among those sooty alley-dwellers the chemists, with their practical pots, but even those austere, unstained – theoretical physicists, nay, mathematicians.  Mathematics does not need metamathematics to go about its business, whether devising formulae that will predict the stresses of actual bridges, or proving theorems about ideal manifolds in n-space.  (We may define pure mathematics as the subject in which Bertrand Russell does not know what he is talking about, though what he says is none the less true.)

~     ~     ~

~  Posthumous Endorsement ~
"If I were alive today, and in the mood for a mystery,
this is what I'd be reading: "
(Ich bin Thomas Mann, and I approved this message.)
~        


Other  tragic examples:

Valéry était atteint  de cécité philosophique.
-- Etienne Gilson, Linguistique et philosophie (1969), p. 234

Freud himself  confessed to an insensitivity to philosophy -- or at any rate, to academic philosophizing -- after reading a book a colleague had recommended:

“You cannot imagine how alien all those philosophical convolutions  seem to me.   The only feeling of satisfaction they give me  is that I take no part in this pitiable waste of intellectual powers.  Philosophers no doubt believe that  in such studies  they are contributing to the development of human thought;  but every time, there is a psychological  or even a psychopathological problem  behind them.”
-- quoted in Ernest Jones, Freud: The Last Phase (1957), p. 140.

(Assignment:  How do these observations apply to the case of Wittgenstein?  Discuss)

Latest update:  
"Even when I have moved away from observation,  I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy proper.  This avoidance  has been greatly facilitated  by my constitutional incapacity."
--  quoted in Ernest Jones, Freud: The Last Phase (1957), p.335


Sunday, November 18, 2018

Gemmological Footnote


In 1955, the noted gemmologist and contrarian Sir Nelson Goodman, in a brief note published in the proceedings of the Devonshire Horticultural Society, questioned the received wisdom concerning the colour of emeralds.  “Everyone says that they are by nature green,” he noted, “simply because they have always been green.”  (Note that, in Sir Nelson’s quaint dialect, “been” and “green” actually rhyme.)  “But our observations to that effect, however numerous and of however long standing, may equally be marshaled to support the thesis that they are in fact grue:  which is to say, green prior to 18 November 2018, and blue thereafter.”

In the half century or more that has elapsed since that time, all sorts of philosophical fuss about “projectible predicates” and whatnot (green but not grue  enjoying this rather circular distinction), but in all of that, thinkers lost sight of the basic facts of the matter: are emeralds in fact green, or grue, or what?

We need wonder no longer, for the great day -- 18 November 2018 -- has arrived at last.

And it turns out that  last night, all over the planet, and into the deepest recesses of intersteller space, quite at the stroke of midnight, every last emerald  did in fact turn blue.  Or rather, “grue”.

So now we know.

Sunday, January 1, 2017

On Chocolate-Covered Pretzels


Why would anyone want to put chocolate on a pretzel,  frchrsk?
It’s a Category Mistake!

Monday, July 4, 2016

The Urysohn Metrization Theorem: a Perceptualist approach


At least since Locke, and down to our own day, an especially gormless form of empiricism, which we may call perceptualism, has held sway.
This theory is too boring even to summarize, let alone polemicize against, let alone analyze;  but -- credit where due -- we offer a

Perceptualist Proof of the UMT

(1)  I see … an array of color-patches, in my visual field. …  They form  (or so it seems to me, at this particular instant) … a topological space.

(2) They -- the pattern -- I see at once (unless I am but dreaming) -- it’s:  Regular !!

(3)  I focus on a single point (“Andrew”), and the topology there.  It has, one imagines, were there world enough and time to actually count and Booleanize all the open sets (1, 2, 3, …. ) a countable basis.
I try another point (“Bertha”):  likewise, the basis of the topology there is (let us say  -- obviously we could never really know this, any more than we can truly know that we have hands) countable.
Might this be the general case ??

(4) And -- yes! -- Charlie and Denise and Edmund and … all are graced with a topology enjoying a countable basis!   The space as a whole thus has one [NDLR: Fallacious step, but what do you expect] -- it’s Second-Countable !!!

(5)  And now … hoving in from beyond the horizon, as though from nowhere, it’s … look … a metric!  A very metric!  Hurrah!  The space is metrizable !!!!!!!

(6)  Q.E.D.

Sunday, April 10, 2016

An open-pattern ambiguity


Some words are ambiguous in unique, idiosyncratic ways:  e.g. pen (‘writing-implement’; ‘corral’; ‘female swan’; ‘penitentiary’);  these do not generalize in any sense.   Others, in ways more systematic, though still contingently gerrymandered over the lexicon as a whole: as, the actio/actum distinction of many verbal nouns, which has counterparts in many languages.

An ambiguity of the latter sort  I noticed just the other day.  Schematically,

& <the [Surname] of … [area of activity]>

I was reading (somewhat drowsily, candle guttering on the nightstand) a history of the early twentieth century,  and encountered the phrase

“the Nelson of the Russo-Japanese War”

My semi-befuddled brain (well prepped for noctural Lethe  by abundance of brandy, but less well fit for analysis) first apprehended this as referring to:  a certain Commodore or Admiral, active in the R-J war, and surnamed Nelson (by Christian name  a Clive, or a Bartholemew, as the case might be), but not to be confused with his more celebrated predecessor and namesake, Horatio Nelson. 
But the reference was to:  Admiral Togo.

~

I noticed that  while wearing my linguistic cap;  but upon re-reading, it stands revealed as but an instance of, or at least closely related to, the general topic of possible-world counterparts, and the sort of conundrums of counterfactuals discussed, for example, by Nelson Goodman in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.  As such, a philosopher will greet it with a nod of recognition, or perhaps a yawn.  But for the benefit of such of my readers who may have spent too few hours reading analytic philosophy, and too many playing “Angry Birds”, we offer it anyway, in all humility.

Saturday, July 25, 2015

Informative tautologies


Technically, for a logician, or a semanticist of the Snow-is-White school, tautologies convey no information;  but to linguists and pragmaticians, in context they often do.  In fact, we may state that they usually do, since otherwise why utter them?  “Business is business” is flint-hearted;  “Boys will be boys”, tenderly exculpatory.

The opposite of an utterance that pretends to contain no information (and thus, in particular, to be inexpugnable) but actually does (and often of a trenchant sort), is a definition that, ex cathedra, is all about informing, but which melts to the touch.  Cf. our essay here:

A recent example of the uses of tautology:

Robert Buissière on Médi1, re the  (presumable eventual) Presidential front-runners (after the Trumpwad has been flushed):

Jeb Bush, frère de son frère,
et Hillary Clinton,  épouse de son époux.

As they stand, these are “analytic”; but we understand the import:  Jeb and Hillary got where they are today, largely owing to family association.

Cf. & contrast the common expression “He is his father’s son.”  Normally this means that he takes after his Dad, and not that he is getting any special favors from other people owing to that filiation.  To imply the latter, you might say “Daddy’s little boy” or something.  By contrast, the French phrases in the above context  do not imply that Jeb’s politics are a close match to Dubya’s, let alone that Hillary’s are a close match to Bill’s.

For the full essay to which that is an appendix, click here:

Saturday, June 27, 2015

On Tarski’s “Convention T” (expanded)


Accolades:

Convention T embodies our best intuition as to how the concept of truth is used.
-- Donald Davidson

My lone dissent:

More boredom thou shalt never see
than Tarski’s Truth Convention T.
“Snow’s white” is true -- let’s get this right --
if, but only if,  snow is white.

A.T.,  logician and skirt-chaser
[Footnote]

When Tarski’s logical machinery is used to provide languages with an interpretation, it should not be seen as giving us a definition of truth. [Emphasis in original.]  When used in this way, it gives us a theory that, for each of the infinitely many sentences of the language, assigns a condition that obtains if and only if that sentence is true -- where truth is something we takes ourselves to understand antecedently, without definition.
-- Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century (2003), vol. II, p. 293

For a major empirical research program, investigating the validity of Convention T, click here.
 
 ~

A fellow dissenter:

See for example the panegyrics in Wallace:  “It may strike the reader that Convention T is an astonishingly powerful intellectual device…” (etc.)  Wallace’s expressed admiration for the achievements of modern logic  is of course sincere, and I share it (not always for his reasons).  But these achievements should not be used to terrorize the reader …
-- Saul Kripke, “Substitutional Quantification”, in Evans & McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning (1976), p. 340


Saturday, January 24, 2015

Pugnaciously vacuous definitions


At the beginning of his preface to the introductory exposition Philosophy of Logic (1970),  W.V.O. Quine quotes Tweedledee:

“Contrariwise, if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn’t, it ain’t.  That’s logic.”

That was a bit of nineteenth century donnish waggery (though it does give rather the flavor of modal logics and possible-world semantics  in our own day).

Quine then drolly goes on:

If pressed to supplement Tweedledee’s ostensive definition of logic  with a discursive definition of the same subject, I would say that logic is the systematic study of the logical truths.

We pause for Homeric laughter.
Anyone schooled in the lore of Russell’s paradox and impredicative definitions, will recognize that the professor is having his fun.

He then has some more:

Pressed further, I would say that a sentence is logically true  if all sentences with its grammatical structure are true.  Pressed further still, I would say to read this book.

(Ah!  ‘Tis a plaint  we ourselves have often made:  Buy my books!)



[Note:  Contrast the  equally terse but quite unselfreferential definition of logic in
R. Goldblatt, Topoi , 2nd edn. 1984:  “the study of the canons of deductive reasoning”.  Word for word, that’s very good.]


The jest is not without a subtle content, assuming as it tacitly does that there are such things as logical truths (a subject we see in a different light after Quine’s own extended attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction).   And it is quite in line with Quine’s celebrated existential bon mot:

    “To be is to be the value of a variable.”

To non-initiates, that will be mystifying;  to semi-initiates, cheeky; to familiar navigators of Quinespace, an ultra-compact allusion to his perennial concern with ontology in relation to quantification.

Put more pugnaciously:

Existence is -- what existential quantification expresses.
 -- W.V.O. Quine, “Existence and Quantification” 
~

The celebrated Cambridge Philosopher of Bland, G. E. Moore, wrote in his Principia Ethica:

If I am asked, “What is good?”, my answer is:  Good is good;  and that is the end of the matter.

That is:  If you have to ask, I can’t tell you.  (Even so, that pseudo-definition is preferable to the nihilist/reductionist dismissal by the Eliminative Materialists.)



Indeed, I shall now venture a definition  quite in Moore’s spirit:

Truth is … what is true (and known to God as such), quite apart from human-knowability, let alone provability (whether by finitistic, intuitionistic, or classical means).
~
From a college textbook:

A measure space consists of a set X equipped with two fundamental objects:
(1) a σ-algebra M of “measurable” sets, which is a non-empty collection of subsets of X closed under complements and countable unions and intersections.
(2) A measure μ: M -> [0, ∞] with the following defining property …
-- Elias Stein & Rami Shakarchi, Real Analysis (2005), p. 263

The bolded terms are there defined; but the term measurable sets is not -- the clause that follows reminds us of the definition of a σ-algebra instead.  The authors acknowledge their sleight-of-hand (effectively remedied by material elsewhere in the book) by placing the offending word in quotation marks. -- Note that this typographic care exemplifies the semantic Akribie of math writers, which we have elsewhere praised.




Not all math authors are as onomastically aware as those.  As:

Old-fashioned text-books  tend to start off with mystifying definition of these terms:  Euclid’s own definition,  “A point is that which has no part”, is a good example.  After a perfunctory discussion of these, the author clears his throat, begins a new chapter, and gets going with some concrete examples:  the definitions are mercifully forgotten.
-- Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science (1953), p. 72

~

To define -- literally, ‘delimit’ -- is by way of penning-in the definiendum with antecedently familiar landmarks.   To say that none such exist, is to refuse definition;  as in this classic hymn:

There is nothin' like a dame,
Nothin' -- in -  the -  world,
There is nothin' you can name
That is anything like a dame!
-- “South Pacific”



By this point  we have passed definitely from the realm of Oxbridge drollery to that of Joe on the Boat.  And here, indeed, we discover a whole subculture of definitional legerdemain, noticed in the delightful Dictionary of American Slang, by Wentworth & Flexner (1967).   In the Supplement we find this entry:

blivit   (n.)
   Anything unnecessary, confused, or annoying.  Lit. defined as “10 pounds of shit in a 5-pound bag.”  Orig. W.W. II Army use.  The word is seldom heard except when the speaker uses it in order to define it;  hence the word is actually a joke.


As a former harmless-drudge chez Merriam-Webster, I salute that as a gem of the lexicographic art.


A classic development of the pugnaciously uncooperative definition -- Lexicography with an Attitude -- is The Devil’s Dictionary, by Ambrose Bierce.  (Sample:  fork: an instrument for putting pieces of dead animals into the mouth.”)  Similarly impish was Hobbes’ definition of paradox:  “an opinion not yet generally received”.



A Pugnaciously Vacuous definition of the meaning of life  can be viewed here:
~

Quite other than such conscious humor, are cases like this:

Hamilton follows the Kantian notion of time closely in his “Essay on Algebra as the Science of Pure Time”.  Since the inner sense of time is more general than the outer sense of space, Hamilton concludes that algebra is a more general and fundamental branch of mathematics than geometry.
-- Thomas Hankins, Sir William Rowan Hamilton (1980), p. 268

As the discoverer of quaternions, Hamilton has as much right as anyone to deliver himself of after-dinner remarks (a genre of public speaking to which he was particularly devoted) about the nature of algebra;  but this one is horse-hockey.
 

(Psychohistorical note:  Hamilton was for a time utterly immersed in Kant;  this characterization of algebra as the “Science of Pure Time” stems from psycho-philosophical exuberance, rather than algebraical expertise. 
A curious tentative parallel might be made with Hamilton’s countryman G.K. Chesteron, who likewise was given to flights of literary exuberance;  both were in marital situations requiring a great deal of self-sacrifice,  which they met with infinite patience;  and both were given to a kind of idealism  which some might diagnose as compensatory.
Okay, beyond our pay-grade.  Yet as Silvan Schweber affirms in his perceptive review [Isis, 1982] of this exemplary socioscientific biography:  “Hankins has eschewed giving psychoanalytical interpretations, [but] to anyone interested in the psychodynamics of creativity, William Rowan Hamilton presents a fascinating case study.”)

~

Another subcategory -- already bordered on by Hamilton’s epigram for the definition of algebra -- is formed by definitions which, while not vacuous, we might label Pugnaciously Perverse.   The poet Coleridge was (unfortunately) Hamilton’s philosophical mentor, even as regards what Science ought to be; and he defined that subject  thus:

“any chain of truths which are either absolutely certain, or necessarily true for the human mind, from the laws and constitution of the mind itself.  In neither case is our conviction derived, or capable of receiving any addition, from outward experience, or empirical data.”
-- Thomas Hankins, Sir William Rowan Hamilton (1980), p. 268

(That first sentence does oddly prefigure the sort of prose  churned out by the truckload by the epigones of Donald Davidson.  -- Note too the anticipation of Post-Modernism.)


~

Another non-cooperative move in the orismological game, is pooh-poohing the very definiendum -- denying that there is anything coherent to define.  One Christian writer (C.S. Lewis or Hilaire Belloc, I forget which) once said testily, that the notion of “the Renaissance” was a will-o’-the-wisp, used  by secular writers to mean “whatever I like that happened in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.”

~

Composing a truly vacuous definition  is harder than you’d think.
Thus, consider the Euclidean definition of a point (“that which has no part”) which our philosopher friend scoffed at;  and let us phrase it even more egregiously:

point:  a point-like figure

That actually has cognitive content.  It means:  To visualize what is meant when geometers refer to a punctum (as opposed to a linea, etc.), think of something like a pencil-point.  Do not think of something like a dance-floor, or the cosmos, or an elephant.

And:

set:  a set of elements

Here the definition is so far from vacuous that someone could reasonably object that it is actually false, since it excludes the null-set.   (In this ‘definition’, the stress, so to speak, is on “elements”; “set” could be replaced by “bunch” or “passle” or “bucketload”.)

For indeed:

There is no direct circularity  if we presuppose sets in our study of sets (or induction in our study of induction), since the first occurrence of the word is in the metalanguage, the second in the object language.
-- Michael Potter, Set Theory and its Philosophy (2004) , p. 9


In further defense of impredicativity:

Impredicative definitions are necessary for ordinary mathematics, as they are unproblematic if one adopts a realist attitude about the objects defined -- realist in just the sense that the objects exist in advance of the definitions, that they are picked out by the definitions, not created by them.  That imposes a substantial constraint on any acceptable philosophy of mathematics.
-- Shaughan Lavine, Understanding the Infinite (1994), p. 107

~

The grandfather of all tautological definitions is the one given by Yahweh in Exodus: 

~ ~ ~  I  Am   That  I  Am  ~ ~ ~

Yet at the same time, that is the best definition that could be given, since, in a common view of the Abrahamic religions, any limitative predication would be false.   (That view led in particular to the via negativa,  which insisted on the denial of all suggested predicates of the One.)

~

Another style of coyness with definition  is illustrated in the following, immediately after the authors have introduced Maxwell’s Equations  for E and H in free space:

At first we do not attempt to give physical meaning to these symbols.  We merely say:  let us assume that there exist physical quantities represented by symbols having the indicated properties, and see what these equations say about the quantities.  From the last two equations [to the effect that E and H -- whatever they might be -- have divergence zero], it is clear that E and H are solenoidal
-- Robert Lindsay & Henry Margenau, Foundations of Physics (1936), p. 303

After a few pages of discussion, the authors summarize:

In a very real sense, therefore, these equations may be said to constitute a definition of E and H.
-- Robert Lindsay & Henry Margenau, Foundations of Physics (1936), p. 306

Thus, back where we began.  The dangled definition in intuitive terms, is ultimately withheld:   No dessert until you finish your broccoli;  then -- Your broccoli was your dessert.

They subsequently reinforce the apophatic stance:

Physical meaning of E and H:  … The only real importance of the quantities is involved in the fact that they satisfy the field equations. … It seems most logical to go the whole way and treat E and H as defined by the field equations in all cases.  The commoner definitions can then be looked upon as mere picturizations. -- Robert Lindsay & Henry Margenau, Foundations of Physics (1936), p. 311

E & H:  They Are That They Are.


~

Lakatos offers his translation of an epigram from Poincaré:

    Mathematics is the art of giving the same name to different things.

Now, that is not vacuous (i.e., vacuously true, or anyhow only infinitessimally informative), since it is egregiously false;  but it is a witticism, not a blooper, since we all know that Poincaré was perhaps the leading mathematician of his time -- he has some cards up his sleeve, which he will slip out when it suits him.

For a series of essays on the art of definition, with especial reference to math,
try these:
http://worldofdrjustice.blogspot.com/search/label/definition